




Education International

Public Private Partnerships in Education



A report by
Education International

September 2009



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*Is education about giving each child, each young person,
the opportunity to develop his or her full potential
as a person and as a member of society?
Or is education to be a service sold to clients, who are considered
from a young age to be consumers and target for marketing?*

Fred van Leeuwen, 2007

FOREWORD

There can be little doubt about the importance and relevance of this study for education unions and their members. We trust that the material summarized in this report will serve EI and the member unions well as they deal with the challenges presented by the strong and varied trends toward greater involvement of the private sector in public education.

The taskforce has undertaken substantial research. Our report is presented to the Executive Board with Conclusions derived both from this research and from the reflections of the taskforce. Based on them, we submit 15 Recommendations for consideration by the Board.

The work of the taskforce began with Mary Futrell, EI Founding President, in the chair. While Mary had to withdraw subsequently for personal reasons, she played a significant role in defining the outline for the project during and after the EI World Congress of 2007 in Berlin, and followed the work closely.

We wish to acknowledge the support of the Hans Boekler Stiftung, based in Dusseldorf, Germany, for the grant to the EI Research Institute which made it possible to undertake the research, particularly with EI member unions, with a level of scientific depth that broke new ground for our Global Union Federation and facilitated significant synergy between research at the national and the global levels. We express appreciation to the International Labour Organization and the World Economic Forum for hosting the first meeting in Geneva and for the helpful contributions of their senior officials on that occasion.

We would like to express the warm appreciation of the taskforce for the very substantial body of research undertaken by Edlira Xhafa, one of the first graduates of the Global Labour University, who pursued the task with enthusiasm and dedication. Our thanks go also to Guntars Catlaks, EI Research Coordinator, for advice and assistance throughout the project, to Laura Figazzolo for her help with the demanding task of editing, to Timo Linsenmaier, who set up and maintained an innovative PPPs web-page on the EI Web-site, and to Christine Chappuis, who not only looked after administrative arrangements for meetings and ensured our frequent communications, but also typed drafts and redrafts of the chapters and the final report.

As the work developed, research studies and then drafts were posted on the PPPs web-page for consultation, and the taskforce received considerable helpful input from members of the Reference Group and members of the EI Research Network.



In accordance with the Terms of Reference set by the Executive Board, we trust that the Board will find the study to be useful for the development of EI policy, and that the report will be widely disseminated for the use of EI member organizations throughout the world.

Respectfully

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Chair

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Available on-line <http://www.ei-ie.org/research>

Under documentation: **Summary of major findings of the survey of EI member organizations**



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The **first section** in chapters 1 and 2 of the paper sets the context for the discussion of PPPs in education and seeks to clarify issues around definitions of the term. Although the participation of the private sector in education has a long history, the concept of PPPs today is more related to the ideological wave of the last three decades – i.e. giving an increasing space to the private sector in delivering public services, but also in using public funds. The reasons for this move may differ depending on the economic and political environment of each country, but generally result in an increasing role of the private sector in providing public education.

The review of definitions of PPPs in academic literature found the term to be rather loose and complex. There is no real consensus. Indications on the meaning of the term “PPPs in education” may be traced from classifications advanced by some agencies and writers. A review of the literature observed that infrastructure PPPs were most often used to describe PPP arrangements. In general, there is a tendency to present PPPs as an umbrella term for any type of private participation in public education, covering a spectrum of arrangements from completely public to almost completely private provision of education. However, PPPs are not meant to describe private provision of education per se – for example, in private schools.

Recently, there has been a strong push for PPPs in many countries. Exploring the political processes behind this shift in the provision of public services is very important in order to understand PPP trends and the actors involved. There is much to be analysed on the interests and motivations of these actors at national and international level, and the ways in which the private sector and inter-governmental and supra-national institutions interact and influence each other.

The rationale for promotion of PPPs goes back to the in vogue discourse of small government, tight state expenditures, the rhetoric of choice and competition, and the oft-stated argument that governments are not up to the job. This rhetoric from political leaders, whether in government or in opposition, is inherently ideological. It is influenced and/or complemented by private sector actors, who seem to be aggressively pushing PPPs arrangements for many reasons, some of which will be elaborated in this report. This alliance between political and business interests stands at the core of the PPP discourse, and now makes it seem to be the ‘only show in town’. However, where does this lead?

my for schools. The limited consensus on what constitutes quality education and partnership are reflected in the language of the assessment of the PPP programmes.

That education systems are in crisis or in immediate need for intervention is heard often. Such crises can be both a threat and an opportunity to reshape the education system. The question is posed as to whether PPPs are an opportunity or rather a threat to the future of our educational systems. However, 'private money for public education and public money for private education are both part of the movement toward privatising education' (McAdie, 2004).

The **core section** of the study in chapters 3 and 4 aims at identifying in education unions' experience and views towards PPPs. Specifically, the report aims to help unions in their understanding of new developments linked to PPPs in order to provide them with information and help them to adopt a more strategic position. These chapters are based on unions' responses and their emerging positions regarding PPPs in education. As an undeniable phenomenon in education in current times, PPPs are increasingly drawing unions' attention, and they are coming more and more to the negotiating table. In an era of stretched public budgets and reduced taxation revenues, the involvement of private resources is increasingly seen as a strategy to sustain expansion of education opportunities both in quantity and quality. This view is shared not only by governments and industry, but also by many unions. The report maps and analyzes various reactions to PPPs in different contexts, seeking explanations, common trends and conditions under which some types of PPPs may be acceptable to unions. While, clearly, there is a trend towards outright opposition to PPPs, mostly from unions in developed nations, this seems to be based not so much on ideological grounds, but rather on their bad experiences so far with various privatisation attempts. These forms have often proven to be inefficient, as they are based on making private profit from public resources. At the other end of the spectrum there are unions, mostly in countries with huge deficits in terms of both access to and quality of education, where the endemic lack of government capacity leads them to consider any private provider of education as an option for relief and assistance. As far as quality is concerned, again there are arguments in favour of, and against, PPPs. When government provision is failing, private input can be associated with better quality and effectiveness, but, where public education is of generally high quality, PPPs are often blamed for degrading education standards.

Between these extremes, there are groups of unions who observe these developments with caution and restraint. To them, the experiences and policies of other unions could be of great value in developing their own strategies towards PPPs. Furthermore, as



we live in a globalised world, a better understanding of the various dimensions of PPPs in education should help to inform and guide unions' approaches and strategies.

The **fifth chapter** sheds light on some of multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) around the world, and some of the actors and their programmes. Evidence of the impact of such initiatives is still limited, hence drawing conclusions is rather difficult at this point. Nevertheless, it is clear that these initiatives impact on the future of public services and affect issues of democracy, accountability and sustainability. These concerns need to be considered seriously in the light of the motivations and interests of the MSP promoters, but also in the light of the experiences on PPPs elaborated earlier.

The report develops a broad picture, which should help unions to draw conclusions on the current PPPs' trends and to develop policies about them. While it is true that worldwide there are different contexts, some making particular forms of PPPs more acceptable than others, there are many similarities among countries. We have to face the reality that PPPs are here to stay and to develop further. The only way unions can influence them in order to avoid their negative and dangerous impact and to foster any positive aspects, is to enhance their involvement in the PPP debate. Such engagement requires strategic thinking and an international perspective on the issue.

INTRODUCTION

The Executive Board of Education International set up the Taskforce on **Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Education** in November 2007. This was done to implement a mandate from the EI World Congress held in Berlin in July 2007, included in a resolution on *Quality Education: Present and Future* (Annex II) adopted by Congress following an important debate.

The Executive Board set Terms of Reference for the Taskforce (Annex I), and work began in January 2008. A first meeting was held in April 2007 at the Headquarters of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Geneva, and included a session at the Headquarters of the World Economic Forum (WEF), also in Geneva. Research was undertaken both prior to the April 2007 meeting, and subsequently, by a research assistant appointed for that purpose, Edlira Xhafa. Research prior to the meeting entailed an extensive review of the literature on PPPs in education, both academic studies and papers published by intergovernmental agencies, as well as by some national entities.

Subsequently, research was pursued on the basis of a survey questionnaire developed by the Taskforce, with input from the Reference Group. Information was obtained from EI member organizations. A good rate of return for the survey (50 percent from a structured sample, with responses from all regions, and from large, medium and small organizations covering all levels of education) gave the Taskforce confidence that it had a very good overview of the experience of many EI member organizations, of the situations they currently confront, and of their views as to policy and strategy.

Our Terms of Reference required us to:

"identify the various definitions of public private partnerships that exist in different parts of the world or are used, sometimes with variations in the terminology, among intergovernmental agencies and other global or regional organizations".

We quickly discovered that the term Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) describes a wide array of arrangements. In fact, there is a long history of private sector involvement in delivering public services, particularly in education. In many countries religious faiths established primary and secondary schools, or in some cases universities. In several countries such schools have been integrated into public systems. In others, faith-based private schools have remained apart while receiving public subsidies and being subject to public regulation. In virtually all countries, public educational institutions provide a significant market for private suppliers of a range of services, from computers, textbooks and other learning materials, to canteen and cleaning services.



We agreed that forms of public-private interaction like those just described, well-established in the context of the history and practice of each country, were different from the new concepts of PPPs in education that have emerged over the last few years, and were the subject of the EI Congress Resolution. We knew that some of these arrangements had historically been sources of political controversy and debate, over issues such as the allocation of public resources and the secular role of the State. We note them because the context they provide is significant, but they are not the focus of this report.

EI's own constitution reflects an understanding of public education in a broad sense:

"To promote the right to education for all persons in the world, without discrimination, and to this end :

- (i) to pursue the establishment and protection of open, publicly funded and controlled educational systems, and academic and cultural institutions, aimed at the democratic, social, cultural and economic development of society and the preparation of every citizen for active and responsible participation in society;*
- (ii) to promote the political, social and economic conditions that are required for the realisation of the right to education in all nations, for the achievement of equal educational opportunities for all, for the expansion of public educational services and for the improvement of their quality".*

This report is about new approaches to public-private interactions in education that have emerged in many countries since the 1990s, as well as likely developments we can perceive in the near future. Many but not all of these developments have commercial implications.

We go into definitions in more detail in Chapter 1. In general, we are in little doubt that the various types of PPPs have begun to redefine the roles of the public and private sectors, as OECD noted recently (OECD, 2008). We do not, however, draw the same conclusions as the OECD, which like other international institutions and many national governments, has tended to assert that PPPs are the wave of the future. We also note some general shifts in the political discourse. PPPs were firstly promoted strongly under the banner of bringing value for money, competition and higher efficiency in running quality public services, as well as risk transfer and innovation. Today, the emphasis seems to be more on affordability and value for money.

From the debates at the EI World Congresses and regional meetings, it is clear that PPPs in their various guises have become a major concern for many EI member organizations. As references, we have been particularly attentive not only to the

2007 Congress Resolution from Berlin on *Quality Education: Present and Future*, but also to the 2004 Congress Resolution from Porto Alegre on *Education - Public Service or Commodity*.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study gives a general overview and analysis of the Public-Private Partnerships in Education. Given the increasingly broad use of the term, the study does not elaborate on private education or outsourcing in the education system. Moreover, issues on privatization of education are beyond the scope of the study although the analyses of PPPs sometimes refer to the trend of privatization of education.

In particular, the study sought to shed light on the following issues:

- ⇒ definitions of PPPs;
- ⇒ an evaluation of international agency and civil society programs and activities involving PPPs;
- ⇒ an analysis of current trends in public-private interactions now affecting or likely to affect education at all levels;
- ⇒ the experiences and views of EI member organizations; and
- ⇒ proposals for action by EI and member organizations.

In addressing these objectives the main methods used by the study were the review of secondary data through a literature review, and gathering primary data through the conduct of a survey involving a broad sample of EI member organizations. The literature review component of the study was used mostly to address issues of PPP definitions, evaluation of programmes and activities involving PPPs as well as analyses of PPP trends and impact on education. The literature on PPPs is increasingly broad and diverse. The focus of the analyses drawn from the literature review was based mainly on issues of quality, democracy, transparency, participation and sustainability of education.

The survey component of the study was conducted to collect the experiences and views of EI member organizations on PPPs and their perception of trends. The survey sample did not include all EI members, so the findings of the survey may not necessarily apply to all EI member unions. Nevertheless, the excellent response rate from this structured sample, with responses from all regions, gave us a high level of confidence in the findings. We believe that useful insights may be drawn from the results which may guide unions in framing up their policy position and strategies on PPPs.



Chapter 1

UNDERSTANDING PPPs IN EDUCATION

Definitions


1. Proponents and critics of PPPs agree on a loose concept of PPPs, namely a public and private interaction to deliver a service. Yet providing a clear definition turns out to be challenging. The term is a sort of 'umbrella notion' covering a broad range of agreements between public institutions and the private sector, aimed at operating public infrastructures or delivering public services (Centre for European Studies, 2006; OECD, 2005).

Here are some of the definitions that have been used in recent times:

- ⇒ "An agreement between governments and a private partner(s) (that may include the operators and financiers) according to which the private partner(s) delivers the service in such a matter that the service delivery objectives of government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private partner(s) and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partner(s)" (OECD, 2008).
- ⇒ The set of arrangements "in which the private sector carries out the role of supplier of infrastructure of assets and services that have traditionally been provided by the government" (IMF, 2004: 4).
- ⇒ "The transfer to the private sector of investment projects that traditionally have been executed or financed by the public sector" (European Commission, 2003, cited in OECD, 2006).
- ⇒ "A generic term for the relationships formed between the private sector and public bodies often with the aim of introducing private sector resources and/or expertise in order to help provide and deliver public sector assets and services," and:
- ⇒ "A wide variety of working arrangements from loose, informal and strategic partnerships, to design-build-finance-and-operate (DFBO) type service contracts and formal joint venture companies" (both from European Investment Bank, 2004; cited in OECD, 2008).

2. These definitions all seem to be based on the notion that PPPs: ‘fill a space between traditionally procured government projects and full privatisation’ (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005, cited in OECD, 2008: 9). OECD also notes that there may be public private interaction in the form of short-term management and outsourcing contracts, concession contracts and joint ventures between the public and private sectors. However, the OECD attempts to draw a line by stating that **“the distinguishing feature that determines whether a project is defined as traditional public procurement or a PPP should be whether or not a sufficient amount of risk has been transferred”** (OECD, 2008).

Figure 1. **The spectrum of combinations of public and private participation, organised on the basis of risk**



Source : (OECD, 2008: 11)

It could be added, however, that, in the case of education, it is always the government the one who holds the ultimate responsibility for the provision of public services, hence the assumption of “risk distribution” is questionable.

3. Traditional procurement means the government awards contracts to private providers for certain services, eg computer services. In the case of a concession the private operator pays the government for the right to operate the asset and usually depends on user charges for income (OECD, 2008: 13). In practice, however, it may be difficult to distinguish a PPP from a concession.



PPPs in education

4. Partnerships between public authorities and private entities in providing education existed in some countries long before the term PPP became widespread. They reflected each country's history and political processes. However, the last three decades marked the rise of a different type of PPP – an alternative strategy put forward to address the challenges confronting education systems. This alternative, which started in the industrialised countries, is being promoted in developing countries by aid agencies as well as international institutions such as the World Bank and OECD¹. It has important implications for the role of the state *vis-à-vis* the private sector as a provider of public services, including education systems.
5. The terms used in defining PPPs in general are also seen as applying to PPPs in education. UNISON² (2005: 2) contends that PPPs are a major mechanism for introducing the private sector into public services, especially sensitive services like health, prisons and education. The authors of EI's Hidden Privatisation report see PPPs as a form of exogenous privatisation, a term to describe forms of privatisation involving the opening up of public education services to private sector participation on a for-profit basis and using the private sector to design, manage or deliver aspects of public education (Ball and Youdell, 2008: 8). The authors contend that the relationships of power within public-private partnerships vary markedly and the language of partnerships is often a 're-labelling' of contractual or out-sourcing arrangements (2008: 33).
6. A strong supporter of PPPs in education and a consultant to the World Bank, LaRocque (2008) states that these PPPs share a number of characteristics: they are formal in nature, involve the development of a long-term relationship between the partners, are outcome focused, include an element of risk-sharing among the partners and can involve both the voluntary and commercial sectors as private sector partners. The public sector's role is essentially to define the scope of business; to specify priorities, targets, and outputs; and to set the performance regime by which the management of the PPP is given incentives to deliver. The essential role and responsibility of the private sector in all PPPs is to deliver the business objectives of the PPP on terms offering value for money to the public sector.

¹ OECD has been extremely active in organising seminars on PPPs all over the world well beyond its constituency.

² UNISON is a major public sector union in Britain.

Classification of PPPs in education

7. Partnerships in education may differ depending on the actors who are involved or the types of partnership. The private sector is not homogeneous and covers a variety of non-state actors including businesses, NGOs, charities and faith based organisations. These different players are likely to have distinct approaches to education provision emerging from their own histories as well as their economic motivations (Fennell, 2007). The term 'partnership' associated with other terms such as 'multi-stakeholder' and 'public-private' can be used to mean a pure contractual arrangement, a loose agreement among different parties to work together, a highly structured and governed-set up, or can merely be a term indicating an attitude of reciprocity in development programmes between donors and recipients (Draxler, 2008). Moreover, the phenomenon is not static, but changes over time. In the light of this broad and shifting terrain, we have opted to **deal with two categories of public-private interaction in education**. One is described broadly as "Contractual PPPs", since there is some form of contractual relationship between government and private providers. The other is described as "**Multi Stakeholder Partnerships in Education**" (MSPEs).

Contractual PPPs

8. The term defines a wide range of arrangements opening up to private sector (for-profit and not-for-profit) involvement in delivering public education. The International Finance Corporation (IFC: part of the World Bank Group³) attempts to set out a classification of PPPs based upon private sector involvement, and focused mostly on the delivery, management and financing of education. These types are:

- Private operation of public schools – Contract Schools
- Private sector supply of inputs into education process
- Education vouchers and scholarships
- Delivery of education by private providers.

9. LaRocque (2007) provides another classification of contractual PPPs in education, including additional categories:

- Infrastructure
- Contracting for delivery of education services
 - Private management of schools
 - Vouchers/Subsidies
- Private sector quality assurance
- Public-Private affiliation arrangements
 - Innovation and research.

³ IFC is the private lending arm of the World Bank Group, with a mandate to build the private sector in developing countries. Its "Public Private Dialogue Handbook" is one of a series of "Privatization Toolkits". One of the key annual publications of IFC, entitled "Doing Business", has been firmly criticised by the ITUC and the ILO for promoting the non-respect of International Labour Conventions.

10. Yet, another classification identifies five types of contracts in education, depending on which services are procured or bought from the private sector (Table 1).

Table 1: Five Types of Contracts in Education

What government contracts for	Definition	Contract types
Management, professional services (input)	Government buys school management services or auxiliary and professional services	Management contracts Professional services contract (curriculum design)
Operational services (process)	Government buys school operation services	Operational contracts
Education services (output)	Government buys student places in private schools (contracts with school to enrol specific students)	Contract for education of specific students
Facility availability (input)	Government buys facility Availability	Provision of infrastructure services contracts
Facility availability and education services (input and output bundle)	Government buys facility availability combined with services (operational or outputs)	Provision of infrastructure contracts with education services contracts

Source: Patrinos, World Bank 2006.

11. The taskforce has opted for a classification of contractual PPPs in education that draws on these three typologies. Our classification is set out as follows:

- a) **Infrastructure PPPs:** The most common type of PPP involving large infrastructure projects in the education sector is *Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)* (LaRocque: 2006). A private operator is granted a franchise (concession) to finance, build and operate an educational facility such as a public school, university building or hostel. The government, in effect, leases the facility from the private sector for a specified period, after which the facility is transferred to the government.
- b) **Private operation of public schools (Contract Schools):** Public schools are operated by private firms or organisations under contract to a public agency. The schools remain publicly owned and publicly funded, but are managed by a private sector operator in return for a management fee.

- c) **Outsourcing of educational services:** Government contracts with the private sector for the provision of education-related services such as: curriculum development and/or delivery; assessment or administration of examinations; school evaluation, review, inspection and/or school improvement programmes, as well as supply of text books and other learning materials.
 - d) **Outsourcing of non educational support services:** These may include canteen, transport, health care, or cleaning services or building and operating student hostels. The taskforce was of the opinion that such outsourcing is not strictly a category of PPPs. However, it was included in the survey of member organisations so as to give space to unions to express their views and experiences.
 - e) **Innovation and research PPPs:** Government programmes that encourage industry-research institute partnerships and promote commercialisation of public research
 - f) **Vouchers and subsidies:** The government provides vouchers to students enabling them to attend private schools, or direct subsidies to private schools. Although these are also forms of public-private interaction in education, we considered them to be generally beyond the focus of this report. However, space was included in the survey of EI affiliates for union to express their views.
12. This classification aims at showing the broad coverage of the different types of PPPs and is used subsequently for the survey of the views and experiences of EI member unions. However, it is recognized that clear-cut distinctions cannot be easily made between the different types, and that certain categories may be described as PPPs in some countries but not in others. We do not include private education as such. In general, we classify infrastructure PPPs separately, and give them special attention because of their importance in many countries.

Multi Stakeholders Partnerships in Education (MSPEs)

13. Multi Stakeholders Partnerships in Education (MSPEs) is terminology that has come into use more recently, promoted notably by the World Economic Forum within a general framework of Corporate Social Responsibility. It is intended to describe a form of partnership that does not entail a contractual relationship with a definable commercial benefit for the private provider. Generally, it refers to multinational companies involved in global education initiatives partnering with UN agencies, International Financial Institutions, and civil society organisations. We found it useful to distinguish MSPEs from contractual PPPs, and this type of partnership will be reviewed in a separate chapter (chapter 5).



Variations on the theme

14. There is some variation in the official language of describing PPPs among countries. The UK government refers to its *Private Finance Initiative (PFI)* as a form of PPP. Mexico has the *Service Provision Project (SPP)*. The provincial Government of Ontario in Canada chooses to use the phrase "*Alternative Financing and Procurement*" as a form of partnership with the private sector that defines and assigns risks, resources and rewards. Spain purposely does not use the term partnership, stating that the formula included in the Spanish legislation is not a partnership but a contract between a public administration and a private firm or consortium, where the goal is to complement each other. Deloitte and Touche (2007) notes that there are some jurisdictions which choose to describe their approach to alternative financing as a form of partnership, yet choose not to use the PPP terminology.
15. That being said, in general it is noted that the English terminology has been adopted widely, probably because PPPs were firstly introduced in the UK, Australia and Canada. The language of 'partnership' seems to be convenient in many national contexts, and it is also convenient that the usage of the concept of PPPs remains quite loose. Extensive use of the term may be related to the efforts of some international institutions and governments to try to draw a line between privatisation and PPPs, but, for many authors, PPPs are often seen as privatisation in disguise. For example: "*Despite its ambiguity, "public-private partnership" is sometimes a useful phrase because it avoids the inflammatory effect of "privatisation" on those ideologically opposed*" (Savas, 2005).
16. In the context of the developing countries, the World Bank coined a similar term, "*private sector participation*" (PSP) (*ibid*). Like PPPs, this term, argue Hall et al. (2003) is neither a legally nor a technically exact phrase, but rather a replacement for the older use of the word 'privatisation'. They maintain that the vast majority of PPPs are not partnerships in any legal sense, but simply contractual relationships. The same point is made by Sheil (2002) who emphasises that "it seems obvious that the role of the 'partnership' rhetoric is used simply to hide the unpopularity of privatisation behind a term that implies equality, and therefore evokes a friendly glow".
17. However, this is not to say that PPPs are promoted everywhere in the same way. Fennell (2007) argues that there are differences between the types of PPPs adopted in the UK and the USA, for example, which indicate that they are based on the demands of the respective political processes. Indeed, as Commom (2001) puts it, there does appear to be a strong element of national ideology and social policy in fashioning the terrain of public-private partnerships (cited in Fennell, 2007).

Chapter 2

THE PROMOTION OF PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION

Emergence of PPPs in education

18. Private participation in providing public services has a long history, with prominent examples being the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark. However, some important considerations should be presented here. Firstly, provisions are linked to the history of compulsory education. In the Netherlands, the law of 1900 made education compulsory for children aged 6 to 12, revised to 9 years of schooling in 1969 and 10 years in 1978. The constitutional freedom to educate leads to a legal obligation for the government to pay for religious-based schools the same per capita funds that are provided for secular schools, provided that religious schools comply with the quality requirements of the government. This principle also applies to universities. All such publicly funded and controlled schools and institutions are considered to be public. Other schools get no funds from the government and are considered to be private, but are recognized as fulfilling legal obligations as providers of education. Moreover, there is a small group of private schools that are not recognized by the government. In Denmark, as far back as 1814, government made seven years of education compulsory (Patrinos, 2005). The history of public education in these countries has also to be seen in the broader context of the political processes involved. Thirdly, and most importantly, although private firms have been involved in forms of public service delivery for a long time, the introduction of public-private partnerships in the early 1990s established a mode of delivery that redefined the roles of the public and private sectors (OECD, 2008). In short, although some European systems of education provided from early times for participation of the private sector in delivering public education, the current PPP terminology refers mostly to new tendencies dating from the early 1990's.
19. However, some recent proponents of PPPs, notably the World Bank and the OECD, have referred to the Dutch system of free choice based on per capita allocations as a "voucher system". This characterization is considered by EI member unions in the Netherlands to be erroneous.
20. Despite the fact that the concept started in Western countries, the WEF asserts that, some of the strongest levels of involvement in PPPs are seen in Latin America and the Middle East, where business alliances and other PPP models are particu-



larly active (WEF, 2005: 47). The expansion of PPPs has paved the way for recommendations that developing countries might embark on these ventures to improve educational access and quality in their school sector (Patrinos, 2005 in Fennell, 2007).

21. **Proponents of PPPs** argue that partnerships in education have been driven by the need for more finances to run ailing school systems as well as the need to improve quality provision through raising management standards in schools (Fennell, 2007). For the OECD (2007), the introduction of PPPs in education addresses issues such as new financing arrangements to enable governments to bring forward their works programmes, and meets the demand for new projects; it brings additional new skills and tighter discipline which focuses on the planning and delivery of building projects and their associated services; it provides innovation in the planning and delivery of services and especially in financing arrangements; and it provides greater discipline to procurement processes. The IFC argues that lack of competition in the public sector limits incentives for efficiency and effectiveness, while in the private sector there are problems of information, of too many examples of opportunistic behaviour and of inequitable access (IFC Handbook on PPPs, 2002). In this light, partnership ensures that public sales, procurement contracts and divestitures will occur in order to discipline service provision through competitive market pressures. Likewise, the OECD (2008) sees the emergence of PPPs as part of the trend of governments to rely increasingly on markets, either for inputs to government production and provision, or for direct provision of goods and services. PPPs in education are often proposed in order to correct for inefficiencies in the public delivery of education services (Patrinos⁴, 2006). The World Bank contends that in developing countries, the rationale for partnerships is driven by the demand for access to schooling, and the need to tap private resources when the state cannot afford education for all.
22. Indeed, the literature promoting PPPs puts strong emphasis on the achievement of access to education for all – one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). A country's performance in the global economy is seriously endangered by the often limited finances available to educational systems. Constraints on public budgets and human resources for health and education mean that governments need to

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<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:21550596~iSURL:Y~menuPK:2448342~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:282386,00.html#details>

find cost-effective ways of drawing on the private and non-profit sectors for delivery of services and getting the best performance out of publicly paid providers (World Bank website on PPPs). Partnerships are viewed by some as the ideal way to bypass failed, corrupt or simply ineffective governments (Draxler, 2008). It is in this context that private sector involvement, either for-profit or not-for-profit, emerges as an alternative way of ensuring access to education, also increasing the competitiveness of countries. The **main reasons** advanced for the governments to enter into contractual PPPs include to:

- improve the quality of spending by lifting the efficiency of service delivery and by allowing better targeting of spending;
- allow governments to take advantage of specialised skills from the private sector;
- allow governments to overcome operating restrictions such as inflexible salary scales and civil service restrictions;
- allow governments to respond to new demands and facilitate the adoption of innovations in service delivery and experimentation;
- permit economies of scale;
- allow governments to focus on those functions for which they have comparative advantage;
- increase access to services, especially for those groups who have been poorly served under traditional forms of service delivery; and
- increase transparency of government spending by making the cost of services more visible (Savas, 2000 in LaRocque, 2007).

To these reasons can be added to:

- make up for constraints on public budgets;
- get around political limits imposed on the levels of deficit allowed for government borrowing;
- mobilize resources in the absence of effective systems for collecting revenue, especially in developing countries.

23. IMF acknowledges that *"it cannot be taken for granted that PPPs are more efficient than public investment and government supply of services"*. IMF further raises concern *"that PPPs can be used mainly to bypass spending controls and to move public investment off budget and debt off the government balance sheet, whilst the government still bears most of the risk involved and faces potentially large fiscal costs"* (2004:3). We consider this to be an important point.

**Box 1: The World Bank and BNPP**

A project proposal of the World Bank⁶ in cooperation with BNPP (The Bank-Netherlands Partnership Programme) says that constraints on public budgets and human resources for health and education mean that governments need to find cost-effective ways of drawing on the private and non-profit sectors for delivery of services and getting the best performance out of publicly paid providers (Draxler, 2008).

24. **For the critics of PPPs**, these partnerships emerged as an alternative to the unpopularity of privatisation. This seems to have been the case particularly in Latin America (Nordtveit, 2005a), but also in the UK, for example. Influenced by the post-Washington consensus⁷, governments and funding agencies, especially the World Bank and the IMF, have increasingly turned to contracting out to private providers for the implementation of projects and the provision of services. Critics of PPPs see the strong influences of the Thatcher and Reagan era as well as the principles of Hayeks' economic theory, which focused on individual liberty and the restriction of government - policies which later became widely known as neoliberalism or market fundamentalism (Nordtveit, 2005a: 23). This approach seems to be complemented by the emergence of the New Public Management paradigm in Western Europe 'that regards the introduction of the ethos of profit-making into the state sector as a beneficial feature to ensure better and more efficient production of services' (Fennell, 2007). As we saw above, one argument for partnerships in education and health was to bring the management practices of the private sector into the public sector, improving competitiveness and increasing efficiency (Fennell, 2007). However, in the case of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, where students perform well on the international scale, the traditional view has been that efficiency alone cannot be conducive to good education. In the case of the UK, it has been argued that political ideology was a key factor in the introduction of PPPs in the education system, rather than any substantial economic gain (Ball, in

⁶ World Bank idem.

⁷ Criticism of many of the Washington consensus policies (based on the IMF and World Bank approach to development in the 1980's), including evidence of their detrimental impact on health, led to the development of the post-Washington consensus (World Health Organization, 2008). This package of ideas and policies aims to:

- Manage liberalized trade, finance and monetary systems
- Include the creation of enforceable codes and standards, and concessions to social welfare through targeted social safety nets
- Create vertical and horizontal policy coherence
- Include businesses and firms in a Global Compact for Development and the PRSP process.

Fennell, 2007). In the Netherlands, there is criticism of new public management from the State Council, the government's official advisory body, arguing that public institutions should remain really public and promote the value of their public character as characterized by notions of integrity, professionalism and commitment to the common interests of society.

25. **Although the emergence of PPPs is presented as a necessity to achieve universal access in education and/or quality of education, the core of the debate appears to be ideological.** The emergence of PPPs seems to reflect the ideological discourse of the last three decades, which has been influenced by terms such as choice, competition, efficiency and innovation, associated with the private sector, juxtaposed against corruption and bureaucracy, associated with the public sector. Whereas the promotion of PPPs in developed countries has been articulated around issues of efficiency, choice and competition, the debate in most of the developing world and in transition countries is driven by a focus on the inability of the state 'to provide an adequate and acceptable level of education' as well as issues of corruption. The argument has been that "government services are corrupt, and that privatisation, outsourcing and partnerships may have an effect of bypassing corrupt civil servants" (Harper, 2000 in Nordtveit, 2005a). Such arguments seem to be derived from rather romantic notions of private sector effectiveness, and a tendency to overlook the private interests involved (see paras 32 and 33 below). Civil society movements emerge as alternative deliverers of social services and welfare. According to Anthony Giddens' concept of the 'Third Way', which became the ideological orientation of the Clinton and Blair governments, civil society is an intermediary sphere serving to complement rather than to replace the state and to offer a third route to welfare provision, which is neither private nor state. From the 1980s, the World Bank and other development agencies began to use civil society organisations in the implementation of their social programmes. In the early '90s, development programmes not only began to use civil society, but also to set up programmes that aimed to strengthen, or even to create civil society organisations. All this has occurred against a background of chronic degradation of many education systems, both in the South and in the North.

Key actors: international agencies and civil society

26. The **World Bank** has been particularly active in promoting PPPs in developing countries, and is at the centre of the PPP discourse in industrialised countries as well. The Bank's private lending arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), has produced an elaborate toolkit and a webpage on PPPs in education⁸. The advocacy of the World Bank for PPPs is extensive. The World Bank has been involved in many projects that have aimed either to promote PPPs or to create an environ-



ment for the involvement of private actors in education. The Bank involvement includes a wide range of countries such as: Chile, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, El Salvador, Comoros, Cameroon and Ethiopia. The Bank has been very active both in promoting some types of PPPs as in the cases of Tunisia, Lebanon, Mexico, and Argentina, but also directly establishing the institutional environment for PPPs, as in the cases of Indonesia, Cameroon and Ethiopia. Another important aspect of the World Bank projects has been the involvement of NGOs in delivering education, as in the cases of Senegal, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Niger and the Gambia. The role of the Bank and the IFC is generally both financial and technical as they provide assistance for the set-up of PPPs involving NGOs.

27. Likewise, the **OECD** is very active in promoting PPPs. OECD reports more than 300 papers and activities such as round tables and forums on PPPs. It has commissioned research dedicated to PPPs to provide educational facilities, and to PPPs in general, in a range of countries including: Albania, Bulgaria, Mexico, Nicaragua, South Africa, Thailand Turkey, Uganda and Vietnam. OECD studies have been instrumental in recommendations for countries to engage in PPPs so as to maintain or raise their competitiveness in the global market. While assessing government-industry partnerships in the Netherlands, research from OECD revealed some of these dynamics, stating that a 'major conclusion of the OECD Growth Study was that greater use of public-private partnerships can enhance the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of technology and innovation policy' (OECD, 2003).
28. The **European Union** (EU) has been particularly keen to promote PPPs. In April 2004, the EU produced a Green Paper that set out a series of initiatives aimed at extending the role of the private sector in public services, promoting PPPs, and ensuring that PPPs would have access to public funds (Hall, 2004). The idea is to promote PPPs as a way of raising investment, through financial and administrative incentives, with the encouragement of the private interests that stand to gain from PPPs. The paper recommended that the EU review the legislation in order to facilitate the greater role of the private sector in public services.
29. Similarly, despite scepticism on some issues (see Chapter 1), the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) has also actively worked on PPPs by producing papers and publications on financial risks and PPPs; and providing technical assistance on managing risk in European and African countries, with about 10 missions in the last 3 years. In 2005, IMF also held seminars on public investment and PPPs in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and in Europe (Cottarelli, 2008).

30. **USAID** is another important player in pushing for partnerships in general, and for PPPs in education in particular. It has a special functional bureau – the Global Development Alliance (GDA) - which is charged with mainstreaming the public-private partnership development assistance model at all levels of the Agency (USAID, 2005). This model reflects the emergence of private sector entities as active participants in the development process (ibid). USAID has developed a 5 year programme to support PPPs in education around the world, including in South Africa, India, Jordan, Angola and Peru, and has also supported the WEF/UNESCO Partnerships for Education and MSPEs (see Chapter 5).
31. **UNESCO** and **UNICEF** have shown support for PPPs, dedicating specific websites to the subject. UNESCO's International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP) has begun a study on PPPs in Education, which is intended to prepare for training programmes to Education Ministries in member countries. It is important to note the increased networking between UNESCO, the World Economic Forum (WEF), USAID and major corporations such as Microsoft, Intel and Cisco. WEF is a supporter of PPPs in general, but has moved to distinguish between partnerships with direct commercial interests and global initiatives, by using the terminology **Multi Stakeholders Partnerships in Education** as described in Chapter 1. However, UNESCO, IIEP and UNICEF do not always make such a clear distinction. These issues will be further addressed in Chapter 5.

Motivations and interests

32. PPPs are seen by proponents as the way to obtain a greater involvement of the private sector to improve and strengthen education systems and infrastructure. As indicated above, governments have a list of reasons for proposing PPPs: (i) infrastructure gaps; (ii) fiscal restrictions on public sector budgets; (iii) attractiveness of new financial instruments; (iv) off balance sheet financing (one of the most doubtful motivations); (v) improving efficiency; and increased complexity of government tasks (overlap between the public and private sectors) (Fausch, 2008). EU member governments face increasing pressure to improve under-funded or neglected public services but also face restrictions (including those of the Maastricht criteria) on their ability to raise debt (Infra-News, 2005). It is striking that the whole discourse is void of debate on the reasons for the existence of poor educational infrastructures: PPPs are presented as a novel yet sustainable solution to the problems of education systems.
33. The mode for PPPs generates its own momentum. Some might even perceive a conspiracy. The logic is suggested by Miller and Gerson (2008): under-fund public services, create an uproar and declare a crisis, claim that privatisation can do



the job better, deregulate or break public control, divert public money to corporations and then raise prices. In any event, there are powerful private sector interests at work, and those interests do influence the paradigms of political thinking and decision-making. Governments in developing countries may be forced to choose the PPP model, given both their limited resources and the conditions imposed by IFIs on public budgets.

34. Nordtveit (2005a) argues that in the case of Senegal there was a strong political rationale for outsourcing of literacy programmes since the financing of many donor agencies was contingent on using private firms for implementation. From the beginning of the negotiations between the World Bank and the government about a possible literacy project, said Nordtveit (2005a: 129), the discussion centred on the definition of the outsourcing approach, and on clarifying the respective roles of the state and the providers. In developing countries, there are also strong pressures to introduce the PPP approach, simply because the mode in favour of PPPs has become pervasive among donor agencies and World Bank field staff.
35. Published studies reveal serious doubts about the reasons for the introduction of PPPs, and the misleading nature of some of the reasons advanced. One notable case is that of the P3 (PPP funded) schools in Nova Scotia, Canada. Froese-Germain (2004) points to the political motivations of such a project.

Box 2: PPPs in Nova Scotia, Canada

In addition to costing \$32 million more than if they had been publicly financed, the motives underlying the Nova Scotia P3 project were political – this arrangement allowed the government to keep the cost of the schools off its books in an attempt to reduce the apparent size of the provincial deficit (Robertson, 2003, cited in Froese-Germain, 2004). Moreover, it is often argued that the fiscal characteristics of the PPPs are exactly the same as for public debt, except that these funds are more expensive and less flexible and that the macroeconomic effects of infrastructure investment will be exactly the same whether the investment is made collectively through the public sector or by select private firms (Quiggin, 2002 in Sheil, 2002). Analysing the reasons for governments of all political persuasions taking this path, Sheil (2002) maintains that “the only available conclusion is that, effectively, our States have become imprisoned within their own populist anti-public debt rhetoric. Under the present circumstances, where pressure for public infrastructure investment is intense, PPPs are attractive because they offer the governments a way to take on debt-equivalent obligations, while avoiding the appearance of having done so.

Another example of the politics of PPPs comes from Taiwan, China.

Box 3: PPPs in Taiwan, China

It is a model of emerging market. Though the political orientation of Taiwan, R.O.C. is controversial, the economical and educational performance, as a matter of fact, is competitive to those top ranking countries. However, due to global economic recession and a mammoth deficit after the Democratic Progressive Party seized the reins of government, both parties introduced PPP into education to lighten the burden of education budget. NGOs and non-profit organizations fought hard for the legislation of securing education budget expenditure of 21.5% of average net government revenue over the previous 3 years. So the education system in Taiwan is mainly public-funded (public schools in all levels make up more than 90%). What also differs from other countries is that the normal universities were able to pick up students from the top ranking in the early days, and ensured the graduates with teaching vacancies, so the performance of Taiwan education is usually one of the best. However, the government, under the pressure of economic gloom and financial deficits, deliberately ignores the background of successful education outcomes and leads scholars and civil organizations, which gain benefits from the government, to criticize and make the public to believe the education should be even better. During the period of 1995 and 1999, the policy of opening the education market and stimulating competition between teachers suggested that teachers and schools were merely business centres with knowledge supply, which misled the public to demand teachers offering better "service". Massive numbers of outstanding teachers therefore withdrew from schools and the government continuously reduced education budget to decrease the deficit, so the quality of education has been deteriorating rapidly in the past ten years, which raised even more vigorous critics toward education. Inverting cause and effect constructs a good environment for the government to introduce PPPs into education and deceive the public that PPPs could help to offer a better education. The rights-based education has been replaced by profit-oriented one. Education is seen as a tool to create value of outputs for the country; therefore, education quality is more worsened and PPP is more popularized. Though PPP is not widely demonstrated in Taiwan yet, the tendency of the government to collaborate with private sectors is evident. Emerging cases of PPP in Taiwan include contracting out school meals, canteen service, security services. And above all, the government plans to amend laws so as to legalize PPPs in education (contribution of NTA).

36. The emergence of PPPs is the result of a somewhat complex but nevertheless real concordance of political and business interests. **Business lobbies** are particularly important in driving PPPs. Engaging in PPPs seems to be a very safe investment

with minimal risks, and substantial funds are involved. Moreover, construction companies holding several PFI contracts can improve their credit ratings compared to companies without significant PFI involvement, because of the low risk profile of the service delivery phases of these contracts (Gosling, undated). This is why PFI investments are so attractive to pension funds, which may in turn explain the opportunities for refinancing and the sale of equity stakes in companies set up to operate PFI projects. Another dimension of this debate comes out in the cases of the UK and the US. Hatcher (in Froese-Germain, 2004: 2) identifies the emergence of three interconnected yet distinct agendas: a business agenda for *what* the school system should do: above all to produce human capital for competitiveness in the global economy; an agenda for *how* it should do it most efficiently, by adopting a business model of management; an agenda for what the business itself should do *within* the school system: opening up state education systems to private for-profit companies.

Box 4: Thinking of education as a business opportunity ...

“A big inner – city school system is kind of like that – the General Motors of the education world. I see very, very similar dynamics: very large bureaucratic organisations that have become increasingly disconnected from their costumers; that are producing an inferior product and losing costumers; that are heavily unionised. A successful charter school, on the other hand is ‘like Toyota’ 20 years ago” (Tilson, in Miller and Gerson, 2008).

Box 5: ... and anti-union behaviour

Evidence of anti-union behaviour is emerging in some PPP types, including refusal to recognise unions and union busting type behaviours in schools that have come under private control, e.g. Vardy Academies in NE England (contribution of ATL union, United Kingdom).

37. It is also interesting to see the push of the private sector over the last decade to enter public services in the light of more complex developments in the global economy. Here the rather prophetic analysis of Shutt in 1998 may be important to consider:

...It thus seems inevitable that continued economic stagnation will sooner or later precipitate the effective bankruptcy of the state, leading rapidly to financial crisis engulfing the private sector as well (Shutt, 1998: 74).

38. The analysis of Shutt, although made more than 10 years ago, is strikingly pertinent today, and sheds light on the interests of the private sector in pushing for PPPs.

Evaluating the impact

39. After about 15 years of different types of PPP operations in various countries, it is timely to assess their impact. For EI and its members, the key question is the impact of PPPs on both equity of access and the quality of education. This is especially pertinent in view of the arguments often presented in support of PPPs. Let us recall some of the fundamental precepts underlying the concepts of equity and quality in education, for they provide the criteria against which the impact of PPPs should be assessed.

Equity and Quality

(1) Everyone has the right to education. (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality... (Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948)

40. While the commitment to free compulsory elementary education was reaffirmed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), quality in education was addressed specifically at the Jomtien World Summit on EFA in 1990 : *quality is a prerequisite for achieving the fundamental goal of equity and expanding access alone would be insufficient for education to contribute fully to the development of the individual and society* (UNESCO, 2005: 29). In 1995 came the ten commitments of the Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development and in 2000 the UN's eight MDGs, which included Achieving Universal Primary Education. The Dakar Framework for Action¹⁰ adopted in the same year (2000) affirmed that quality was 'at the heart of education' – and was a fundamental determinant of enrolment, retention and achievement (UNESCO, 2005: 29). As asserted by UNESCO (2005, 28-29), education is a set of processes and outcomes that are defined qualitatively: the quantity of children who participate is by definition a secondary consideration, merely filling spaces called 'schools' with children would not be sufficient to achieve quality education objectives. One international document which makes an important normative statement in terms of the aims of education is the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 (Box 6).

¹⁰ See the Dakar Framework for Action for more:
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001211/121147e.pdf>



Box 6: The Aims of education from the convention on the rights of the child, article 29 (1) (1989)

1. States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to:

- | | | | | |
|---|--|--|---|---|
| (a) The development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential; | (b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations; | (c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own; | (d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin; | (e) The development of respect for the natural environment. |
|---|--|--|---|---|

41. However, there is a growing trend towards measuring quality with international comparisons based on standardized indicators (Carnoy, in Nordtveit, 2005a: 51). The use of such indicators places increased emphasis on national performance levels in reading, math and science curricula, at the primary and secondary levels of schooling. Analysing the education systems in a number of countries, the Norwegian education researcher Alfred Telhaug identified a common tendency which prevailed during the 1980s. Although Japan, China, Germany, Great Britain, the USA, Russia and the Scandinavian countries differ greatly in their history, culture and political systems, there is, according to Telhaug, a common tendency to shift the focus from 'child-centred' to 'economy-centred' (Nordtveit, 2005a).
42. While EI recognizes the importance of education for the economic development of communities and the economic success of individuals, we believe that the primary focus of teachers remains the full development of each child or young person. This will be the basis for our evaluation of the impact of PPPs on equity of access and the quality of education.

Partnership

43. Partnership is a widely used term based on a broad understanding rather than a precise definition. The World Economic Forum acknowledges that “the word partnership means different things in different parts of the world” (WEF, 2005: 45). “Partnership” implies equality, cooperation and transparency in achieving the same goal. But it may also be argued that in reality the term partnership in the context of PPPs has become misleading as “the idea of entering into a partnership veils the nature of the relationship involved in PPPs, suggesting positive connotations of equality, with both sides working towards a joint goal” (Quiggin and Sheil, 2002). Similarly, Sheil (2002) argues that “Far from constituting partnerships in any meaningful sense, PPPs provide for the contracting parties to pursue their separate, diverse and potentially conflicting public and private interests”. Draxler (2008) argues that governments, donors, businesses and civil society organisations have different aims, constituencies and ways of working. The government has the primary responsibility for the public good and for guaranteeing education as human right – that is for ensuring universality, equity and quality of education. On the other hand the private sector has legal and image reasons to take into account the public good in many circumstances, but its primary interests remain to make (Draxler, 2008).

Private sector

44. The term ‘private’ sector in these partnerships currently covers all non-state actors. Corporate entities, NGOs and faith based organisations all fall into this category (Fennell, 2007). The IFC (2002) sees partnerships as including: “*inter alia*, government, for profit organizations, community based NGOs, wider public interest organizations, private citizens, religious organizations, political representatives and donor organizations”. It is particularly striking that in the language of the PPP promoters, partnerships may be built among nearly any imaginable grouping, but there are few references to workers’ organizations. Specifically, teachers and teachers’ organizations rarely have a voice in these partnerships. There is hardly any reference to social dialogue and participation of teachers in the efforts to improve the educational systems and to deliver quality education as proposed in the ILO/UNESCO Recommendation on the Status of Teachers (1966).

Approach to education

45. The interest groups just described differ greatly in their approach to education. To simplify, we could say that on the one side are those who hold a human-rights approach to education, and argue that education has a very important role to play



in creating and promoting critical thinking as well as in transforming societies. They see public education as open to all, as being fundamentally important as a guarantee of the right to education for all children and young people, without discrimination, and as a basis for citizenship in a democracy. Many NGOs would join education unions in taking this approach, and this is indeed the basis for the coalition that has been built by EI with Oxfam and other NGOs in the Global Campaign for Education.

46. On the other side, we tend to find today the promoters of PPPs, for whom the emphasis is placed rather on the need to invest in education for economic reasons. These proponents of PPPs tend to focus on the dire state of education systems and on the consequences for competition in the global economy. In doing so, deliberately or not, they are also bringing in a new wave of political thinking in education. For them, it is most important to tackle the challenges without losing time, but along the way, they are actually introducing a new approach to thinking about public education. Indeed, there are increasing efforts to blur the differences between public and private provision of education and to play down any reference to the ethos of public education. These substantial differences raise concerns about PPPs that 'go far beyond the drafting and signing of a bad deal – they speak to the very way the quality and content of an education is determined' Shaker (2003).
47. So indicators of quality vary greatly, depending on the perspective of the source. Educators, for example, will be concerned with the "question of how education can contribute to create a more just society, rather than only serving as a means to replicate existing social structures" (Nordtveit, 2005b: 18). On the other hand, business sees education being 'recognized as a necessary condition for sustained economic growth'. Whereas both views are valid, there are clear tensions between them. WEF acknowledges that "education is measured by generations, while private sector performance is measured by quarters" (WEF, 2005: 48).
48. Different understandings of key terms such as quality and partnership, different approaches to education, and to the history of education are fundamental to understand differences in the evaluation of PPPs. Depending on the perspective, the criteria used to measure the quality of education may vary greatly. IMF (2004) argues that "when considering the PPP option, the government has to compare the cost of public investment and government provision of services with the cost of services provided by a PPP." The literature on PPPs is particularly concerned with cost-efficiency and risk sharing, leaving in the shadow the risks faced by the citizens.

Education is not seen as a right or as a public good which is necessary for the society; it is rather considered as a product or merchandise" (Nordtveit, 2005a: 30). In the case of PFIs in Britain, Davidson (2002) argues that their [language] "is like the languages of corporate lawyers in the tax avoidance business". Moreover "accounting rules are hardly objective. They are open to interpretation – and, of course, manipulation – and there is often more than one reasonable way to measure expenses and revenues" (Granof and Zeff, 2002).

49. It is important to note that PPPs are often difficult to assess clearly. Monbiot (2002) attributes the obscure status of many PPPs in the UK to two main reasons: "first because it is so complicated and appears so boring that few people have grasped its implications; second, because so many of the crucial details are hidden from public view by the blanket ban on disclosure known as "commercial confidentiality" ". Another example comes from a developing country. In one Columbian municipality, the private sector provided a significant level of resources and had a robust staff, but the number of municipal staff was limited, so the municipal government was not able to play a strong leadership role. USAID recognized that such an imbalance could potentially minimize the role of the public sector in the municipality (USAID, 2008: 16).
50. Similarly, a report which examines a sample of 25 recent studies – three Global/European, 18 British and four Australian – by governments, consultants and academics, demonstrates 'the lack of a long term perspective' and that ' policy analyses and evaluation of PPP/PFI is constrained by a number of key factors'.

"Firstly, the combination of political and economic vested interests of public sector organizations, major construction companies and financial institutions that PPP/PFI is 'working well'. They also maintain a collective illusion, aided and abetted by the accountancy/management consultancy firms, that options appraisal and business case development is 'scientific' and based on analysis of alternatives when in fact it is frequently contrived, because PPP/PFI is 'the only show in town'. Secondly, the scope of evaluation is determined by a narrow definition of value for money which excludes a full consideration of equality and equity issues, social justice, employment, sustainability and community well-being. Thirdly, rigorous, indeed any kind of local scrutiny is virtually non-existent" (Whitfield, 2007).



Assessment of different types of PPP in education

The following section will focus on each of the types of contractual PPPs in education, according to the classification set out in Chapter 1.

Infrastructure projects

51. A short description of some of the PPP infrastructure projects is provided in the following box (7).

Box 7: Infrastructure PPPs

Under a *PFI arrangement*, as in the case of the UK, a capital project, such as a school, hospital or housing estate, is designed, built, financed and managed by a private sector consortium, under a contract that typically lasts for 30 years (LaRocque, 2007). The most commonly used structure is DBFO (Design, Build, Finance, Operate), where a private sector partner (usually a consortium of companies) takes on the provision and long-term operation of a facility in line with the Local Education Authority (LEA) and school or schools' specification. The private consortium is paid regularly from public money, based on its performance throughout the contract period. If the consortium misses performance targets, its payment is reduced. (LaRocque, 2007).

The *New Schools Project in the Australian state of New South Wales*, consists of two main components. First, the private sector finances design and construct nine new public schools in the state between 2002 and 2005. These new schools are built to standards that must meet or exceed Department of Education and Training (DET) school design standards. Second, the private sector will provide cleaning, maintenance, repair, security, safety, utility and related services for these schools' buildings, furniture, fittings, equipment and grounds until 31 December 2032. In return, the private sector will receive performance-related monthly payments from the DET during the operational phase of the project. At the end of the contract period, the buildings will be transferred to the public sector. The New Schools Project in New South Wales is part of a broader move toward PPPs in Australia. A recent report by Standard and Poor's show increasing investor interest in PPPs, with projects valued at \$3.7 billion in the pipeline (LaRocque, 2007). The project has been extended to the State of South Australia.

The *Offenbach schools PPP project* provides for the renovation, upkeep and facility management of over 90 schools within the County of Offenbach, located near Frankfurt Germany and with a population of some 350,000. The project, which involves the government contracting for the financing, refurbishment and operation of government schools, is split into two parts, with a combined capital value of over \$1 billion. The first part of the PPP project involves 43 schools. The total value of the contract is estimated at \$492 million. The contract was recently awarded to SKE, a subsidiary of the French Vinci group. According to one estimate, the use of a PPP will generate savings of about 19 percent relative to government delivery of similar services. The second part involves 49 schools. The contract was recently awarded to HOCHTIEF. The total value of the contract is estimated at \$545 million. Under the Offenbach Schools Project, the private sector partners will operate schools for a period of 15 years (LaRocque, 2007).

52. Value for money and affordability are considered to be the benchmarks for PPP viability and have been widely used as political slogans in support of an aggressive use of PPPs. Value for money means assessing the benefits and their value when all factors such as social political, environment, organisational and operational as well as economic value are taken into account (OECD, 2007). Marty (2008) sees value for money being delivered through risk transfer, better financial terms, innovation, greater asset utilisation or an integrated whole-life management. Value for money is demonstrated by comparing the whole-life costs of the project as financed under conventional procurement (Public Sector Comparator – PSC), discounted to yield a Net Present Cost (NPC) (Marty, 2008). Value for money is closely linked to risk transfer, which is considered as one of the main characteristics of PPPs. As mentioned earlier, according to the OECD, if there is not risk sharing, there cannot be a PPP. Commentators have argued that a total risk transfer is an illusion, since risk would be internalised by the government, which remains responsible in the last resort, in the case of essential public services (Marty, 2008). The government has the primary responsibility for guaranteeing education to its own citizens. If it renounces this responsibility, there is both a moral failure and a risk of political (and electoral) failure (Draxler, 2008). In fact, in the case of a PPP, the risk will in reality be completely borne by the government, since it undertakes to guarantee demand for 25-30 years. It is exactly this remarkable government guarantee that underwrites all PPP policies and which indeed makes PPPs the river of gold for which the private consortia are bidding (Sheil, 2002). Another argument in favour of PPPs is that they bring innovation. Here it seems we are talking about innovation in financing, not in education. Take the case of JF Oyster:



Box 8: J.F. Oyster School, Washington DC

The JF Oyster bilingual elementary School in Washington DC, which opened in September 2001, was the first public school to be built in Washington DC in 20 years. In 2002, the school had 350 students. The school was built at no cost at taxpayers through an innovative public-private partnership. Under that partnership, a local developer demolished the existing school and rebuilt a new one in exchange for the right to build a block of apartments on what had been a playing field. The school's construction was financed by an US\$11million tax-exempt city bond issue, which, in lieu of property taxes, will be repaid by the developer over 35 years from revenue generated by the apartments (LaRocque, 2006).

53. In this example, it is hard to see the risk taken by the private developer.
54. *PPPs projects are based on the concept that better value for money can be achieved through the exploitation of private sector competencies and the allocation of risk to the party best able to manage it* (BNPP ¹¹, undated). Whereas there is a lot of scepticism among the economists on the complicated assessments of PPPs, it is clear that the value for money of PPPs when compared with traditional public procurement cannot be systematically proven. In fact, in many cases, PPPs have demonstrated just how risky they can be. Boxes 9, 10 and 11 describe some specific cases.

Box 9: Tower Hamlets

The London Borough of Tower Hamlets awarded a £120m contract for the refurbishment of 27 schools to a consortium that operated as a Special Purpose Vehicle called Tower Hamlets Schools Ltd. The prime contractor behind the successful bid was Ballast PLC, a subsidiary of a major Dutch group Ballast Nedam Infra B.V., with facilities management to be supplied by a subsidiary of the UK Ballast company, Wiltshier, and finance supplied by a subsidiary of Abbey National bank, Abbey National Treasury Services. The initial contract was awarded until 2007. But Ballast PLC ceased trading in October 2003, after recording a half year loss in excess of £10m and a previous full year loss of £35m, with a pensions deficit on its balance sheet of about £25m. By closing the subsidiary, its parent Dutch company abandoned the Tower Hamlets schools contract and a £45m contract to redevelop six schools in East Lothian. Wiltshier also closed as a result of the Dutch parent company's decision.

¹¹ The Bank Netherlands Partnership Program (BNPP) was established in 1998 between the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the World Bank.

The company closures disrupted Tower Hamlets' school building programme. But this was exacerbated by a coincidental decision by Abbey National to withdraw from the PFI market, following poor results from its investment banking operations. The combined effect has been "severe disruption due to the delays in the major construction works programme", leading, said head teachers, to management and organisational problems, "impact on pupil behaviour and morale, and impact on staff morale", it was reported in a confidential Tower Hamlets committee paper in June 2004. The committee report added:

"The demise of Ballast plc did mean that the schools received a very poor standard of hard facility management services for some time [...] The collapse of Ballast plc meant that some schools were left in the unenviable and extremely difficult circumstance of having a significant proportion of their facilities being a building site, with no building activity taking place." Compensation of £8.2m has been paid by Ballast plc's parent company, Ballast Nedam, but even if this is calculated as providing recompense for financial losses to date, this does not compensate for the service disruption.

The unilateral withdrawal of Abbey National's subsidiary Abbey National Treasury Services (ANTS) from the PFI finance market is in its own way just as concerning. The Tower Hamlets report makes clear that the SPV, Tower Hamlets Schools Ltd, reached an agreement with ANTS on the conditions for withdrawal, without the involvement or agreement of the council. Compensation was agreed between ANTS and Tower Hamlets Schools Ltd without the involvement of the local authority and compensation paid into the control of Tower Hamlets Schools, not the council. "This exposes the council to the risk that should TH Schools take a strategic decision to default on the contract, it might decide to provide as little service as possible, whilst taking as much cash as possible out of the contract." (Tower Hamlets committee paper). Despite the intervention of Partnerships UK, ANTS is reported to have refused to alter its position of withdrawing without first ensuring that refinancing is in place. As one role of the financier is to accept project management financial risk, the withdrawal of ANTS transfers risk to the council without the council receiving compensation for this.

The overall impact of the ANTS withdrawal and the Ballast collapse has been to increase the cost and perceived risk of the Tower Hamlets school build project. While Tower Hamlets is in no way to blame for this, it has had to increase the fees it pays to TH Schools to prevent the risk of them walking away from the project. It is therefore clear that the agreement of a PFI contract neither fixes financial commitments in stone, nor does it provide certainty over the realities of risk transfer. (Gosling, undated).



55. This example and others leave us with important questions to be considered: At what level can we experiment with our public services? And as importantly: at what cost? What are some of the problems related to the PPP experiences in schools? The PPP schools of Nova Scotia in Canada are another important case in point (Box 10).

Box 10: More on PPPs and Nova Scotia schools

In 1997, the Liberal government decided that all new schools in Nova Scotia would be built through the P3 initiative and began looking for partners – real estate companies, land developers, financial corporations and public sector pension funds – and construction began. By the time the Conservative government came to power in 1999 it became clear that P3 schools were costing much greater sums of money than originally had been anticipated and the project was cancelled. However, the existing P3 schools remain and by many accounts are plagued with problems that reveal and reinforce the many concerns with this aspect of the privatization of education. Public concern with the P3 process, including the additional costs to the taxpayer resulting from the private company's inability to qualify for lower interest rates available to the province for construction of regular public schools, plagued the project from its outset. It was pointed out that these schools provided a way for the government to claim falsely a better financial position because the P3 arrangement does not show up on the government's books. Furthermore, at the completion of the lease, the public is left with the prospect of purchasing a facility that they had been leasing for a number of years, a facility, that by then would be 25-35 years old, and with a value that will have declined accordingly. All this results in increased costs for the taxpayers in spite of the claim that P3s are cheaper and more efficient than public administered and financed school construction projects. *Often the additional costs are not discovered until the P3 project is well under way* (emphasis added). In June 2000 Nova Scotia cancelled its P3 projects - 50 schools for \$350 million - when it became too expensive. However, the 38 schools that had already been built under this initiative cost Nova Scotia taxpayers \$32 million more than had been estimated. When the province reverted to traditional public sector methods for future school construction it did so at an estimated \$2 million saving per school. (Erica Shaker, CCPA, 2003).

The P3 experiment in Nova Scotia brought to the surface numerous problems, including the location of new schools which were determined by corporate interest rather than educational needs. School access for students and the community was limited after school hours as the facility and its state of art techno-

logy were often rented out by the corporate owners, as stipulated in the lease, to conduct private training courses (Froese-Germain, CTF, 2004).

Scotia Learning Centres (SLC) charged \$75 per hour for a gym while the public board charged \$30 per hour in public schools. Taxpayers found that they were responsible for operating costs, capital improvements, repairs, and technical upgrades. The PPP contract specifically exempted the companies from costs associated with shoddy construction or even faulty wiring and plumbing. Ironically, the Canadian Council for Public Private Partnerships presented the first Halifax P3 schools with their first prize in infrastructure. By 2000 the students were still drinking bottled water, as arsenic was found in the school's well and the corporate owner and the board could not agree on who was responsible for providing water. The schools are still plagued with leaky roofs and unusable sports fields four year after the opening. The SLC demanded a share of all concessions within the school including thirty per cent of students' chocolates bar sales! Responsibility for the costs of vandalism is still unresolved (OSSTF/FEESO, 2004).

Other problems are observed with P3 schools in Canada, such as: they are not necessarily placed 'near inner city communities where they maybe most needed but near high income neighbourhoods where investors may already own property or where it will drive up property values for developers; the application of exorbitant fees in P3 schools for after school activities has 'the effect of decreasing community use of the schools and detaching the community's sense of ownership'; charging substantially more than it costs to deliver the product or service; driving down the quality by the use of substandard materials and non-union labour; and cutting the costs of production by reducing staff or salaries or both, often in the form of contracting out caretaking and maintenance and other support services (OSSTF/FEESO, 2004).

56. The same case is analysed differently by Patrinos (2005) who argues that a KPMG¹² review of the scheme was unable to show whether or not these projects achieved value for money, partly because the bureaucracy had never prepared a public sector comparator against which to compare the PFI outcomes. Likewise, LaRocque (2007) argued that the problems with PPPs in Nova Scotia were related to a variety of political and other problems, including cost overruns driven by project 'gold plating' (that is, increasing school standards, expensive site selection) and weak bureaucratic management. The story of PPP schools in Nova Scotia provides a clear example of very different analyses of the same problem.

¹² Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (accounting firm).



Box 11: PPPs in Scotland

At one Jarvis-built school in Scotland, storm damage to the roof was left unrepaired for a month while the local authority waited for the company to fulfil its maintenance obligations," reported Ireland's Sunday Tribune. "Eventually the local authority was forced to repair the damage itself". A contract held by Jarvis to re-roof schools in the Wirral during 2003 hit serious delays when workers walked off the site, claiming they had not been paid for two months. That, together with other problems on the contract, led to schools being closed over the summer for an extended period, disrupting children's education. Jarvis's accommodation division, Jarvis UPP Holdings, paid compensation of £120,000 to 400 Lancaster University students because of delays in providing new halls of residence (Financial Times, 31st May, 2004). Brighton City Council said in February that the quality of Jarvis's work on redeveloping four schools was "unacceptable" (Gosling, undated).

57. The findings on whether PPPs do really deliver value for money and improve efficiency are contradictory. Some (Patrinos, 2006) state that PFIs have saved the government money and have more efficiently delivered educational infrastructure. Others (the Institute of Public Policy Research, Britain, in Quiggin & Sheil, 2002, and Sheil, 2002) argue that (British) results were highly variable, offering significant gains in roads and prisons, but not in hospitals and schools and that privatisation is merely a more expensive alternative to funding the infrastructure through public borrowing in the traditional way. The Audit Commission (2003)¹³ in the UK reports that the quality of the PFI schools is, statistically speaking, significantly worse than that of the traditionally funded sample (see Box 12).

Box 12: PFI schools in UK

Report of the Audit Commission (2003)

Most users were understandably pleased to have a new school, but they were less happy with some specific aspects of their buildings – for example, size, layout and environmental control. A feature of PFI is that providers suffer financial deductions if they do not put certain failures right, and so, for example, the system builds in maintenance safeguards that are not always there under tradi-

¹³ Independent body responsible for ensuring that public money is spent economically, efficiently and effectively to achieve high-quality local and national services for the public.

tional procurement. But this is only the case if the failures contravene the agreed contract output specification, and availability and performance criteria. Some of the problems we found were covered by the specification (for example, a leaking roof). But others were not, for example, poor acoustics, which is both harder to define precisely as a performance measure and (often) not easily remedied once the school is built. It is a considerable challenge to translate all of these aspects into a usable specification, and then make it work as a performance monitoring tool.

The unit costs of new schools varied widely, with no clear-cut difference between PFI and traditional schools in either construction or most running costs (the average cost of cleaning and caretaking – on the limited evidence available to us at this time – appeared to be higher in PFI schools, probably reflecting higher standards). There was no evidence that the PFI schools were delivered quicker.

Recent report by leading management consultants (2008)

The quality of academy school buildings, established as part of the UK Government's PFI initiative, is reported to have improved since the launch of the first academy schools. Some of the earlier buildings, whilst deemed to be outstanding architecturally, were not always fit for purpose. Buildings and facilities were most frequently cited as the 'worst Academy feature' identified by pupils, parents and staff. Pupils were chiefly concerned about toilets and insufficient space to congregate during break and lunch times; parents most frequently specified inadequate design features and the length of time it had taken to complete the building; and staff highlighted design features, particularly inadequate teaching space. Issues around the project management of earlier buildings (including cost overruns, follow-up on snagging and the need for post-occupation modifications) have been a consistent theme throughout the evaluation. The capital costs of some of the earlier Academies were substantially greater than for equivalent buildings constructed under Building Schools for the Future (BSF). Maintenance and utilities costs are also reportedly higher in Academies than in their predecessor schools (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008).

58. These reports could not show any cost-effectiveness superiority of PFIs in schools in the UK. Yet PPPs continue to proceed in the UK. Here, another critical issue should be taken into consideration: the more public money that is hypothecated (tied) to the operation of the physical infrastructure, the more pressure will automatically increase on the funds allocated for the remaining services (Sheil, 2002).

**Box 13: Another PPP disaster story from Canada**

In this PPP, in the health sector, taxpayers are the ones who paid. A report by the Ontario Auditor General on the Brampton Civic Hospital project shows the pitfalls of this kind of financing: "Public-private partnerships (P3s) are an increasingly popular method for financing the construction of public works projects, from sewage systems through to hospitals. But a recent report by the Auditor General of Ontario should give pause. Auditor General Jim McCarter examined in detail the deal that saw a private consortium build Brampton Civic Hospital and lease it back to the province. Using the ever-cautious words of an accountant, his bottom line was: "Our work indicated that the all-in cost could well have been lower if the government had built the hospital itself." Put more bluntly: Taxpayers got screwed. On paper, P3s look good. The idea is that private business will use its acumen and access to capital to build facilities quickly and cost-effectively. Cash-strapped governments, for their part, are able to invest in much-needed infrastructure now while repaying investors over the long term - as individuals do with a mortgage. In theory, this allows both public and private partners to focus on what they do best.

But let's take a look at what happened in practice at Brampton Civic Hospital. In November, 2001, the Ontario government approved the development of new hospitals using the P3 approach. In August, 2003, a deal was signed between William Osler Health Centre (the health corporation that runs Brampton Civic) and The Healthcare Infrastructure Company (a consortium of private-sector companies) to design, build and finance a new hospital. The consortium would also provide non-clinical services such as laundry, housekeeping, security and maintenance over a 25-year period. The Auditor General found that, when all was said and done, going the P3 route cost Ontario taxpayers \$194-million more than if the hospital had been built and run publicly. Financing the construction cost added a further \$200-million in interest charges because government can borrow money at a lower rate than private business.

As much as we love to complain about the presumed inefficiencies of government, this is not capitalism's shining moment of glory. Paying \$394-million too much for a \$614-million hospital is pathetic - with a capital PPP. So how did the money-saving P3 idea unravel? Again, the Brampton Civic story is informative. The Auditor General points to several key problems:

In 2001, a consultant pegged the cost of a new 716-bed hospital at \$381-million. By 2004 - after the province embraced P3s - that estimate jumped to \$525-million for a smaller, 608-bed hospital, but the discrepancy was never justified. (The hospital opened with 479 beds operating in October, 2007); The cost of

a government-built hospital was overstated by a whopping \$289-million, making it look like a totally unaffordable option compared to a P3; For example, when estimating the cost of a government-built hospital, William Osler Health Centre added \$67-million, assuming a 13-per-cent cost overrun. In reality, cost overruns are about 5 per cent; The province spent \$28-million on consultants working on the P3 project but didn't include that in the P3 costs; nor did it factor in all the time government employees spent on the project; During construction, \$63-million in modifications were made that were attributable to lack of planning and rushing the project.

While those numbers are damning enough, Mr. McCarter notes, more fundamentally, that the province never conducted a formal analysis to determine if the market was sufficiently large and competitive to justify a P3 arrangement. In this instance, the answer is clearly "No." Because so few construction contractors are able to undertake a project as large and complex as building a hospital, they would end up being involved whether the facility was built by government or a consortium. So all that going the P3 route does is pad the bills. In his report, the Auditor General makes a series of recommendations to avoid the Brampton Civic debacle and notes that the Ontario government has already implemented many of the changes. There is no doubt P3s can be done better. But no one is asking whether they should be done at all.

As the federal government embarks on a plan to spend its way out of a recession, it has created a new Crown corporation, PPP Canada Inc., and given it \$1.3-billion to "spearhead the promotion of public-private partnerships." Taxpayers deserve more than P3 boosterism. And they deserve more justification than a fallacious premise that governments are incapable of efficiency. Our much-needed public works projects, from hospitals to bridges, should be built and operated as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible and, so far, P3s have not proven their mettle. As Canadian comic and aspiring politician Greg Malone has said bitinglly: "P3s should be called P12s - Public Private Partnerships to Plunder the Public Purse to Pursue Policies of Peril to People and the Planet for all Posterity" (A. PICARD, *Globe and Mail*, February 5, 2009).

<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>

59. Clearly, the problems with PPPs go beyond what may be considered to be mere technical issues. PPPs raise serious worries about the very processes involved, as well as issues of democracy, accountability and transparency. In other words, the range of problems related to PPPs in different countries raise the fundamental issue of democracy in public services. Maybe the most important concerns is that commercial relations can fundamentally change the values and processes of democratic governments (CUPE, 2005).



Private operation of public schools – contract schools

60. *Public schools operated by private firms or organisations under contract to a public agency are part of this type of PPPs. Under these arrangements, the schools remain public owned and funded, but are managed by a private sector operator in turn of a management fee.*
61. These initiatives are based upon the argument that giving schools **autonomy** will free schools from public service constraints, and harness the interest and knowledge of motivated parents and other community members to improve school oversight (Patrinos, 2006). In some of these operational contracts, the private operator manages and staffs the school. Such schools include the charter schools in the USA, the *Fe y Alegria* (FyA) school network in Latin America, *Colegios en Concesion* (concession schools) in Colombia, City Academies and Edison Schools in the UK, AVEC in Venezuela and Alternative Education in New Zealand among others. Each of these schools has its own specific arrangement, as shown in the boxes below.
62. In the US, the entities that undertake school management are almost all organized as for-profit companies. The number of privately managed public schools in the United States has grown from 138 schools in 1998-99 to 463 schools, managed by 51 Educational Management Organisations (EMOs), in 2003-04 (Patrinos, 2006). In 2003, approximately 80 percent of privately managed schools were charter schools (see Box 14 below).

Box 14: Privately Managed Public Schools in the United States

The private management of public schools in the USA can take either of two forms. The first involves direct contracting, under which a local school board contracts directly with an EMO (Educational Management Organisations) to manage a public school. The second involves indirect contracting under which EMOs manage charter schools either as the holder of the school charter or under contract to the organization that holds the school charter. Although these schools are privately managed, they remain publicly owned and publicly funded. Students usually do not pay fees to attend these schools. Typically, private sector operators are brought in to operate the worst performing schools in a given school district. In terms of the typology set out above, private firms may operate under either 'management contracts' or 'operational contracts'. Under the former, only the management of the school is turned over to the private sector; while teaching and

other staff remain employed by the government or local school board under their existing terms and conditions. Under the latter, teaching and other staff are employed by the private operator and terms and conditions of employment may differ from the central teacher contract. Under both of the above models, the private sector operator is paid a fixed amount per student (usually equal to the average cost of educating a student in the public sector) or is paid a fixed management and must meet specific performance benchmarks (LaRocque, 2007).

Charter schools

Charter schools are secular public schools of choice that operate with freedom from many of the regulations that apply to traditional public schools, such as geographic enrolment restrictions and teacher union contracts. The charter that establishes a school is a performance contract that details the school's mission, program, goals, students served, methods of assessment and ways in which success will be measured. Charter schools may be managed by the community or by a for-profit or not-for-profit school manager. School charters may be granted by a district school board, a university or other authorising agency. The term of a charter can vary, but most are granted for 3-5 years. Charter schools are accountable to their sponsor or authorising agency to produce positive academic results and to adhere to the charter contract. A school's charter can be revoked if guidelines on curriculum and management are not followed or standards are not met. At the end of the term of the charter, the entity granting the charter may renew the school's contract.

63. Typically, private sector operators are brought in to operate the worst performing schools in a given school district, as the case of Philadelphia, where 70 of the worst performing schools have been contracted to for-profit and not-for-profit management organizations. Taken together, the findings are inconclusive. A few studies have found significant performance improvements whereas several have found either no impact or deterioration in school performance (Patrinos, 2005). Other commentators have pointed to very critical issues raised by charter schools. Gerson and Miller (2006), report that charter schools which are run by private companies, operate with "flexible" hours, longer school days, longer school years, no teacher seniority rights, no pensions, limited health benefits, etc. Other concerns were raised by the two labour members of the Commission on Skills of the American Workforce¹⁴, who wrote a short statement registering 'concern' that "the design for contract schools can become an open door for profiteers," citing the example of Ohio, "where charter school legislation has resulted in almost universal poor student achievement, minimal accountability, and yet considerable profits for charter operators, many with peculiar political agendas". The list of serious concerns on charter schools continues (Box 15).

¹⁴ Morton Bahr and Dal Lawrence (past president of the Toledo Federation of Teachers).



Box 15: The other face of charter schools – the case of Oakland

The public schools in Oakland, California, were seized by the state in 2003 because the district supposedly could not pay off a state loan. Oakland Unified School District (OUSD) is a heavily minority majority school district in a city that lost much of its industry as manufacturing was automated. The take-over meant that the parents, students and teachers of the city lost their civil rights to make decisions about their schools. This loss is central to everything that followed. The state came in with a pretence of fiscal responsibility, but quickly doubled the debt. The real purpose was to change a captive city's public education into the corporate model. Randolph Ward, the first state-administrator, quickly shut down the high school newspapers, closed schools, opened charters, eliminated libraries, counsellors, electives and support staff, especially in the poor Flatland schools. Schools became profit centres, based on high-stakes testing and scripted learning. This was a classic bait and switch scheme, similar to what is now happening in New Orleans, Washington DC and other cities. For four years, the Oakland Unified School District (OUSD) has been a captive laboratory for corporate-style education: *"It has been hailed as a national model of education reform, a school district where public-private partnerships combined with strong leadership and vision to completely transform a long struggling public education system"* (emphasis added). "School districts from coast to coast had seen pieces of what Oakland was experiencing, but rarely – if ever – had all the planets supporting meaningful reform aligned themselves together like they did in Oakland back then". "Together these forces (a state-appointed administrator, philanthropists and key community organizations – ed) set out to turn the Oakland school system on its head by creating a marketplace of schooling options for families, shifting school budgets from the central office to the schools and forcing the entrenched bureaucracy to reinvent itself as a bona fide support organization for schools."

Despite the alignment of the planets, after 4 years of state-appointed administrators, the district was further in debt than ever with little positive to show for it. In fact, the state take-over was virtually a hostile corporate take-over by billionaire Eli Broad, who hand-picked all important district personnel. Since the community lost its voice, 42 of 98 schools have been closed, chartered or made into "small schools". 62% of Oakland's schools have been forced into PI under NCLB (No Child Left Behind). Suddenly, to everyone's surprise, it turns out that charter schools actually cost the district money. The district loses Average Daily Attendance (ADA) revenue from the state for every child that went to a char-

ter school. Furthermore in California public property, often including buildings, supplies, computers and all manner of resources, is usually handed over to charters at no cost. However OUSD steadfastly keeps increasing the number of charters. Under the state regime, every cut in the educational program lead to an attack on teachers and every attack on teachers guaranteed cuts to the educational program. Libraries, counsellors, nurses and psychologists disappeared in schools in the poor parts of town. Kindergarten was extended to a full day schedule, without naps, so the children could take standardized tests. However, since younger students cannot be trusted to bubble in the forms correctly, teachers are forced to fill out hundreds of forms for them on their own time. To support this effort, corporate forces came forward to raise more than \$40 million for OUSD “to redesign the central office” and refused to allocate even a penny of this money to the classroom. However, administrators are leaving the schools at an alarming rate, the highest in the state, despite the money. Meanwhile, the debt is being paid for by the children, since a portion is deducted from the classroom, from the (ADA) that the city receives from the state. The children are forced to pay off the loan (Miller and Gerson, 2008).

64. Although it is claimed that charter schools are public schools, they have quickly evolved either towards well-funded, niche schools for the Haves, or schools of deprivation for the Have-Nots (Quigley, in Miller and Gerson, 2008). Their managements lack the public accountability of public schools, do not have to report to the public and can pick and choose their students, something that public schools cannot do. Other research has also argued that charter schools often receive major private donations of funds that provide them with much greater resources than public schools, and yet they do not show significant achievement (Miller and Gerson, 2008).
65. City Academies in the UK face challenges similar to those of many Charter Schools in the US – particularly as they take over poorly performing schools in socially disadvantaged areas. A recent evaluation of the program shows that there is no significant short-term impact on learning outcomes, though it may be too early to assess the impact of the program because it covered only two years of operation (Machin and Wilson, 2005, in Patrinos, 2006).

**Box 16: Academies in the United Kingdom**

Academy schools, described as 'publicly funded independent schools', have been one of the most controversial initiatives within the UK Labour Government's education agenda since 1997.

The academy programme was, initially at least, part of the Government's response to tackling 'educational underperformance' in deprived areas and to rising demand for school places. The academy schools programme was launched in March 2000 as 'a radical approach to promote greater diversity and break the cycle of failing schools in inner cities' (Taylor, 2004).

Under the academy schools programme, the Government establishes contracts in the form of funding agreements with external sponsors representing private or voluntary sector interests. Initially, sponsors were required to commit to contribute 20 percent of capital costs up to a maximum of \$3 million (equivalent); the Government would agree to pay the remaining 80 percent. Each Academy is given significant freedom over management structures, staffing and curriculum organisation. The first 3 schools opened in September 2002 (Source: Machin and Wilson 2005, cited in Patrinos, 2006).

Sponsors name the school and appoint the governing body in return for investing up to £2 million in the school. However, there is some doubt that all of the original sponsors actually provided the full £2 million investment required under the programme (Taylor and Evans, 2006).

Since 2008, the Government has actively encouraged local authorities to take part in joint sponsorship of academies. There is increasing concern, too, that the planned expansion to 400 Academies will "create challenges for [the Government] in securing sufficient numbers of high quality sponsors". The requirement for sponsors to commit £2 million has also been removed.

(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008).

The closest international equivalent to the academy programme is the Charter Schools of the United States, although the programme has a close lineage to the failed City Technology Colleges initiative developed by the UK Conservative Government during the 1980s.

The extended power and diminished public accountability of sponsors of academy schools has been a major battleground. The available evidence points to sponsors using public funds to advance their religious and commercial interests, diminished engagement and consultation with parents of pupils attending academy schools, and the failure of sponsors to honour the pay and other contractual terms and conditions of staff transferring from predecessor schools to work in the new academies. However, getting access to talk to academy school spon-

sors and principals for the purpose of independent research and evaluation is difficult to achieve, reflecting to some degree that these schools are resistant to public scrutiny. There is widespread concern about the difficulty in obtaining independent evidence of the impact of the academy schools model on standards of education. (Rogers and Migniuolo, 2007; and Needham and Gleeson, 2006) Academy schools represent a break with the national pay and conditions framework for teachers and some have been unwilling to recognise trade unions. In response to mounting concerns about the difficulties experienced by trade unions seeking to represent their members in academy schools, the Trades Union Congress (TUC), together with teacher and support staff unions developed and published a 'Model Agreement for Academies in England' which was launched in 2008. The Model Agreement is intended to support negotiations with academy schools over union recognition, consultation and bargaining arrangements (TUC, 2008).

The evidence from the existing academy schools indicates that there is high demand for academy school places. On average, 2.6 applications are received for every place. However, there is also evidence from the review commissioned by the UK Government that although the *number* of pupils from socially deprived backgrounds has grown by around 1,400 since the first Academies opened, the *relative proportion of pupils from these backgrounds* has declined at a faster rate than for other schools, with a fall of nearly 6% in Academies compared to 2% in comparator schools and 1% in England as a whole. This suggests that one of the central policy aspirations for the academies programme is not being met. There are marked differences between academies in terms of admission of pupils with special educational needs, although there is reportedly no strong quantitative evidence that changes in the profile of academy school pupils has been at the expense of other schools. However, despite this, academy schools consistently are more likely to exclude pupils permanently compared to other schools nationally.

The impact of academy schools on pupil attainment confirms there is considerable diversity across individual academies and no simple uniform 'Academy effect'. There is also evidence that academy schools employ more teachers without Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) (12%) than Local Authority maintained schools (5%), despite the fact that the funding agreements for the schools all require teachers to have QTS (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008).

In its campaigning document *Academies – looking beyond the spin: why the NUT calls for a different approach*, the NUT sets out the key reasons for its opposition to the Academies initiative. 2007 has seen an unprecedented level of



campaigning all over the country against individual Academies. The Anti-Academy Alliance organised a Committee of Enquiry in the House of Commons in June 2007, at which MPs heard evidence from the school workforce unions, parents' and governors' organisations, education researchers and almost 30 local campaigning groups: "The evidence presented revealed a damning indictment of the Academies initiative – unsuitable sites, undesirable sponsors, the closure of good and improving schools, local consultations ignored, local authorities bullied through Building Schools for the Future funding, the manipulation of pupil intakes and admissions policies, scant regard for pupils with special educational needs and concerns about the curriculum being offered to pupils in Academies. Overwhelmingly the message was that the Academies initiative was damaging local schools and was being foisted on reluctant local authorities, parents, governors and teachers" (NUT, 2007). The Academies programme is expanding even though it has not been proven to be successful for pupils in Academies nor has it been independently evaluated for its impact on other local schools (NUT, 2007).

There is, however, mixed evidence on the subject. The TUC Report (Rogers Migniuolo, 2007) points out to the "recent developments and changes to the Academy model, which do offer opportunities to build a new strategy". In a number of parts of the country, local authorities are now being enabled to integrate Academies into their overall strategy for secondary school provision within their locality. In addition, relatively recent changes to the model funding agreement governing the activities of Academies means that they are increasingly having to meet core national standards required of community schools. However, in spite of these welcome developments, there remain challenges in building a new consensus for a reform of the Academies programme that would achieve genuine support from all parties. "A key finding of the report is that the programme itself, and the context within which it operates, have changed so significantly since its launch that there is an overriding need to review and evaluate the current situation" (Rogers Migniuolo, 2007).

66. The Education and Skills Select Committee in the UK found that 'Despite the Governments' proclaimed attachment to evidence-based policy, expensive schemes seem to be rolled out before being adequately tested and evaluated compared to other less expensive alternatives' (UK Parliament: House of Commons, 2005).
67. Likewise important issues are raised with Edison schools being introduced in the UK¹⁵

¹⁵ E-mail communication with Andy Ballard (ATL)

Box 17: Edison Schools in the United Kingdom

Edison Schools is well established in the United States, where it runs around 100 charter schools, which enjoy similar freedoms to academies. The company, which struggled financially after its launch, has enjoyed mixed success. In England, its operation has grown over the past four years and now works as a consultant to at least 60 schools. It caught the attention of Lord Adonis when he was junior schools minister, and Michael Gove, the shadow schools secretary, has visited Turin Grove to see the company's approach. Edison's CEO said that a business contract and profit incentive helped to ensure that the company performed at a high level. "We are not embarrassed about being a profit-making company," he said. "That is what allows us to innovate and bring school improvement. We are interested in expanding our influence and becoming a main player. If we are not doing a good job at a good price, people will not use us." Edison Schools is in advanced talks with academy sponsors to take charge of three schools within the next year, and as many as 12 in total. The company will charge each academy around Pounds 1.2 million for a three-year contract, with about 20 per cent of the fee directly linked to improving school performance. The controversial move pushes the Government's ban on running state schools for profit to its limit. It also follows a policy shift that has paved the way for profit-making companies to run alternative provision for excluded and vulnerable children. Academy sponsors themselves are not allowed to operate their schools for a profit. But Edison Schools will be able to take money out of the schools' budgets in return for hitting targets. Mark Logan, managing director of Edison's UK operation, said the company would deliver value for money and sustainable improvements. The fee includes providing a senior management team, training for staff and a system that strictly monitors pupil performance. Edison Schools said it had received increased interest from local authorities following the launch of the Government's National Challenge scheme, which has threatened to close schools where fewer than 30 per cent of GCSE pupils attain five good grades, including in English and maths. The company's plan to run academies is based on a model it is using at Turin Grove School, formerly known as Salisbury School, in Edmonton, north London. It took over running the school in April last year, the first time a for-profit company had struck such a deal. Edison Schools also expects to expand its work with local authorities. The move would be similar to a deal the company recently signed in Northampton, where it is working with 20 schools. Part of the contract would be based on payment by results, with exam grades, value-added scores and Ofsted ratings being taken into account (TES Connect, 2008¹⁶).

¹⁶For more: <http://www.tes.co.uk/article.aspx?storycode=6005076>



68. These initiatives are promoted to aim at freeing schools from public service constraints or giving schools 'autonomy', and harnessing the interest and knowledge of motivated parents and other community members to improve the oversight of schools. However, proponents of charter schools note that the initial results are inconclusive. 'Management improvements' include a reduction in the share of the budget allocated to human resources. Although charter schools receive often vast private donations of funds that provide them with tremendously greater resources than public schools, they do not show significant achievement. Moreover, charter schools run by private companies operate with 'flexible' hours, longer school days, longer school years, no teacher seniority rights, no pensions, and limited health benefits. Another drawback of the model is that it provides the poorest students with educational models that do not match their real needs. Other concerns: the design for contract schools can become an open door for profiteers. Reasons given for the promotion of these PPPs included alternatives to poor quality public education. However, even promoters of PPPs have drawn attention to the potential for corruption and monitoring problems in supply-sided funded PPPs (meaning public money given directly to private schools; as a block per student grant) as well as public school systems. Cases of corruption have been observed not only in poor countries, with weak regulatory systems and democracy, as the following case from the US shows:

Box 18: Corruption

Brenda Belton, former charter oversight chief for the DC Board of Education plead guilty in 2007 to massive theft from the low-performing school system. She admitted to arranging about \$649,000 in illegal school payments and sweetheart contracts to herself and her friends. Not to be outdone, in California, the CEO of one of the state's largest charter school networks, C. Steven Cox, was indicted on 113 felony counts of misappropriating public funds, grand theft and tax evasion. Meanwhile, in Oakland, the principal of Urban Preparatory Charter Academy, Isaac Haqq, resigned after it was proven that he changed many failing student grades to A's and B's (Miller and Gerson, 2008).

69. Indeed, as the United National Global Compact (in Draxler, 2008) puts it, in many areas, business is too often linked with serious dilemmas – for example, exploitative practices, corruption, income inequality, and barriers that discourage innovation and entrepreneurship. The problems of corruption observed in education PPPs are not just related to the wrong people doing the business. Indeed, they may point to the perversities that such an arrangement brings into education systems.

70. A specific case is that of contractual PPPs with NGOs and faith-based organisations. An experience of the operation of public schools by a faith-based organization is the case of AVEC schools in Venezuela (Box 19) and Fe y Alegria in Latin America (Box 20).

Box 19: AVEC in Venezuela.

The Venezuelan Association of Catholic Education (AVEC) runs over 700 Catholic schools, most of which deliver education to poor children. In 1990, the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sport (MECD) struck an agreement with AVEC to provide subsidies to private schools located in low-income urban and rural areas, indigenous communities, vocational schools, and those schools that were only able to cover up to 85 percent of operational costs. *Fe y Alegria* schools form a large body of AVEC schools. In 2005, government subsidies to AVEC schools amounted to almost \$49 million, covering 483,000 students. The agreement between MECD and AVEC holds AVEC schools to higher degree of accountability for performance than public schools (Mora 2005). Whereas there are no conditions imposed on public schools, AVEC schools must provide financial statements to MECD regarding the use of funds and present an annual management report. Supervision is also a large part of the AVEC model: supervisors visit the schools twice a year to assess the academic and operational situation. This information is then compiled for future analysis (Patrinos, 2006 – report for the World Bank).

71. There is very little rigorous empirical evidence of the impacts of AVEC schools on education outcomes *vis-à-vis* regular public schools according to Patrinos (2006). A comparison of publicly subsidized AVEC schools and public schools shows that AVEC has a strong association with better schooling outcomes (Mora, 2005). Repetition rates and dropout rates are lower in AVEC schools than they are in public schools and AVEC schools have a higher percentage of teachers with higher education diplomas (*ibid*). In addition, AVEC schools have lower per student costs but a higher percentage of their budgets go to non-personnel costs (*ibid*).
72. FyA schools network in 14 Latin American countries stands out among the institutions affiliated to AVEC. FyA is a Jesuit initiative which began its work in Venezuela in 1955 and since then, its programmes have spread through various Latin American countries (Mora, 2005). FyA is funded by contributions from the state and from private individuals (*ibid*).

**Box 20: *Fe y Alegria* (FyA) in Latin America**

FyA schools network in 14 Latin American countries stands out among the institutions affiliated to AVEC in Venezuela, the *Fe y Alegria* is a Jesuit initiative which began its work in Venezuela in 1955 and since then, its programmes have spread through various Latin American countries (Mora, 2005). FyA is funded by contributions from the state and from private individuals.

In Latin America, an example of extensive contracting is the FyA school network, which operates schools in 14 Latin American countries, serving more than one million students. Essentially, they operate public schools. FyA is a non-governmental organisation affiliated with the Catholic Church that operates formal pre-school, primary, secondary and technical education programmes in the poorest communities of Latin America. Most of the schools are located in rural areas, but some are found in or near urban slums. By agreement with government, teacher salaries are publicly funded, while communities and the private sector cover other costs (Patrinos, 2005 and LaRocque, 2007 – reports for the World Bank).

There are sources which report that schools integrated into FyA outperform traditional public schools, with lower repetition, lower dropout rates, and higher overall rates of progress in school and higher overall retention rates. Here the main indicator of school performance is schooling retention – largely because most countries where FyA operates do not have standardised tests. The same sources see the superiority of such schools in the fact that they generally enjoy great autonomy, despite being publicly funded and regulated. Such schools can usually appoint school directors and teachers without state or teacher union interference. Part of the success is seen on their labour contract flexibility and decentralised administrative structure. But there is scepticism about the success of this type of arrangement; for example: unit costs in FyA schools were higher than in public schools when community contributions were factored in.

73. According to Patrinos (2005), the evaluation of the program in nine countries indicates that schools integrated into FyA outperform traditional public schools, with lower repetition, lower dropout rates, and higher overall rates of progress in school and higher overall retention rates. FyA schools consistently come out on top in performance tests and the overall retention rate in FyA schools is 11 percent higher than that of the corresponding public schools. By comparing FyA and public schools in nine Latin American countries, Swope and Latorre (2000, in Patrinos, 2005) found that unit costs in FyA schools were higher than in public schools when the community contribution was factored in. However, it is important to consider here that the main indicator of school performance is schooling retention – largely because most countries where FyA operates do not have standardised tests (McMeekin, 2003 in Patrinos, 2005).

Box 21: Colegios de Concesion (Colombia)

The City of Bogota, Colombia has introduced the *colegios en concesión* (concession schools) program, under which the management of some public schools is turned over to high quality private institutions. The concession schools program was developed in the late 1990s and the first schools began operating in 2000. There are currently 25 schools (serving 26,000 students) being operated by private managers under the concession model. The program is designed to overcome some of the problems faced by public schools, such as weak leadership, inability of schools to select their own personnel, lack of labour flexibility, lack of equipment and supplies, bureaucratic red-tape and the politicization/unionization of the education sector. Under the program, private schools and education organizations bid in a competitive process to manage newly built schools in poor neighbourhoods of Bogota. Contractors may manage one or a group of schools. Schools are paid \$506 per full-time student per year (well below the average annual cost of a student who attends a half-day public school), must provide educational services to poor children and must accept all students. Management contracts are for 15 years. The provider has full autonomy over school management and is assessed based on results. Failure to meet educational outcome targets such as standardized test scores and dropout rates for two consecutive years can result in the cancellation of the contract. Schools are monitored through private inspection firms, the Ministry of Education, and a Ministry-financed evaluation (LaRocque, 2007 and Patrinos, 2006 – reports for the World Bank).

74. While true impact evaluations have not yet been undertaken, initial assessment results show that the programme has led to a number of 'management improvements', including a reduction in the share of the budget allocated to human resources (from 90% to 55% in the public school system), which has freed up money for nutritional support, as well as the purchase of textbooks and teaching materials (LaRocque, 2007). Educators have expressed satisfaction with the greater autonomy that schools enjoy (Patrinos, 2005, LaRocque, 2005). But this type of schools has also produced some disadvantages (Mora, 2005). The salaries and working conditions of teachers are lower than in the public sector, teachers may be motivated to leave these schools when they have the chance, with negative effects on the school. Another drawback of the model is that it provides the poorest students with educational models that do not match their real needs.
75. One of the in-depth cases of NGOs involvement in PPPs on delivering education is the case study of Senegal analysed in box 22 below (Nordtveit, 2005b: 18). Although the case may not be representative of all the PPPs involving NGOs, the analyses made by Nordtveit are worth considering, especially given that the same pattern has been put forward in other countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Niger and The Gambia.



Box 22: The case of Senegal

The “Women’s Literacy Project” is a World Bank-funded project that the Senegalese government outsourced to local development associations and organisations between 1996 and 2001. The project aimed to strengthen existing civil society organisations and also to stimulate growth of new associations for the provision of literacy courses. At the local level, the literacy project was designed to teach literacy and also to improve the participants’ organisational capacities i.e., building local capacity to manage women’s associations. The selection of provider organisations was done through outsourcing, consisting of a yearly bidding process that selected the best literacy course proposals for financing. The method went under the names of “partnership” (*le partenariat*), or “to make do” method (*faire-faire*). Nordtveit (2005a) argues that PPPs lack guidelines to ensure an equitable distribution of the services, as for example providers usually have a tendency to choose only areas and ethnic groups that are easily accessible. The market mechanisms of the partnership approach, if not corrected, argues Nordtveit (2005b: 18), may exclude certain population groups from service delivery (e.g., nomads, or inhabitants of remote and inaccessible areas). In reviewing the outcomes of the World Bank financed Women’s literacy Project in Senegal, it was noted that public private partnerships “decreased the quality of learning through the use of cost cutting practices” (Nordtveit, 2005: 21). Concerns over the case of Senegal were voiced even from the World Bank itself, pointing out to a considerable amount of money, which “has been spent on monitoring and on an evaluation system which has largely failed to ensure that the literacy activities were of adequate quality” (Nordtveit, 2005b: 17). Indeed, the experience of delivering education through PPPs with NGOs in Senegal has changed the role and relative influence of civil society and of the government. The government’s opposition was weakened inasmuch as it had less choice in defining implementation policies in the 1990s than before, whereas the World Bank and other bilateral and multilateral institutions had more influence (Nordtveit, 2005). Similarly, Nordtveit (*ibid*) argues that this system has changed the nature of civil society associations, which became government-dependent businesses. The experience of such arrangements in Senegal, elaborated by Nordtveit (2005), revealed other problems, such as: (i) PPPs lack guidelines to ensure an equitable distribution of the services, as for example providers usually have a tendency to choose only areas and ethnic groups that are easily accessible; (ii) the market mechanisms of the partnership approach, if not corrected, may exclude certain population groups from service delivery (e.g., nomads, or inhabitants of remote and inaccessible areas); (iii) the system has changed the nature of civil society associations, which have become government-dependent businesses.

76. A World Bank review notes that contracting for school management is very difficult to implement because of the challenge of identifying measurable and verifiable performance criteria Patrinos (2005). While trying to analyse the experience of schools introduced under the PPP arrangements, referring to the example of FyA, Patrinos (2006) reports that schools generally enjoy great autonomy. Despite being publicly funded and regulated, they can usually appoint school directors and teachers without state or teacher union interference; their better performance is argued to be attributable to their labour contract flexibility and decentralised administrative structure. Operational services contracting is most often tried in areas or schools that are performing poorly or have the greatest financial need such as the case of the US, where it is most often used in 'failing' schools. In Latin America, governments most often contract with FyA to run rural schools for hard-to-reach populations, and the heavy reliance on parents' and community participation is a complement to the accountability pursued via the contract. Literacy courses in Senegal offered very cheap and ineffective schooling (whereas the state-implemented primary school system offered much more expensive but also a somewhat more effective education). Literacy education through this PPP in Senegal can be characterised as poor education for the poorest of citizens, pointing also to the profit-seeking behaviour of the private providers. The providers offered low-quality learning because they wanted to make money from the service delivery, and therefore cut the costs (Nordtveit, 2005: 3).

Outsourcing of education services

77. This type of PPP include services such as: (i) supply of text books; curriculum and other learning materials to schools; (ii) the supply of associated services to schools and higher education institutions, such as school review and inspection¹⁷.

¹⁷ A (controversial) snapshot of how countries involve the private sector in supplying inputs into education systems is also given by the World Bank webpage on Teacher Evaluation as Part of Quality Assurance: (a) in centralized countries (such as Cuba, France, Japan), the State effectively controls the curriculum, educates and employs teachers and evaluates them and measures student achievement; (b) a number of reformist countries, most with a decentralized tradition (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK, US) increasingly use standards that are intended to align teaching, materials, and assessment with curriculum goals; (c) countries or systems (Holland, Scotland, Ontario) with a high level of educational attainment and a strong democratic tradition, which have a self-regulating approach, i.e. they substitute stakeholder participation and accountability for control, so that, instead of standards, they have a continuous dialogue about education quality, and what can be done to improve education.

<http://www1.worldbank.org/education/globaleducationreform/08.TeacherReform/teacher%20ref%20Quality%20Assurance.htm>



78. According to Patrinos (2006), contracting for professional services to improve quality is less common. Public and private schools in 11 countries across the Middle East, Europe and North America have contracted with the Sabis Network, which was founded in 1886 in Lebanon, for curriculum design and implementation services. In 2003, there were about 25,000 students in Sabis¹⁸ network schools, which implement the Sabis Educational System, an internationally focused curriculum. Two examples of outsourcing of educational services are provided from India and Brazil below (boxes 23 and 24):

Box 23: Quality Assurance Resource Centre, India

Another type of service offered to schools in India is the SEF Quality Assurance Resource Centre, which promotes the introduction of mechanisms to evaluate and accredit courses, programmes and degrees offered by educational providers (both public and private) (World Bank, 2003).

The SEF (Sindh Education Foundation) operates a Quality Assurance Resource Centre (QARC), an educational development project aimed at developing a quality assurance certification programme as a means of influencing the quality of education at both public and private schools. The proposed certification programme would allow schools' quality to be categorised as a means of informing parents' schooling decisions. It would also provide for tailored quality enhancement support for public, private and community/NGO schools, through for example, training and capacity building of teachers, school heads and managers. The programme has only just been developed. Its budget is nearly Rs40 million (LaRocque, 2008).

Box 24: Pitágoras Network of Schools (PNS)

Pitágoras and Positivo are examples of big corporations supporting both the public and private sector through an integrated school improvement package offering administrative and technical support to affiliated schools (Mora, 2005). In Brazil, besides providing schools with an integrated curriculum and textbooks, they offer principals and schools, a wide range of professional development opportunities and management support. In the case of public schools, the participation of these companies is funded by selling books to the schools, reports Mora (2005). PNS supports public and private independent schools through an integrated school improvement package that offers integrated curriculum, management and technical support to affiliated schools. Schools enter into a yearly contract with PNS, in which they commit themselves to using Pitágoras textbooks at all grade levels. PNS has its own curriculum and provides schools in its network with textbooks, management training for principals, teacher training, cheap internet access, as well as management and pedagogical support. Five regional directors visit member schools between one and five times per year. There are currently some 350 schools, with over 150,000 students, affiliated to PNS. In 2001, Pitágoras charged schools anywhere from \$68 to \$157 per student for these services (LaRocque, 2007).

¹⁸ Sabis schools operate a longer school day than most schools and put considerable emphasis on testing.

79. The concept of quality assurance mechanisms is problematic. It is often striking, though, that this literature does not deal with the content of education quality, but with methods and organisation models mechanisms (Fredriksson, undated). These assessment systems have a quite different basis to those of international comparative indicators, such as PISA¹⁹.
80. While making a critical analyses of the educational systems in Europe, Amaral et al (2006), notes that, under new public management, students are referred to as customers or clients, and in most higher education systems quality assurance and accountability measures have been put in place to ensure that academic provision meets client needs and expectations. Among these mechanisms one finds an extensive array of performance indicators and measures of academic quality. Auditing practice in the public sector has received a decisive stimulus since the mid-1980s, in keeping with political commitments to reform of public sector administration (Fredriksson, undated). In little more than a decade, the frequency and number of standardized tests has more than doubled in many countries in response to political and public debate over the effectiveness of public schools.
81. In his essay "The case against standardized testing" in the US, Henry (2007) notes that in 2005, 11 million exams were added in elementary and middle schools; another 11 million tests for high school science are expected to bring the national total to near 50 million by 2008, amid signs that the quality, reliability and validity of exams are eroding (ibid). While, Henry (2007) asserts that there are no large-scale, peer-reviewed academic studies which prove or even suggest, that a high-stakes, standardized testing educational program improves learning, skill-development or achievement for students. He also notes that standardized testing is only imposed in public schools, and draws a contrast with the approach of elite private schools: "The academic motto of the Blake School in Minneapolis is: *Challenging the mind; engaging the heart*. And from their program description: *One of Blake's core values is love of learning. Every day, in every classroom our students embrace this value by actively engaging in the learning process*. Here is the Mission Statement of St. Paul Academy and Summit School in Saint Paul: *In pursuit of excellence in teaching and learning, St. Paul Academy and Summit School educates a diverse and motivated group of young people for leadership and service, inspires in them an enduring love of learning, and helps them lead productive, ethical and joyful lives*" (Henry, 2007).

¹⁹ Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), OECD 2006.



82. So, questions Henry: If elite private schools in American education do not utilize high stakes exams, why then is it being foisted on public schools? The political drive of standardized tests is highlighted also by Kohn (2000) in his important work on standardized testing and the impact on schools. Kohn argues that they are "not like the weather, something to which we must resign ourselves. . . . They are not a force of nature but a force of politics – and political decisions can be questioned, challenged, and ultimately reversed." In other words, it is time to challenge the test-based approach of New Public Management, which has shifted the debate on educational quality and accountability.

83. The EI congress²⁰ of 2007 expressed the same concern in its resolution "Quality Education: Present and Future".

... any evaluation of the quality of education provided by any public education institution must not be based solely on student achievement test scores but take into account a range of factors related to the context of the school and the class, such as student capacities, skills, socio-economic circumstances, financial and learning resources, facilities, school administration, class sizes and school organisation characteristics" (EI Congress 2007).

84. Education is highly political, and so are the indicators used to assess it. As EI maintains "assessment systems may become a political and economic tool to promote privatisation". As the IFC recognized "different stakeholders have differing interpretations regarding both the production and valuation of educational quality". But the IFC goes on to assert that these differing interpretations are to be considered as essentially in terms of "the trade off between quality enhancement and access, quantity and cost". This seems to suggest that we are left with no alternative but to find the best "trade offs". Serious questions emerge from such an assertion: **is it true that we have no other choice, but to trade off? What are we to trade off in education? Who takes the decisions and through which processes?**

Outsourcing of non-educational support services

85. No attempt has been made to assess studies of the impact of these PPPs, but space was provided for comments in the survey of member organizations. The following box provides a summary of some examples of outsourcing of support services in several countries.

²⁰ EI resolution *Quality Education: Present and Future* in the EI Congress 2007 (Annex II).

Box 25: Support services around the world

Support services such as non-instructional activities, including maintenance, pupil transportation and school meals are often very costly in public schools. In the few cases where good cost analysis has been done, it is frequently found that these services are significantly more costly in public compared to private schools. The proportion of staff not involved in instruction is often very high in public schools; in a number of countries, support staff in public schools is paid higher salaries relative to similar jobs in the private sector. Education policymakers in many countries have expanded contracting for support services as a way of improving cost effectiveness of these services, so as to free up resources and time devoted to education. Usually contracts are tendered for multiple schools – so that contract management expertise can be developed in a single place, and contracts are sufficiently large to attract many bidders. Contracting for support services is done in virtually all public education systems to different degrees. Food services for example are rarely run by public school authorities in OECD countries. Virtually all school-bus service in England and New Zealand is provided through contractors, as is 80 percent in Canada (Patrinos, 2006). The UK, for example, has been contracting out not only core services such as schooling improvement, curriculum advisory services, literacy and numeracy strategies and inspection/advisory services, but also support services such as: budget and financial management, human resources and Information Technology services (LaRocque, 2007).

Innovation and research PPPs

86. These partnerships differ according to the types and characteristics of the actors involved, including: i) university-industry partnerships; ii) government (including laboratories)-industry partnerships; iii) research institute-industry partnerships; and iv) a combination of the above, such as partnerships linking multiple government research institutes to one another and to industry (OECD, undated). In several OECD countries, industry partnerships with research institutes are more common than those with universities or laboratories (*ibid*).
87. Industry-Government Partnerships are proposed for reasons which are rather similar to the ones used to promote PPPs in general. According to OECD (undated), 'three of the main factors driving public/private partnerships, in particular university-industry collaboration, are: i) increased speed of transition to the knowledge-based economy; ii) increased globalisation and competition; and iii) budge-



tary constraints faced by governments and their impact on patterns of funding of university research as well as the higher costs of research in general. Some writers emphasize that this type of partnership is not new and dates back in the 19th century in the US and German research systems, and later in Japan, Korea and the UK. However, in recent years, the UK government's attempts to encourage research of greater immediate relevance to the private sector through funding and research councils appear to have altered the terms of this relationship (UCU, 2008). Such tendencies are seen particularly in the OECD countries as in Canada, where external advisory boards have made public laboratories more applied and client-oriented as reported by OECD (undated).

88. According to a UCU (UK) report²¹ (2008), while academics are faced with limited resources to finance research in areas which are 'perhaps temporarily unfashionable or whose conclusions are likely to be unwelcome to funders of research', there is 'a new level of pressure to tailor their findings to reflect the needs of their sponsors' (UCU, 2008). This same tendency is observed also in the US. OECD (undated) argues that the reason for this lies with the specific national characteristics and embedded structures for (university) research financing. Scientists pursuing basic research in US universities largely depend on competitive grants from extramural funds. Understandably, the drive to push research towards industry needs also strongly shapes the research agenda toward the interests of large companies, capable of funding and exploiting research in universities (UCU, 2008).
89. OECD is particularly keen in promoting this type of PPP through the Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry. Indeed, a major conclusion of the OECD Growth Study was that governments need to be more responsive to the rapid transformation of innovation processes and related business needs and strategies, and that greater use of public-private partnerships can increase this responsiveness and enhance the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of technology and innovation policy (OECD, 2003). Following this policy, OECD has been active in conducting peer-reviews of PPP programmes for research and innovation in member countries.
90. Although there is a need for more research in this area, one example is worth citing. A report by the New Economics Foundation in the UK has shown the growing role of the oil and gas industry in the funding of research in geology departments and research centres, which has resulted on research on fossil fuel extraction dwarfing that on renewable or sustainable energy sources (UCU, 2008). It may be of interest to explore how the role of academic staff is changed through this kind of partnership.

²⁰ EI resolution Quality Education: Present and Future in the EI Congress 2007 (Annex II).

Education vouchers, scholarships, fundraising and fees

91. McAdie (2002) usefully distinguishes between private money used for public education – e.g., school fundraising for basic items like textbooks, classroom supplies, library books and computers; teachers buying school materials out-of-pocket – and corporate sponsorships and donations; and public monies used for private education – e.g., through charter schools, vouchers, and government funding for private schools.
92. Contracting with schools to enrol publicly funded students is used extensively and is argued to be a good strategy for rapidly expanding access to education, while avoiding large public sector capital costs. This form of contracting is also based on the principles of **competitive pressure**, either from parental selection of schools (Philippines, Spain) or by competitive tender (New Zealand) (Patrinos, 2006).

Box 26: Education Contracting in the Philippines

Since 1998, under the Educational Service Contracting (ESC) scheme, the Philippines government has used contracting to support the enrolment of low-income students in private high schools in localities where public schools are full. Eligible schools must be certified and charge relatively low fees. Family income for eligible students cannot exceed \$1,280. The per-student payment to private schools is set at \$71 and cannot exceed the unit cost of delivery in public high schools. Schools cannot charge the students any additional fees. The number of ESC-funded students grew from 4,300 in 158 schools in 1986 to 280,216 in 1,517 schools in 2003. In 2002, ESC contracts covered 22 percent of students in private high schools (equal to 13 percent of all private school enrolments). A recent assessment of the certification procedure in one region of the country showed that less than 10 percent of schools were below standard. Source: FAPE 2004 (Patrinos, 2006).

Box 27: PACES in Colombia

The Program for Expansion of Secondary Education Coverage (*Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura en Educación Secundaria*, PACES), was launched in 1991 in order to provide access to secondary education for the poorest third of the population in Colombia, by using vouchers to pay for attendance in private schools. Municipal governments provided 20 percent of the funding for PACES, while the federal government covered the remaining 80 percent. The program, which ran until 1997, covered 125,000 children in 216 municipalities. The vouchers were renewable through the end of high school as long as the child continued to progress through school, and 77 percent of beneficiaries renewed their vouchers. The vouchers could be used at private academic and vocational schools and about 40 percent of private schools accepted the voucher. The unit costs for participating private schools were 40 percent lower than for non-participating private schools.



93. Due to oversubscription in the program, there were more applicants than vouchers, which were then awarded by lottery (World Bank 2006 in Patrinos, 2006).
94. The Chilean case (Box 28) provides an example of a school voucher programme with financial incentives for both public and private institutions.

Box 28: The Chilean Case

Basic education in Chile is provided by three types of schools: municipal schools, subsidized private schools and non-subsidized private schools. Additionally there are some technical-vocational schools with special fiscal funding managed by business corporations. Prior to 1980, the administration of Chilean school system was fully centralised in the Ministry of Education. In 1981, as part of the Pinochet government's sweeping market-oriented reforms, Chile introduced a nationwide school voucher programme with financial incentives for both public and private institutions. The objectives of this reform were twofold. On one hand, the idea was to bring educational decision-making closer to the different territories and on the other, to generate competition for student enrolments between municipal and private school as financing was linked to the number of students enrolled at each school. The aim of a free-choice schooling policy should lead to improvements in the quality of education since it means that parents can choose whichever school they wish and this force schools to compete against each-other. Free-schooling changes the incentives that schools are faced with and encourages them to deliver better quality schooling at a lower cost. Public and private education currently account for 90% of enrolments in Chile. This public-private combination has meant that the Chilean school system has been able to take in and retain a lot more students in education than in previous years. The current schooling system is more capable of taking in, providing for and retaining the children of the poorest 40% of the population in education than in 1980 (Mora, 2005).

In 1988, Chile implemented a system to measure the quality of education and assess the differences in between the different types of schools. The results of this system show that private schools with no public financing obtain the best educational results, whereas subsidized private schools had better results than municipal schools according to Mora, (2005). Other performance-related measures such as the drop-out and repetition rates followed the same trend (MINEDUC-SIMCE, 2005, *ibid*). However, in the light of the differences in the socioeconomic level of the students in the three types of schools, the validity of this comparison has been strongly challenged, says Mora (2005). Other factors have made difficult any comparison between private and public schools. Bellei (2005, in Patrinos, 2006) identifies three main reasons: private schools tend to be located in urban areas and serve middle to middle-high income students there are wide differences in the level of resources available to schools, even among the same type of schools, and there is very little information about how families select schools and how private schools select students.

95. Results of these experiences are often contradictory and inconclusive. In fact, Gauri (1998, in Patrinos, 2006) found out that “school choice had led to increased social and academic stratification”. The same was confirmed by Mora (2005: 5), who, while maintaining that the choice schooling has undoubtedly contributed to access for some children with limited resources, emphasizes that the Chilean free-choice schooling policies tend to favour middle and high income families. Mora (*ibid*) concludes that competition does not lead to improvement school performance, as the subsidized private schools choose the students with the most resources and abilities and leave the disadvantaged students in the public municipal schools. The free-choice system and competition may even have prompted greater segmentation in the system. Equality has not been respected, especially since private schools have been allowed to charge their students high fees.

Public school fundraising and trade in educational services

96. Another facet of private money brought into public schools for which there is not much discussion is school fundraising. Increasing reliance on such funds in some countries reflects both declining public budgets for education and a growing emphasis on private contributors, to make up the shortfall. Froese-Germain (2004) reports that in Canada 7% of the total expenditure for elementary-secondary education came from private sources in 2001-02, reaching a high of over 10% in Alberta and Quebec. 9% of Canadian households paid pre-elementary and elementary-secondary tuition fees in 2000, an average of \$974 per household. Part of the fundraising movement is also a trend of relying more and more on international students. In a period of declining provincial education funding, the lucrative ‘trade in international students’ is picking up steam, with foreign fee-paying students being aggressively recruited for high schools by school boards (in some cases through federal “Team Canada” trade missions). Tuition fees for international students are exorbitant, with boards in Vancouver, Ottawa and Toronto charging annual fees of \$10,000 or more. The ability to recruit even small numbers of international students can make a big difference to a school board’s budget (Bruno-Jofré & Henley, 2002 in Froese-Germain, 2004). The effects of such trends are already tangible. When one thinks of the school as a private market rather than as a community good, priority shifts. This can be seen in the decision of secondary schools in North Vancouver not to accept students from their neighbourhood because places were reserved for fee paying international students (Kuehn, 2003). A similar phenomenon has developed with state schools in Australia raising funds through fees charged to international students.

97. There are many undesirable consequences for public education of relying on private sources of funding (McAdie, 2004). Equity: schools that can raise more



money are typically located in wealthier neighbourhoods, thus increasing inequities in the education experience for children from wealthy and poorer families. Competition for funding: relying on private donors may set up a competition among programs and schools, as different institutions go after the same sources of funds. Such competition may detract time and energy from more positive approaches to public education. Targeted funding: relying on private sources, through fundraising or corporate donations, allows private sources, rather than schools and school boards, to influence decisions on programs. Some schools or programs may be seen as more “worthy” of support, at the discretion of private interests. What is funded: an increasing number of items are being defined as “frills,” outside of government funding. Playground equipment, field trips, and even some classroom and learning resources are seen as non-essential. Children from wealthier families and in wealthier neighbourhoods will have better access to a richer variety of experiences, which have a positive impact on education. Stability of funding: funding dependent on private sources is not stable. Many sources of such funding do not make commitments to provide the resources over any extended period. As parents and corporations go through challenging economic conditions, they may not be as willing or able to support public education to the same extent as in previous years. Requirements for receiving funding: private donors may attach strings to their funding for public education. For example, private corporations or organizations may require advertising or the use of specific curriculum or other materials in order to access funding. The problems inherent in school fundraising challenge the fundamental principles of education systems. School fundraising reinforces the problematic notion of education as a charity, rather than as a basic human and social right, it deepens inequities between schools and their communities because, as noted, working class neighbourhoods have much more difficulty raising money than affluent ones (Froese-Germain, 2004).

Where are teachers in the debate?

98. The literature review on PPPs notes few research studies in which teachers were the subject of analysis, and even in those cases, issues of representation and voice at the working place tend to be presented in a negative light.
99. Tracing literature which elaborates on the impact of PPPs on teachers is all the more difficult as PPPs are treated as part of broader so-called “educational reforms”. With regard to the reforms being carried out in the UK, an Audit Commission survey saw the existence of too many targets as “a major reason for public service workers leaving their jobs. As they put it: many felt that the content of their work was increasingly driven not by what matters but by what could be measured” (Unite,

2007). Ball and Youdell (2007: 47) reinforce the same findings while elaborating on the increased surveillance of teachers' work and outputs and the gap in values, purpose and perspective between senior staff with a primary concern with balancing the budget, recruitment, public relations and management, on the one hand, and teaching staff on the other, with a primary concern with curriculum coverage, classroom control, students' needs and record-keeping. Ball and Youdell qualify this trend as part of endogenous privatisation – i.e. the application of private sector employment and management methods to public institutions. Endogenous privatisation often paves the way for exogenous (outside) privatisation. The same concern has been voiced also in a recent report by ILO, which pointed out that the consequences of PPPs on jobs and working conditions are considerable: reduction of employment; loss of good quality jobs; decrease in pay; increases in atypical workers; those who experience job instability, and placement agency workers; the emergence of two-tier workforce; general deterioration of conditions in terms of health, safety, job security and training, loss of collective agreements, decline in unionisation and weakening of the influence of the unions (ILO, 2006 in CSN, 2008).

100. Issues of quality teaching, which indeed constitute the core of quality education, remain a much contested aspect of PPPs. The agenda of quality is dominated by a discourse based on competition, parental choice, and client orientation – claimed to be the preconditions which should be leading to quality. Yet, the situation of teachers around the world is critical. In its 2006 report, the Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel reviewed the key developments that had occurred in the preceding three years, noting a “well-documented declining status of teachers worldwide and the growing flight from the profession” (CEART, 2006: 12). It has been argued by teacher organisations, with some force, that the relative social value of the teaching profession, as expressed by the public remuneration level for teachers, compared with other professions, is in long-term decline. Moreover, they claim that, in general, public teachers' salaries compare unfavourably with those in some private schools (CEART, 2006: 17).
101. While monitoring the global needs for 2015, UNESCO (2007) reports that countries across the world will need to recruit more than 18 million teachers over the next decade. UNESCO (2007) reports that, “wage differentials can seriously impact the quality of education by reducing the prestige of the teaching profession. Low wages will ultimately attract less qualified individuals and demoralise those teachers seeking a long-term career in education”. Whenever the PPP projects make reference to teachers, it is more in terms of training and qualification, leaving out other issues of concern for most teachers around the world. Yet,



WEF states that school performance (as measured by test scores) is significantly improved by smaller class sizes, improved teaching practices, adequate instruction time and textbook provision, and increased teacher training, all of which require significant investment (WEF, 2005: 45).

102. Chapter 4 deals with the impact of PPPs on teachers' terms of employment, working conditions and their representation. These analyses are important and crucial for the future of educational systems, because, indeed "schools are more than just buildings – they are communities, places of learning, and a reflection and a response to the neighbourhoods in which they are located" (Shanker, 2003). The experience with PPPs reinforces the need to ensure that our schools, as part of our system of education, are accountable to the public, and are not driven by cost-benefit analyses or the end-of-business-quarter returns on investment. The centrality of the education workforce in delivering quality education is undisputable.

Chapter 3

THE EXPERIENCES OF EDUCATION UNIONS

Rationale of the survey

103. The EI Executive Board required the Taskforce to seek information from EI member organisations on their experience with PPPs or similar concepts and the policies they have adopted in relation to them. This we did by conducting a survey of member organisations in June and July of 2008. The previous chapters demonstrated the broad and somewhat nebulous nature of the PPPs concept. The difficulty of precise definition in turn presented a challenge when it came to drafting survey questions, for the simple reason that the term “PPP” can mean different things in different countries. The Taskforce settled, however, on the categories outlined previously (Chapter 1), and developed a set of survey questions accordingly.

Scope and objectives

104. The areas of enquiry were as follows:
1. definitions of PPPs in different parts of the world as perceived and understood by EI member organizations;
 2. experiences of EI member organizations with PPPs and the extent of their involvement, if any;
 3. union policies on PPPs and decisions regarding union responses to PPPs;
 4. proposals for action related to PPPs.
105. The survey also aimed to identify factors that influence or shape unions’ perception of PPPs, and, importantly, unions’ assessment of the overall impact of PPPs on the quality of education and on the working conditions of teachers and other education employees.
106. The survey was based on a 7-page questionnaire²² structured as follows:
1. union’s familiarity with the term PPP as applied in education;
 2. types of PPPs existing in each country;
 3. actors promoting/initiating PPPs in education;
 4. reasons cited by governments for engaging in PPPs in education;
 5. union’s definition of quality education;
 6. union’s overall perception of PPPs in education;
 7. impact of education PPPs on employment and working conditions;
 8. union’s policy on PPPs;
 9. experience and involvement with PPPs;
 10. current and foreseeable trends in education PPPs; and
 11. general comments.

²² See Annex V for the questionnaire.



107. Open-ended questions were included to give scope for member organisations to elaborate on their responses. These produced interesting and relevant information.

Respondents

108. Respondents to the survey were leaders of EI's national affiliates. Initially, the survey targeted **158 respondents** in 100 countries with follow up telephone calls and emails (more than 450 e-mails) **Seventy-nine (79) organizations or 50%** of the initial target group actually responded to the survey. They represented **57 countries**.

109. The study used purposive sampling in selecting the 158 organizations invited to respond among 394 affiliates²³. The total 158 sample was distributed according to the following criteria: (1) regional distribution; (2) stage of development of the country; (3) size of the organization; and (4) levels of education represented. Each of the sampled affiliates had one respondent.

110. Respondents to the questionnaires were:

- General Secretary/ President/ Deputy General Secretary or President/ Assistant Secretary (36 respondents)
- International relations departments (12 respondents)
- Advisors (6 respondents)
- Research Departments (3 respondents)
- Other departments (8 respondents)

111. The questionnaire was first formulated in English, then translated into French and Spanish. The input of the respondents was also accepted in the respective languages and translated into English. The method of data processing and analysis is provided in the Annex VI of this report.

Analytical Framework²⁴

112. The study proposes key variables that could explain commonalities and/or variances of perception related to union experiences with PPPs in education. Each major variable tended to influence significantly a specific set of dependent variables. Unions were grouped in clusters according to their positions towards PPPs. Each cluster/position was then analyzed to find out some key characteristics that could allow the identification of patterns. This analysis allows us both to help unions **understand these developments**, in order to provide them with the instruments to adopt a more strategic position towards PPPs, bearing in mind the 'bigger picture', and to draw conclusions and recommendations for **EI to develop a consistent and long-term policy towards PPPs**.


²³ Since then, the number of EI affiliates has increased to 401.

²⁴ For the detailed analytical framework, please refer to Annex V.

The profile of respondents

113. The respondent-organizations' total membership base ranged from 248 (Fiji) to 5,292,533 (Russia). The combined membership of 73 organisations that answered this question (six did not) added up to over 19 million. About 60% of this membership base (as reported by 67 organisations) was comprised of female teachers and other employees in the education sector. **Teachers in public education** are the most organized group (73%). Public senior management/supervision personnel were also cited as members by 44% of respondent-organisations, while non-teaching staff in public education were reported by 37%. Membership among **teachers in private education** was reported by 37%. About 14% of respondents included senior management/supervision in private education among their members, and non-teaching support staff in private education were counted as members by 16%. Many organizations represent members in several categories.

Figure 1




114. The highest number of union membership came from public primary/elementary (49.3%) and public secondary compulsory levels (49.3%). The sample covered teachers and other education personnel working at all levels of education in both public systems and private institutions (Figure 2)²⁵.

²⁵ Further details are provided in the Technical Report (Annex V).


Many organizations represent members at more than one level of education. In most countries, there are separate organizations for teachers and other personnel in public and private schools.

Figure 2



115. Unions in **Europe** comprised the biggest number of respondents. Unions in Africa came second, followed by affiliates in Asia-Pacific and then Latin America.

Figure 3 (a)




116. The regional representation of respondents to the survey may be compared with the distribution of EI member organizations and countries among regions.

Figure 3 (b)



117. **High income economies** represent the majority of respondents' countries. Upper middle income economies and low income economies come in second and third respectively. Lower middle income economies comprised the least²⁶.

Figure 3 (b)



²⁶ Economies are divided according to 2007 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, \$935 or less; lower middle income, \$936 - \$3,705; upper middle income, \$3,706 - \$11,455; and high income, \$11,456 or more. See <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html> For more details, see the Technical Report (Annex V).

Unions' responses²⁷


118. This section draws a general overview of the main trends as developed in relation to:

- funding for education (percentage of GDP spent on education);
- common forms of PPPs (types, actors involved, main reasons for engaging in PPPs);
- unions' level of involvement;
- the overall impact of PPPs as perceived by unions.

Funding for Education

119. Whilst most (86.1%) of the respondents pointed to the national/federal government as responsible for funding of public education, some 44.3% noted the role of state/provincial governments while 25.3% mentioned regional government structures within the country and more than half (55.7%) also noted the role of local/municipal districts. Thus in many countries funding responsibilities are shared between two or more levels of public authority. National governments have the predominant role in many, but not all countries.

Figure 5



120. In 1998, EI's World Congress called on all governments to implement the recommendation of UNESCO's International Commission on Education for the 21st century (Delors, UNESCO 1996) to allocate 6 per cent of Gross National Product


²⁷ A complete overview of the major findings can be found in Annex VI. More within the Technical Report, annexed as well (Annex V).

(GNP)²⁸ to education. This benchmark was then included in regional annexes to the Dakar Framework for Action of the World Education Forum in 2000. Since that time GDP (Gross Domestic Product) has been generally used for this benchmark rather than GNP²⁸. 40 out of 79 provided information on this item, 26 reporting an allocation to education of less than 6% of GDP and 14 reporting an allocation above that benchmark.

Existence of PPPs in Education

121. When asked whether the union is familiar with the term PPP as applied in education, a very high number of organisations (78.5%) reported familiarity. Only 20.3% stated otherwise.

Figure 6



122. Unions were also asked to elaborate on their understanding of the term PPPs. Below is a tabulation of the information provided:

- *Relationship of parties in PPPs*
 - Transfer of public tasks to private initiatives through judicial and/or legal mechanisms
 - Contract between public and private sector
 - A protocol or agreement between a private and public entity
 - Delegation of powers and operations in public education to private interests
 - Financial arrangement
 - Large scale sponsorship of schools, colleges
 - Formalised cooperation between public and private providers
 - Government works with private sector

²⁸ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is defined as the total cost of all completed goods and services produced within the country in a stipulated period of time (usually a 365-day year). Gross National Product (GNP) is defined as the value of all (final) goods and services produced in a country in one year, plus income earned by its citizens abroad, minus income earned by foreigners in the country.



- *Duration*

- 20-30 years
- From short term projects to longer term initiatives (for several years)

- *Actors*

- Private sector/actor/entity (corporations, commercial banks, religious foundations, charity foundations, independent sponsors; NGOs, parents)
- Public sector/actor (government, local authority and public service providers)

- *Reasons*

- To deliver services/infrastructure
- Used for urgent implementation projects of a complex nature
- A cheaper way to provide educational infrastructure
- Financial aid for public institutions aiming at benefiting both sides
- To provide a much better service in achieving a world class quality education to all
- Provide education in areas with low coverage of public schooling
- Allow a complementary offer to educational needs in the country
- Assist the state towards achieving priority goals that relate to improving services or infrastructure
- Cover capital costs that school districts, states, or the federal government are unwilling to fund

- *Forms of PPPs*

- Government funds the operation of private sector
- Infrastructure PPPs; private sector funds being used to build, operate, manage and/or operate public infrastructure
- Operation of educational facility (staff and their activity)
- Government provides the land and private sector builds the school or vice versa
- Private actor reconstructs and provides educational materials – government pays wages, materials and maintenance of the schools
- Outsourcing of educational services (curriculum design and/or implementation, innovation of education, examination and testing, evaluation systems, audits)
- Private actor provides equipment such as PC: (and at times use the school facilities in exchange)
- Private actor provides food, lodging, cleaning services, facility maintenance
- Government finances students attending/using facilities of private institutions
- Private actor runs special courses for students in public schools
- Voucher system: State subsidizes the private manager based on an average of pupils' attendance. The subsidy is not subjected to accountability of control (Chile).

- Charter schools²⁹
- Academies³⁰ are state-funded independent schools. Private sponsors, in return for a small proportion of building costs, trigger a much larger amount of Government funding for building a new Academy school. They gain control of the assets of the school and its governance, the curriculum, admissions and staffing.
- Trust schools³¹
- Non-public schools (Poland) applying national curricula and financed by fees from the parents, private enterprises and foundations and governmental grants based on the number of pupils
- Private provision of education in areas where there is no public education: state provides subsidy for each pupil and teacher' wages
- Parents finance the school, but the nomination of a director or school principal is responsibility of the state
- Investing of private money funds into public schools
- Independent schools (Sweden): financed totally by the state and run by the private actor. The private actor is not allowed to charge parents, but it is allowed to make profit

123. Clearly, unions' understanding of the term PPP varies quite widely, confirming the perception from the review of numerous studies that the term is both generic and confusing. The public and private sectors, often named as actors or entities, vary too in terms of different levels of government engagement. There are also different levels of engagement or partnership between schools in the public sector and business companies/consortiums and banks, religious institutions and charity foundations, NGOs and parents in the private actor.

124. Unions mentioned a very wide range of PPP types, beyond the categories provided in the questionnaire, and their responses gave very important information on how the broad concept of PPPs is translated into reality in different countries. This diversity of PPP types in different countries as reported by the affiliates confirmed the findings of the literature review.

²⁹ Private sector operators are brought in to operate the worst performing schools in a given school district. Charter schools are secular public schools of choice that operate with freedom from many of the regulations that apply to traditional public schools, such as such as geographic enrolment restrictions and teacher union contracts (see Chapter 2).


³⁰ Academies are a form of charter schools (idem).

³¹ A trust school is a state funded foundation school supported by a charitable trust.

Common types of PPPs

125. The types of PPPs included in the survey questions were³² : a) infrastructure PPPs, b) private operation of public education institutions, c) outsourcing of educational services, d) outsourcing of non educational support services and e) industry-government partnerships for innovation and research, f) vouchers and subsidies.
126. As shown in Figure 7, infrastructure PPPs and industry-government partnership for innovation and research appear to be the most common type existing in the countries of the respondents. Nearly 70% of respondents cite the existence of the former PPP type, and 58% the latter type. The high presence of the industry-government partnerships is a very interesting finding, given the limited literature on this type of PPP. Outsourcing of significant support services is also cited by nearly half of respondents (46.8%). Outsourcing of curriculum design and of curriculum delivery were sub-sets of type d) (outsourcing of education services)³³.

Figure 7



127. Other types or features of PPPs mentioned in the responses to the open-ended questions are the following: raising funds from parents' and teachers' organisations (Brazil); parents taking charge of teachers (Congo); proposal to transform


³² For a definition of the terms used, see Chapter 1.

³³ 3 sub-types of educational services were included : a) curriculum design; b) curriculum delivery; c) assessment, school evaluations and administration of examinations.

public universities into foundations (Italy); internships and sponsorships (Dominican Republic); support for the parents or contracting services from early childhood education providers (Finland); hiring of school facilities to third parties (Malta); training of teachers (the Philippines); “schools with association contracts” (charter schools) (Portugal), in which private schools are financed by the State on the condition of accepting all the students living in the area and conform the national curriculum; contracting of communication technologies (Switzerland); and outsourcing provision of personnel advice, health and safety advice, payroll services and general administration (UK).

128. **Income-level grouping and PPP type:** except in high-income economies, industry-government partnerships become more evident or present as the income classification of a country increases.


Figure 8



129. **Regional groupings and PPPs:** except in the case of Latin America, the majority of respondents in each regional grouping points to infrastructure PPPs as the most prevalent in their countries. Taking the most common forms of PPP, the picture which emerges from the survey is that **infrastructure PPPs** are strongly present in all regions, albeit less in Latin America (40%). **Industry-government partnerships** are strongly present in all regions except Africa. **Outsourcing of non-education support services** is strong in Asia Pacific and Europe, less so in Africa, Latin America, and even North America/Caribbean.


130. It is also interesting to look at the industry-government partnership presence in relation to income levels of countries. This type of PPP is strongly present in upper-middle and high-income countries, less in lower middle-income countries, and very little in low-income countries.

Figure 9



131. Among those that reported familiarity with the term PPP, most also identified the existence of infrastructure PPPs in their respective countries. On the other hand, among those who were not familiar with the term, most reported that infrastructure PPPs did not exist. This confirms that such PPPs are generally the most visible.


Figure 10



Main actors initiating or promoting PPPs

132. An overwhelming number of respondents reported their governments to be the main initiators/promoters of PPPs. Domestic private-for-profit entities comprise the dominant actor cited by nearly 80% of respondents. Domestic NGOs and faith based organisations were listed as the second main actor, cited by a majority of respondents (60%). The respondents often refer to a long period of involvement of religious actors in delivering education. Foreign private for profit entities came third, with nearly half of respondents citing them. International financial and development institutions were likewise mentioned by 36.7% of the organisations. International NGOs and faith based organisations were cited by 34.2% of the organisations. 20.3% of the organisations reported other main actors initiating and promoting PPPs in their countries such as: foreign university branches (Bulgaria); senior management experts (Denmark); private agencies which run education on commercial bases (India) and big educational companies (Sweden); non-governmental foundations established from the government to run education (Malta); local governments interested in lowering their expenditures as the funds allocated to the local government are often very low (Poland); and parents of student associations (Rwanda).

Figure 11



133. **PPP actors and regional grouping:** domestic-private for profit entities are the dominant PPP actors in all the regions, except in North America and Caribbean. This is overwhelmingly true in Asia-Pacific, Europe and Latin America. **PPP actors and GDP in public education:** As expected IFIs are more present in countries which allocate less than 6% of GDP in education (59.6%).


Figure 12



134. **Governments' cited reasons for promoting and engaging in education PPPs:** the survey results reveal the three most common reasons for government's engagement in PPPs. Namely: budgetary limits (78.5%), improvement of quality of education (57%) and innovation in management (50.8%). Other reasons cited are:


improve access to education (49.4%); limit public debt (43%); raise management standards (38.0%); finance educational reforms (35.4%); provide greater discipline (24.1%); and need for regulating the operation of private sector providers (10.1%). It is worth noting the contrast with the literature, often from World Bank sources, as reviewed in Chapter 2, where studies placed less emphasis on budgetary constraints, and more on management and efficiency issues.

Figure 13




135. **Improving access to education** is significantly related to income level grouping – this reason is cited by majority of respondents in all but high-income economies, and overwhelmingly noted among low-income economies.

Figure 14



136. Similarly, **improving access to education** is highly related to regional grouping. It is in Africa that the majority of respondents pointed to this reason (86.7%), followed by Asia (50%). However, this reason is cited the least among Latin American respondents (20%).


Figure 15



Union perceptions of impact of PPPs on education

137. Ranked according to the number of respondents in descending order, these perceptions are that PPPs: (1) change the ethos of public education (43%); (2) provide financial and technical support (41.8%); (3) change the role of support staff (35.4%) as well as teachers (35.4%); (4) provide innovation in management (31.6%); (5) provide adequate and acceptable quality (26.6%); (6) save public money (25.3%); (7) provide financial support to educational reforms (22.8%); (8) raise management standards (21.5%); and (9) provide greater discipline in procurement (8.9%).


Figure 16



138. A number of respondents (31.6%) indicated other perceived impacts, both negative and positive, which provided variations or nuances to the survey questions. The negative impacts are: PPPs threatens future education budgets; they meet the needs of private contractors and not the needs of schools; they do not offer value for money and there is no risk transfer to the private sector; they do not improve the quality of services; PPPs are seen as an indicator of privatisation; the participation of private sector in delivering education has made it more difficult to draw a distinction between governmental structures' responsibility and private companies' contracts³⁴; violation of principle of local democratic accountability and a fair admission system which affects particularly children with special educational needs and behavioural problems (Academies in the UK); very little public debate on methods of financing; PPPs move the debate away from education as a public good; minimising the concept of 'public' in favour of 'citizens' right' concept; they exclude the poor and redefine the role of the state structures responsible for education. All these reasons reflected some of the main findings of the literature review summarised in Chapter 2. Some respondents reported more positive perceptions with regard to PPPs such as: helping the government to promote a healthy teaching/learning environment when the government is not able to provide education for all, or preventing the breakdown of the education system. PPPs are considered in some cases as positive as long as they are under government control and are well organised.
139. Overall, members' perception of the impact of **infrastructure PPPs**, though varied, tends to be more negative than positive on most issues. The majority of the unions perceive that **PPP infrastructures** do not: (1) provide greater discipline in procurement (69.1%); (2) provide financial support to educational reforms (58.1%); (3) save public money (56.4%); (4) provide adequate & acceptable quality education (48.4%); or (5) provide innovation in management (41.9%). Opinions are divided as to whether infrastructure PPP: (1) provide financial technical support, (2) change the ethos of public education (43.6 say yes); and (3) change the role of teachers (41.8% say yes).


³⁴ NUT elaboration

Figure 17



140. Generally, the respondents thought that **private operation of education facilities:** (1) do not provide greater discipline in procurement (64.5%) and (2) do not provide financial support to educational reforms (58.1%). A significant proportion of respondents likewise do not agree that this type of PPP: (1) saves public money (48.4%); (2) raises management standards (48.4); (3) provides innovation in management (41.9); or (4) provides financial & technical support (38.7%).

Figure 18



141. The picture is quite different for **outsourcing of curriculum design and delivery**. In this case a majority of unions recognize that this kind of private input provides financial and technical services, while a very significant majority declare that they change the role of teachers and the ethos of public education. This type of PPP is scored negatively in relation to issues, including raising management standards, providing innovation, discipline, and transparency procurement and saving public money.

142. The negative opinions indicated that:

- Outsourcing changes education from a public/common good to an individual right/commercial transaction/private good/financial transaction; from state responsibility to family responsibility.
- Transformation of schools into 'market schools'; unhealthy competition among schools; Introduction of private concepts such as global competitiveness in educations at the expense of disadvantaged;
- Undermining/transferring public responsibility; introduction of culture of secrecy; and endangering the community orientation of schools; and
- Threatening of academic freedom/mission and autonomy.

143. However, four respondents, all from Africa, pointed to a positive impact on the learning environment.

Figure 19






Figure 20



144. A similar pattern emerged in relation to outsourcing of assessment school evaluation or administration of examinations.


Figure 21



145. So union perceptions of outsourcing of educational support services showed similar patterns, whether the services entailed curriculum design, curriculum delivery, assessment, school evaluation, or administration of examinations. The picture was somewhat different in relation to **outsourcing of significant non-educational support services**. Most unions did not perceive any impact on educational quality, reform


or management issues, nor did they see any impact on discipline in procurement, or saving public money. While less unions saw an impact on the role of teachers or the ethos of public education, than was the case with outsourcing of educational service, there was still a small majority of respondents holding these views.

Figure 22




146. Similar observations can also be made about union perception on the impact of **industry-government partnerships in education**, although here there was a very small majority reporting in the provision of needed financial and technical support to the educational system. The difference, however, is not substantial. No significant impact was reported, on the role of teachers, support staff and ethos of public education.

Figure 23



147. We then looked for correlations between union perception and other factors.
148. In general, the survey responses reveal that for all types of PPPs, the only area where more of the respondents acknowledge the positive impact of PPPs is the provision of needed financial and technical support to public education.
149. Income grouping is significantly related to the perception that PPPs provide or do not provide greater discipline and transparency. The negative perceptions are more striking in lower-middle-income and high-income economies, whereas in the upper-middle-income group the respondents appear to have different opinions and in low-income countries the majority of the respondents do not know the impact.


Figure 24



150. **Regional grouping and union perception of PPP impact:** three perceptions are identified as significantly related to regional grouping – (1) PPPs provide needed financial and technical support; (2) they provide adequate and acceptable quality education; and (3) they provide financial support to educational reforms. The perception that PPPs provide needed financial and technical support appears to be overwhelming among the unions in Africa with nearly 80% of respondents responding positively. Europe ranks second, though the perception is not shared


by the majority of respondents. Likewise, in Asia-Pacific, about 35% of respondents claim the positive impact of PPPs in providing needed financial and technical support. However, unions in Latin America and North America and Caribbean do not perceive that PPPs provide needed financial and technical support. With regard to the perception that PPPs provide adequate and acceptable quality education, again Africa tops the list with a majority of respondents (65%) affirming this perception. The same perception is shared also by 28% of respondents in Asia-Pacific; about 20% among respondents in North America and Caribbean; and 12% in Europe. No respondents from Latin America agree that PPPs provide adequate and acceptable quality education. Again, the majority of African respondents (over 50%) claim that PPPs provide financial support to educational reforms. About 40% of respondents from Asia share that view, about 20% from Latin America and 5% from Europe, and none from North America and Caribbean. Overall, respondents from Africa positively point to three perceived impacts of PPPs in education: provide needed financial and technical support, provide adequate and acceptable quality education, and provide financial support to education reforms. Such a perception is not shared by majority of respondents from other regions.

Figure 25



151. The survey of member organizations provided substantial information on working conditions that had not been found during the reviews of recent studies on PPPs in education. One important example was the impact on casualisation. Using a rating scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being a great deal and 5 not at all), the respondent-organizations were asked to indicate the level of impact that PPPs have on casualisation in the education sector. Casualisation here means short-term contracts or other non regular forms of employment.
152. About 67% of respondents indicate some degree of impact of PPPs on the casualisation of labour relations in the education sector. Unions from the developed world particularly elaborate on this issue, highlighting concerns on: (1) the existence of short/sub-standard labour contracts, or the lack of them (in one case without the right to pension); (2) an increase of part time hiring; (3) the precarization of working conditions and total flexibility in the sector as employees of the sector under PPP are ruled out of the Labour Code; (4) the proliferation of contractual employment; (5) a raise in the hiring of non-regular instructors and staff; (6) less possibilities for workers to be organised under PPPs.
153. Moreover, the use of PPPs is seen to have spill-over effects on depression in terms of pay levels, conditions of service and occupational pension rights. These findings appear to be linked to the perception that some particular types of PPPs change the role of teachers and have a negative impact on the ethos of public education.

Figure 26



154. Among the respondents who indicated that PPPs change the role of teachers and support staff, the highest proportion rated 1 (PPPs had a great deal of impact on casualisation) in the case of the role of teachers and 4 (nearly not at all) in the case of role of support staff. Very few said that PPPs had no impact at all on casualisation. Most of the respondents who stated that PPPs changed the role of teachers and support staff also considered that PPPs impacted greatly on casualisation.

Figure 27






Figure 28




155. The foregoing observations also hold true as regard the relationship between the impact of PPPs on casualisation and on the ethos of public education. Again we see the link with casualisation. If PPPs change the ethos of public education, it is likely because PPPs have brought about casualisation of employment.

Figure 29



156. Among respondents who noted PPPs do not help provide quality education, again the majority rated 2 and 1 on PPPs impact on casualization (Figure 30).


Figure 30



157. When asked about the extent to which PPPs affect women teachers or other female education employees, 51.9% of organisations indicated impact to some degree, while 31.6% reported no impact.


158. When asked about the extent PPPs affect women teachers or other female education employees, 51.9% of organisations indicate different levels of impact, while 31.6% reported an impact. Those who elaborated pointed to the negative impact that PPPs have on women teachers and female education employees, in a number of ways such as: access to maternity leave/job protection when a child is sick; loss of the right of social security and lower pay. Women are over-represented amongst casual staff; they are exposed to labour flexibility, employment instability and to an authoritarian management; and have limited access to facilities which are available to their tenured counterparts.

Figure 31




159. Nearly half (49.4%) of respondents could identify some degree of impact of PPPs on union organizing among teachers and other employees in the education sector (Figure 32). 20.3% indicated a great deal of impact while 30.4% indicated no impact at all.

Figure 32




160. Of those respondents who provided more details, 68.2% pointed to the negative impact that PPPs have in the education sector. Some respondents cited certain categories such as manual labourers (cleaners and kitchen staff) or research staff engaged in commercially sensitive work, where organising is difficult. Some respondents pointed to variations among PPPs and stated not all of them hinder organising. Interestingly, one respondent reported an opportunity provided by PPPs, claiming that “PPPs can enhance organising activity because they motivate employees to seek a union”, while noting that ‘PPPs often vigorously oppose unionisation’.
161. Some cross-tabulations of survey responses revealed significant relationships between the impact of PPPs on organizing and some perceptions of unions.
162. For example, among those that recognized that PPPs provide innovation in management and delivery of services, more than 40% also indicated that PPPs have no impact at all on organising while only about 10% said otherwise.

Figure 33




163. The same pattern was observed with regard to the perception that PPPs provide adequate and acceptable quality education and the impact on organizing.
164. Among those who indicated that PPPs change the role of teachers, nearly 40% indicated also that PPPs impact greatly on organising. The inverse was true. This finding is supported even more if we combine the columns 1 and 2 and compare them with the total of columns 4 and 5.

Figure 34




- 165. Again the same conclusion can be drawn in the case of perception 'PPPs change the role of support staff', although the difference in positions is less clear.
- 166. The interrelation between the perception 'PPPs change the ethos of public education' and impact on organising indicates the same pattern of responses.

Figure 35



167. PPPs perceived impact on working conditions and the impact on organising are likewise related. As Figure 36 shows, those respondents who noted PPPs improve working conditions tended also to indicate no impact of PPPs on organising. On the other hand, there were more respondents noting that PPPs damage working conditions who also rated a great deal of impact of PPPs on organising.

Figure 36




Chapter 4

UNION POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

Union policies


168. About 54% of organisations reported they had a union policy on PPPs while 38.0% did not and 2.5 responded 'don't know'.

Figure 37




169. When asked on the reasons for lack of policies on PPPs, most of them point to the fact that PPPs are new, limited or are considered to have limited impact on teachers' conditions. They also lack resources to focus on PPPs while faced with many challenges. A few respondents stated that, although they do not have specific policies, they are against PPPs. Few indicated to be in the process of developing policy in this area. Among different regions the existence of union policy on PPPs varies greatly. All respondents from Latin America reported policies on PPPs. A great majority too of European respondents (70.3%) and half of respondents from Asia-Pacific have union policies on PPPs. The majority of unions from Africa (73.3%) and North America and Caribbean (62.5%) lack union policy on PPPs.

Figure 38




170. Overall, the survey findings indicate that the existence of a union policy may temper the extent of impact of PPPs on organizing, but does not eliminate that impact.

Figure 39



171. More significant perhaps is figure 40 which sheds light on the relationship between union involvement in PPPs and impact of PPPs on organizing. Union involvement in PPPs may temper the (adverse) impact of PPPs on organizing, but an important issue here is the kind of involvement that unions have. Some forms of involvement are discussed later in this report.


Figure 40



Impact on wages and conditions


172. Private entities determine wages and employment conditions according to 34.2% of respondents (Figure 41). Only 15.2% of respondents indicated that these are the public authorities. About 16% indicated both public and private entities and 20.3% answered “don't know”. These findings corroborate earlier findings that private entities are the most predominant actors in PPPs.

Figure 41



173. That private entities, particularly those for profit, more often determine wages and working conditions under PPP arrangements largely explains the negative perception of PPPs by unions and their adverse impact on employment security, working conditions, quality of public education, and the ethos of public education. In fact, private interests that threaten many aspects of public education have been cited by many respondents who oppose or are suspicious of PPPs. Such perceptions or positions of unions on PPPs are discussed later in this paper.
174. There were more respondents (36.7%) who claimed PPPs damage working conditions than those who stated they improve the working conditions in general (21.5%). About 28% did not know the impact while 12.7% did not answer (Figure 42).

Figure 42



175. Nearly half of respondents (46.8%) elaborated on the impact of PPPs on working conditions. Out of them, those who stated that PPPs damage working conditions pointed to: promotion of part time employment; weakening of permanent status and job security; decline in pay and benefits; restrictions on annual holiday and overtime; restrictions on the right to organise; more voluntary work by teachers contributing to their workload; and bad building design, to mention few of them. Among those who pointed to the improvement of working conditions under PPPs (13.5%), some qualified their answer as 'little improvement'.


176. It is of interest too to note that while one union in Africa appreciated the role of PPPs in averting the total breakdown of their education system, it also stated that working conditions had been damaged.

177. Respondents pointed to a range of options as necessary conditions to minimize or mitigate the impact on PPPs. Ranked according to the number of respondents in descending order, these conditions are:

- Transparency in PPP contract awards and processes (68.4%);
- Participation of union in PPP evaluation (56%);
- Participation from unions in the implementation of PPPs (50.7%),
- Identification and effective involvement of other stakeholders in the planning and implementation stage of PPPs (41.8%).

Figure 43 illustrates the distribution of responses.

Figure 43



178. However, a number of respondents who elaborated on this point remained of the opinion that unions should fight against the introduction of PPPs in education. Union opposition to any involvement varied greatly from those who advocated that 'unions must understand PPPs and participate in the process and even set up entities to provide expert consultations to private players' to those who expressed 'total refusal' or who do not believe 'that involving unions and other


stakeholders in the process will mitigate the negative effects of PPPs'. One respondent stated that unions and other stakeholders should be involved in determining whether or not a PPP was necessary in the first place.

179. About 29% of respondents list other conditions to minimize/mitigate any negative impact of PPPs, namely: negotiations with trade union on terms and conditions, especially if staff is involved; respect for labour standards; setting up of entities to provide expert consultation to private players in PPPs; commitment to build capacity through skill transfers; opportunities to organise; and statutory provisions which limit the deregulation of service provision within the public sector.

Union involvement


180. Only 22.8% of the respondents reported that they had been involved in any PPP programme or project against 67.1% who reported no involvement (Figure 44).

Figure 44




181. The pattern applies across the different types of PPP in education.

Figure 45



182. The lack of involvement of unions in any PPP program or project cuts across all income categories of countries.

Figure 46





183. About 66% (52 respondents) of respondents elaborate on the reasons their organisations have not been involved in PPPs. The reasons cited are: a principled opposition to PPPs (36.5%); PPPs are new or still limited (19.2%); unions are not accepted/excluded; unions are not invited; there is lack of forum at national level to discuss PPP issues; policies take place at local level and union is representing at national level; there is lack of possibility from union to deal with PPPs; and being involved in PPPs is an uncommon practice.

184. Some 28% of respondents responded to this question, indicating varying degrees of impact of union involvement in PPPs. There were generally positive statements with regard to union involvement on PPPs. Main areas in which unions were thought to have an impact were:

- Protecting working conditions;
- Slowing down the process of PPPs; and
- Changing the direction of PPPs by making them less profit oriented.

185. Several (22%) expressed less enthusiasm about the impact of union involvement in PPPs although they thought it necessary.

186. About 66% (52 respondents) of respondents elaborated on the reasons their organisations not having been involved in PPPs. Their responses varied from a decision by the union itself not to participate, to unions not being allowed to participate. Of the 52 respondents who answered to this question, the main reasons cited are:


- Unions not involved as they oppose PPPs in principle (36.5%);
- PPPs are new or still limited (19.2%).

187. Other reasons cited are:

- Unions are not accepted/excluded;
- Unions are not invited;
- There is lack of a forum at national level to discuss PPP issues;
- Policies take place at the local levels and the union is represented at the national level;
- Lack of possibility for the union to deal with PPPs; and
- Being involved in PPPs has not been common practice.

188. About 48% of respondents indicated that they would consider union involvement in PPPs if there would be opportunities to do so. About 22% answered negatively to this question and 17.7% responded "don't know" (Figure 47).

Figure 47



189. Respondents were asked the types of PPPs in which they considered the union could become involved. About 35% of respondents (28) answered this question. Of them:

- 14.2% indicated they would be willing to participate in all PPPs;
- 25% indicated any PPP which affects working conditions/rights of members;
- 50% indicated either different types of PPPs or different phases in PPP cycles. The main types of PPPs of interest appear to be:
 - PPP infrastructure;
 - Upgrading qualification of teachers and quality of teaching;
 - Outsourcing of educational services; and
 - Innovation and research.

Or phases, such as:

- Implementation of PPPs;
- Evaluation of PPPs.

190. Unions were also asked to elaborate on their roles if involved in PPPs. About 29% responded to this question and their answers could be classified in two main categories: roles and issues.



On roles:

- Partners;
- Representatives;
- Actors;
- Monitoring;
- Supervising;
- social partner representatives;
- Professional representatives of teachers; and
- Facilitator and initiator body of PPP projects;
- Expertise in planning, functioning and evaluation;
- Formulating policies.

On issues:

- Design and construction;
- Maintenance;
- Salaries and working conditions;
- Right to collective agreement;
- Capacity building of leadership;
- High quality education.


Emerging patterns

191. Most (65 or 82% of 79) respondents wrote comments on what they see as current and foreseeable trends in PPPs in education in their respective countries. Such a good turn-out of respondents on an open-ended question in the survey instrument indicates a high level of interest (or dismay) about PPPs in education.
192. In general, respondents point to the continuous trend towards increasing use of PPPs in the education sector. About 52 (or 80% of 65) foresee this trend in their countries, with regards, in particular, to an increasing use of PPPs in general (especially, infrastructure PPPs), to the use of education vouchers, to the outsourcing of training and courses for teachers and students, to private management and maintenance of infrastructure, and to an increasing in assessment and appraisal and in the development of innovative technology and catering.
193. Some of the respondents also indicated the reasons why they foresee the continuous utilization of PPPs in education in their countries. Among the most quoted reasons were: limited public budget allocations for education, the promotion of government of PPP ideology, the attraction to private finance of PPPs

predictable returns in the medium term, the fact that more than 50% of state-financed education is already privately-managed; the fact that government already allocates money for public universities to other universities, the need for cost savings, the promotion by the private sector of ICT in public schools and universities, PPPs providing a comfortable escape for politicians' responsibility, the existence of union endorsements for PPPs, in some cases, and the development of new forms of privatization in education, with increases in the number of authorized charter schools, which operate outside regulations that apply to public schools and are more likely employ non-union teachers and education support personnel.

- 194. However, other respondents indicated opposing trends such as: the lack of a clearly defined public policy on PPPs; the education sector is not yet a target of PPP projects and education is dealt with solely by government; PPPs in education are not likely to increase as funding for them is also decreasing; PPPs are not relevant to needs and aspirations; the uncertainty of political leadership after elections; and no experience with PPPs.
- 195. 62% (51 organizations) of respondents provided comments on the positions of their respective unions on PPPs in education. Their positions varied from outright opposition of PPPs in education to complete acceptance. Analysis of the comments prompted a spectrum of positions which is set out schematically in (Figure 48).

Figure 48





196. Note however that the basis for describing positions on the spectrum is solely based on the comments provided by the respondents in the sample. Unions could be invited to clarify their positions and those unions which were not included in the survey sample should also be given an opportunity to send their comments.

197. Analysis of the responses seems to indicate the emergence of the following positions:

Group 1: **complete acceptance** (6 unions)

- unions in this group are mainly from Africa
- the percentage of GDP spent on education is below 4%
- the dominant forms of PPPs are infrastructure PPPs and private operation often imposed by IFIs and carried out by international NGOs and faith-based organisations
- the main reasons cited: limited budget, need for improving quality and access, for improving management standards, for improving innovation
- unions have not been involved but would like to have more participation
- PPPs have improved the quality of education and in some cases have avoided the total breakdown of the system.

Group 2: **conditional acceptance** (12 unions)

- unions in this group come from Africa (5), Asia (2), Europe (3), Middle East (1), Caribbean (1)
- the percentage of GDP spent in education goes is mainly below 5%
- there are different forms of PPPs that vary according to the contexts:
- Africa: infrastructure and operation of schools carried out mainly by NGOs and faith-based organisations and by IFIs
- Asia: infrastructure and private operation carried out by different actors
- in the Middle East, unions have already been involved.

Group 3: **wait and see** (2 unions)

- unions in this group come from the Caribbean (1) and Asia (1)
- in both cases, the percentage of GDP spent in education is reported to be very low
- all forms of PPPs are reported, mainly carried out by international or domestic NGOs and by IFIs
- both unions report a positive impact of PPPs on the national educational system and would like to be more involved in PPPs, but have not really been involved so far.

Group 4: sceptical/suspicious (4 unions)

- unions in this group come from the Caribbean (1), Europe (2) and the Pacific (1)
- the percentage of GDP spent in education varies from 4% to 8%
- all types of PPPs are reported within this group, and, in particular, industry-government partnerships, carried out by domestic or international private for profit entities
- unions in this group have all been involved somehow in the process of negotiating PPPs, but would wish a deeper involvement in order to prevent the negative outcomes or consequences of PPPs.

Group 5: critical engagement (9 unions)

- unions in this group are from Europe (7), North America (1) and the Pacific (1)
- the percentage of GDP spent in education is around 6%
- all the different types of PPPs are present, and they are mainly carried out by domestic private entities
- the main reasons cited for engaging in PPPs are: limited budget, need for increasing management standards and innovation
- unions in this group would like more involvement in PPPs
- Europe and the Middle East: all types of PPPs, carried out mainly by international and domestic private entities, and faith-based organisations in the case of the Middle East
- the main reasons cited for engaging in PPPs are: limited budget, need for improving access to education
- the level of involvement varies:
 - in Africa, unions have not been involved, so far, but would like to be involved
 - in Asia, unions would like more participation to limit PPPs' negative impact on working conditions
 - in Europe, unions have not been greatly involved but would like more participation to limit PPPs' negative impact on working conditions

Group 6: outright opposition (20 unions)

- most unions are from the developed world
- the percentage of GDP spent in education is around or above 6%
- all the different types of PPPs are present, and they are carried out by different actors
- the main reasons cited for engaging in PPPs are: limited budget and improving innovation and management standards
- unions in this group are not involved in PPPs, or are involved only in a limited way.



198. Overall, findings indicate that there is no common position on PPPs among the respondents, with an almost equal number opposing and conditionally accepting PPPs. The following is an attempt to elaborate on some patterns from the responses.
199. First of all, among unions that accept PPPs, the great majority comes from the **developing world**, mainly from **Africa**. Here, PPPs take the form of infrastructure PPPs and operations of schools, as well as curriculum design and delivery, and outsourcing of significant support non-educational services. In the case of Africa, PPPs are often imposed by IFIs and are primarily carried out by international NGOs and faith-based organisations or by (foreign or domestic) private entities on the basis of IFI mandates or recommendations; the government's most cited reason for engaging in PPPs is, in fact, the need for improving quality of and access to education. In African countries, PPPs are perceived to be beneficial as they improve the overall quality of the country's education system, in some cases even avoiding the breakdown of the whole education system. These countries are, in fact, characterized by a very limited budget spent in education, in both absolute and relative terms, and PPPs represent, hence, a response to this lack of funding.
200. Similar observations hold true to a great extent as far as developing countries in Asia and the Pacific are concerned. Here, as well, the dominant form of PPPs is infrastructure PPP, followed by the outsourcing of significant non educational support services and by industry-government partnerships (primarily in the most developed countries of the region). The main actors promoting PPPs in the region are domestic private entities. In Asian low-income economies, too, the predominant reason for engaging in PPPs is the need to improve access to education. In Asia-Pacific, about one third of respondents reports a positive impact of PPPs in providing needed financial and technical support and an adequate and acceptable level of education quality; around half of respondents agree that PPPs provide funding for needed education reforms. These responses are significantly associated with low- or middle-income economies where the percentage of GDP spent in education remains below 6%.
201. In Latin America the picture looks slightly different, from what we can infer on the basis of the three responses we received from the region (namely Brazil, Chile and Dominican Republic). The dominant form of PPPs is industry-government partnership, followed by infrastructure PPPs. Here, too, domestic private entities are the most significant actor, especially in countries where the percentage of GDP spent in education does not exceed 6%. In these cases, again, the main

reason for engaging in PPPs is the need for improving access to education. The key perception of PPPs' impact on education relates the provision of funding for education reforms. Chile and Brazil represent particular cases, where specific national political contexts have great impact on union perceptions. In Brazil, there is a lively debate over the mobilization of private resources to help social needs, including education for all. In Chile, a socially divided education system emerged as a result of the reforms of the 90s, when the interests of private contractors tied in with those of more advantaged segments of society, leaving rural and urban poor with a consistent degradation of public schools.

202. Unions in the **developed world** appear, instead, to be more careful, sceptical or even absolutely negative towards PPPs. In Europe, North America and Asia and the Pacific (Japan, Australia, New Zealand), all the various forms of PPPs are present: primarily, infrastructure PPPs and industry-government partnerships. They are carried out by different actors, but mostly by domestic private entities or consortia. Only in these countries "improving access to education" is not cited by government as a reason for engaging in PPPs. In terms of the overall perception of PPPs' impact on education, it is interesting to highlight a difference. While the majority of European unions refer to government claims that PPPs are providers of needed financial and technical support, in North America, unions cite mostly the reasons advanced by government that PPPs provide an adequate and acceptable level of quality education. A possible explanation may lie in the different ways in which public education systems are organized and managed. The decentralization and the dependence on local specific taxation as main source of funding for education districts, typical for the US and Canada, lead to very diverse capacities in different areas, and often constitute a limitation to public schools. Inequalities can be more marked in North America in terms of access to quality education. On the other side of the Atlantic, especially in continental and Northern Europe, public education systems have traditionally been highly centralized and bureaucratic, with funding procedures producing relatively homogenous and high quality education services. In such contexts, private sector and PPPs in particular have been perceived until recently as marginal. The concept *per se* has not until now been perceived as a real alternative to government-funded and -run large scale education. The picture is different again in the UK, Australia and New Zealand; while in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, many unions are currently confronted by strong moves towards outright privatization of education.

203. **Infrastructure PPPs** are the most commonly accepted form of PPP in the developing world. Here, as we have seen, PPPs often represent the only option



available to grant the existence and appropriate functioning of education systems. Private operations of public school are generally accepted, too, especially when they mean the **delivery of support (non educational) services**, widespread in both the developing and the developed world. These types of PPPs are associated with the provision of financial support to education reforms and to a greater discipline in procurement; moreover, they are presented by politicians as contributing to saving public money and are associated (extensively in the developing world) with the provision of adequate and acceptable quality education. Industry government partnerships seem to be more problematic, together with the **private operation of school assessment/evaluation and administration of exams**. Concerns over these forms of PPPs come mainly from Europe, North America, Australia. This may be related to the fact that these latter two forms of PPPs raise issues of autonomy and the ethos of public education, especially in the current context, where the dominant trend worldwide is an increase in the practice of international students' assessment and evaluation at school level. The private operation of school assessment is highly associated, for unions, to a change in the role of teachers and in the overall ethos of public education systems. As far as **industry-government** partnerships for research and innovation are concerned, if it is broadly recognised that they help providing needed financial and technical support to public education (especially in higher education), at the same time they raise apprehensions in relation to the actual autonomy of research when private resources are put it.

204. Hence, **unions' reactions vary according to the different contexts**. In the developing world, PPPs are often imposed as the only choice to grant the system, first, the necessary funding to keep running and, second, the improvements needed to increase its quality and access. Unions have no choice but to accept them as they are often the only option to have infrastructure and the provision of this service. Here, respondents overall point to the fact that PPPs provide needed financial and technical support, adequate and acceptable quality education and financial support to education reforms – while such perceptions are not shared by the majority of respondents from other regional groupings. This finding appears to be related to the fact that, in low income countries, the percentage of GDP spent in education is often lower than 6%, hence any financial support offered by private entities is necessary. In the developed world, unions tend to take a more strategic stand, trying to look at the broader picture and at the longer term consequences of privatisation processes in education. Many unions in industrialised nations would accept a conditional or critical engagement into PPPs, while others reject PPPs as a whole concept. This cautious or even negative attitude (more common, as we have seen, in the developed world) is greatly rela-

ted to considerations about the impact of PPPs on working conditions and on issues such as casualisation³⁵, women and organizing. In fact, the overall impact of PPPs (particularly in some forms) on issues related to teachers' (and non-teaching personnel's) terms of employment and working conditions constitutes a great apprehension for education unions, changing their perception on both the short and long term implications of PPPs. Moreover, on the long term unions appear to be concerned about the broad impact of these different forms of private involvement into public education on its ethos – issues of democracy and of autonomy of schools and teachers are here at stake. These concerns, as said, are more relevant in the developed world, where PPPs constitute a further development of education systems that are already functioning appropriately.

205. Many unions (especially in the developed world) have experienced some sort of **involvement** in PPPs – and these are usually the ones that have a clear policy on PPP. They often state that they would like more participation in a way to avoid the eventual abovementioned negative impact of PPPs. A greater involvement of unions is indeed seen as likely to grant a better protection of working conditions, a slowing down of the process of PPPs and to change their direction by making them less profit-oriented. Respondents point to a range of options as necessary conditions to minimise or mitigate the negative impact of PPPs: transparency in PPP contract awards and processes (68.4%); participation of union in PPP evaluation (56%); participation from unions in the implementation of PPPs (50.7%); identification and effective involvement of other stakeholders in the planning and implementation stage of PPPs (41.8%). About 29% of respondents list other conditions, namely: negotiations with trade union on terms and conditions, especially if staff is involved; respect for labour standards; setting up of entities to provide expert consultation to private players in PPPs; commitment to build capacity through skill transfers; opportunities to organise; and statutory provisions which limit the deregulation of service provision within the public sector. Yet a number of respondents are of the opinion that unions should fight against the introduction of PPPs in education, expressing a total refusal of the concept or that they do not believe 'that involving unions and other stakeholders in the process will mitigate the negative effects of PPPs'.

206. EI can draw significant conclusions from this information. First, PPPs are widespread in all parts of the world and they have **significant impacts on quality of education, its access and on working conditions of teachers and education employees.**

³⁵ Casualisation is here to mean as short-term contracts or other non regular forms of employment.



PPPs are transnational and their policies and the practices they encompass in one country can easily be applied in another. This is why unions need a common ground of knowledge in order to develop a consistent policy at international level. Second, while infrastructure development projects seem to be the most acceptable, especially in those countries when there is lack of public funds for school buildings and maintenance services, they raise serious concerns about the **effectiveness of spending and the quality of constructions**. Unions should remain vigilant and critically monitor such PPPs projects. PPPs involving contracting out of management of teaching, employment of teachers, assesment and evaluation of schools appear to be most dangerous, as they underwrite teachers as objects of manipulation and seriously undermine **pedagogical autonomy and quality of education**. Third, the only way for unions to influence development of PPPs is **critical and active involvement**. Unions should be present in every new PPPs project by engaging critically but constructively into them in order to avoid the most radical and dangerous forms of PPPs, while directing the whole project towards more provision, better quality and less profit oriented pathways. There is no way unions can stop the spread of PPPs by simply ignoring them. Finally, while there is no one-size-fits-all, this report suggests some emerging patterns that allow for the development of a **substantial common policy** on PPPs in education in general and their specific forms.

Chapter 5

MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS IN EDUCATION (MSPEs)

Global partnerships

207. Whereas PPPs are generally understood as joint government (including intergovernmental organisations) and for-profit or commercial initiatives, a newer term, multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs), has been introduced to cover partnerships that bring together a wide range of public, private and civil society stakeholders (Draxler, 2008). The World Economic Forum (WEF) promotes this broader concept, which involves business and/or not for profit civil society organisations working in partnership with government agencies and official development agencies (WEF, 2005: 8). To WEF it is a model of development cooperation in which actors from the private sector (private corporations, corporate foundations, groups or associations of businesses) and the public sector (Ministry of Education and schools) bring together expertise and resources to achieve development goals (USAID, 2008: 7). This concept entails reciprocal obligations and mutual accountability, including either voluntary or contractual relationships; the sharing of investment (financial or in-kind) reputational risks (rather than the one-dimensional transfer of risk to the private sector), and joint responsibility in design and execution (WEF, 2005: 8). They are closer to the broader definition of PPPs favoured by the ILO.

Public-private partnerships are voluntary and collaborative relationships among various actors in both public (State) and private (non-State) sectors, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common goal or undertake specific tasks. Partnerships may serve various purposes, including advancing a cause, to implement normative standards or codes of conduct, or to share and coordinate resources and expertise. They may consist of a specific single activity, or may evolve into a set of actions or even an enduring alliance, building consensus and ownership with each collaborating organization and its stakeholders. While they vary considerably, such partnerships are typically established as structured cooperative efforts with a sharing of responsibilities as well as expertise, resources and other benefits (ILO, 2008).

208. Such partnerships have been created for the purpose of advocacy, for pooling resources, for exchange of expertise, or for developing new ways to construct or to provide infrastructure and services. Thus, according to Draxler (2008), they



are seen as complementary mechanisms that can provide enhanced expertise, synergies, resources and responses to needs.

209. There are increasing numbers of actors engaged in multi-stakeholder partnerships in education. This chapter attempts to shed light on different forms of multi-stakeholder partnerships as well as on some of the main actors who are active in such initiatives and programmes.

Actors engaged in MSPs

210. Here is a general overview of some of the main agencies and organizations playing an active role in initiating and fostering multi-stakeholder partnerships in education.
211. UNESCO's relations with the private sector encompass cooperation with business corporations, small and medium enterprises, philanthropic foundations, professional and economic associations as well as other organizations of the business community, individuals, communities, parents and families. Public-Private Partnerships are expected to play an increasingly important role in the Education for All drive, creating an alternative source of funding for the achievement of EFA goals and making more technical assistance available. The five inter-governmental agencies spearheading the global EFA movement (UNESCO, UNDP, the UNFPA, UNICEF and the World Bank) share a consensus view about the value of PPPs, and include support for the PPP concept in their action at the global level. UNESCO has explicitly set the objective of assisting governments to establish PPPs in the education sector, in order to achieve Education for All³⁶.
212. UNICEF is involved in global multi-stakeholder partnerships with other UN organisations and World Bank. Similar to the other agencies, UNICEF sees achieving of MDGs as an "urgent need to meet time-sensitive benchmarks (UNICEF, 2006³⁷). UNICEF recognizes and nurtures its affiliations with corporations (ibid). Together, corporate partners and UNICEF have mobilized resources, created programmes, developed policies, and designed and implemented advocacy initiatives and awareness campaigns (ibid). Corporate partners support numerous UNICEF activities, including interventions in child survival, education, HIV prevention and humanitarian responses in emergencies. Some of the UNICEF partnership programmes are described later in this paper.

³⁶ Ilona Genevois. 2008. PPT presentation: "IIEP and Public Private Partnerships in the education sector". Meeting of the Advisory Group on Capacity Building. September 2008.

³⁷ UNICEF, 2006 Report. For more http://www.unicef.or.kr/unicef/intro/2006_Annual_Report_2006.pdf

213. UNDP sees business and development as mutually reinforcing: businesses that promote development by employing the poor and providing the goods and services they need also benefit from development as rising incomes generate new market opportunities and possibilities for expansion³⁸. UNDP's concept of its entrepreneurial role is rather surprising here. It sees a role for itself, in bringing "the right actors together and to broker solutions, drawing on our extensive global knowledge base. But in some situations we can also assist through direct technical assistance and access to seed capital. We offer a universal presence – we have a full time operations in 166 countries, trusted relationships with businesses, governments and civil society organizations alike, a wealth of development expertise and an intimate knowledge of development conditions 'on the ground'".
214. The *World Bank*, as discussed earlier, is strongly involved in initiating and supporting PPPs as well as the broader MSP concept. The EFA-Fast-Track Initiative (FTI), launched by the Bank, is a global partnership between developed and developing countries to achieve free, universal basic education in specified countries by the MDG date of 2015. In addition to mobilizing funds, the initiative supports the design of comprehensive sector-wide education plans and fills gaps in policy, capacity and data.
215. *WEF* has been very keen on initiating and boosting MSPs all over the world. It has argued for a greater role of the private sector in education identifying areas of involvement, such as to:
- a) **Establish the basic conditions for effective learning:** improve school infrastructure; develop and distribute appropriate supplies and equipment; provide school meals and health services; expand access to affordable, quality education.
 - b) **Improve educational content and skill building:** strengthen curriculum content and teacher training; enable appropriate 21st century skill building for employability.
 - c) **Fostering effective education management:** Develop financing mechanisms and planning; promote performance-oriented, results-driven management and innovation.
 - d) **Engage in advocacy:** building public support and political commitment to improve education; creating new models that engage all stakeholders in collaborative PPPs (WEF, 2006: 33-38).

³⁸ For more http://www.undp.org/partners/business/why_partner_with_UNDP.shtml



MSPE initiatives and programmes

216. The list of programmes and projects related to education mentioned in this section outlines just a fraction of an increasing number of initiatives undertaken by UN agencies as well as private sector corporations. Although it is by no means an exhaustive list, it helps to provide a picture of the nature and direction of such initiatives.

UNESCO

217. UNESCO has carried out various research projects and organizes workshops, seminars and meetings at national, regional and international levels on PPPs in education.

218. Some examples of recent events held at international level:

- Workshop on Public-Private Partnerships in EFA organized jointly by the World Economic Forum and UNESCO with the support of USAID (Paris, 18 July 2006).
- Two Round Tables on "Development-Driven Public-Private Partnerships in Basic Education", organized jointly by the World Economic Forum and UNESCO, firstly in conjunction with the Fourth Meeting of the High-Level Group on EFA (Brasilia, November 2004), and then in Paris (April 2005).
- Session on Partnership with the Private Sector in EFA (Paris, July 2004), at the Fifth Meeting of the Working Group on Education for All.

219. Education projects around the world in cooperation with multinational companies and foundations:

220. *International conference "Bologna process: quality of educational programmes in modern universities"*³⁹ (November 2006 in St.Petersburg). The conference was organized within the framework of the UNESCO activities on higher education reform aimed at implementing the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) in the countries of the region. The EHEA is the objective of the Bologna process - to create more comparable, compatible and coherent systems of higher education in Europe. This activity was supported jointly by the UNESCO Moscow Office and British Petroleum.

221. *International Fund for Higher Education in Iraq*: Cooperation between UNESCO and the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development⁴⁰. Since 2003, the Fund has provided immediate and long term assistance for the reconstruction of higher education in Iraq.

222. *Ford Foundation*: UNESCO and the Ford Foundation currently cooperate in the fields of science, education and culture⁴¹. The initiatives in education include: Establishment of a Regional Body for quality assurance of higher education in the Arab States; Latin American Laboratory for the assessment of quality in Education

223. *Schools in Egypt*: A project undertaken by Hans Christian Andersen abc Foundation and UNESCO⁴². Since 2005, Hans Christian Andersen abc Foundation collaborates with UNESCO on a school project for children in difficult circumstances.

224. *The Global Agreement*: UNESCO and Microsoft use Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to promote education⁴³. In November 2004, UNESCO and Microsoft started cooperation through an agreement to accelerate social and economic development around the world.

225. *Partnerships for Education (PFE)*: PFE is a joint initiative of UNESCO and the World Economic Forum, formally launched in January 2007 arising out of the WEF's Global Education Initiative. The goals are to enhance global understanding of the value of Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships for Education (MSPEs), focusing particularly on the roles of governments and the private sector, and to support the delivery of such partnerships to help achieve the Education for All (EFA) goals⁴⁴.

- Goal 1: Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children
- Goal 2: Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to, and complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality
- Goal 3: Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life-skills programmes
- Goal 4: Achieving a 50% improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults

⁴⁰ For more: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31888&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

⁴¹ For more: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31752&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

⁴² For more: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31340&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

⁴³ For more: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31629&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

⁴⁴ <http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gei/PartnershipsforEducation/index.htm>



- Goal 5: Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls' full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality
- Goal 6: Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills

226. *Education for All – EFA*: In pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals agenda, different multi-stakeholder partnerships in education have been established. Such initiatives include the Association for Development of Education in Africa (ADEA), which began as a donors' forum and evolved to include recipient ministries of education (Draxler, 2008). Worldwide multi-stakeholder partnerships, such as the EFA coordination mechanisms (e.g. Working Group on EFA and High-Level Group on EFA) led by UNESCO and its counterpart financing mechanism, the EFA-Fast Track Initiative include donors, governments and civil society organisations (ibid). This kind of cooperation has been supported by different international instruments, processes and global frameworks for multi-stakeholder partnerships as provided by the box 2. Draxler (2008) gives another interesting definition when describing the multi-stakeholder partnerships in Education for All (EFA), defining their goals as 'pooling and managing of resources, as well as the mobilisation of competencies and commitments by public, business and civil society partners to contribute to expansion and quality of education'. In 2007, the High-Level Group broadened its membership to include the World Economic Forum, an important step towards including the business community in these mechanisms.

Box 1: Intergovernmental agreements bearing on Education for All and Multi-stakeholder Partnerships.

a) International instruments

Dakar Framework for Action
Millennium Development Goals
United Nations Convention Against Corruption
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

b) Mechanisms and processes

EFA Global Action Plan (March 2007)
Education for All International Coordination
EFA-Fast Track Initiative
The Paris Declaration
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
UN Delivering as One Process

c) Global frameworks for MSPEs

Global Business Coalition
 IFC Edinvest
 The Global Compact
 WEF Global Education Initiative (GEI)

UNICEF

227. *The United Nations Girls' Education Initiative (UNGEI)*, led by UNICEF, is a partnership of organizations committed to closing the gender gap in primary and secondary education. UNGEI provides advocacy and technical support for designing, financing and implementing national education plans. It offers stakeholders – which include UN system agencies, governments, donor countries, non-governmental organizations, civil society, the private sector, communities and families – a platform for action and galvanizes their efforts to get girls into school.

228. *The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Cluster for Education in Emergencies*⁴⁵ is part of larger UN reform efforts to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian relief. UNICEF and the Save the Children Alliance are lead agencies for the partnership, whose task at the country level is to clarify the roles, responsibilities and accountability of UN and non-UN partners seeking to restore schooling in specific crisis situations. It also seeks to coordinate better efforts to rebuild education systems in post-crisis transitions. A global advisory group includes UNESCO, the World Food Programme, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Rescue Committee, the Christian Children's Fund, and the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). At the country level, the main cluster partners are the INEE and the respective countries' ministries of education.

229. *The Business partnership for Girls Education in Yemen*⁴⁶ was launched in 30 August 2006 marking the beginning of a novel tripartite coalition between government, private sector and UNICEF. The Business partnership for Girls Education is first major private sector initiative of its kind in the country and is spearheaded by three leading business houses of Arwa Group (Shamlan Water), Spacetel and Universal Group.

⁴⁵ For more: http://www.unicef.org/girlseducation/index_44882.html

⁴⁶ For more: http://www.unicef.org/media/media_35579.html



UNDP

230. As noted earlier, UNDP is another UN agency involved in multi-stakeholder partnerships in support of Education for All. Initiatives undertaken under this framework by UNDP include:

231. *UNDP and HONDA partnership for education in Malaysia:* On January 2008, Honda and UNDP renewed their partnership to promote education for development in Malaysia. The “Human Resource Development Through Education and Training for Malaysian Youths” project is a Honda-UNDP CSR initiative that aims to provide full and non-binding scholarships to 20 underprivileged, but determined students annually to pursue higher education or skills training⁴⁷.

232. *UNDP and Coca Cola Partnership:* Coca-Cola has teamed up with the UNDP to bridge the digital divide in Malaysia and launched in March 2002 the project called “E-learning for life” with the Malaysian Ministry of Education⁴⁸. Supporting the Malaysian Government’s vision to build a knowledge-based economy, the project will bring e-learning opportunities and ICT training and access to students, teachers and local communities.

233. *UNDP and Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation Partners:* In November 2007, The Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched a new partnership to promote creative knowledge generation and investment in education⁴⁹. The partnership marks the first of a series of strategic initiatives announced by the Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, at the Knowledge Conference in Dubai (2007). The agreement marks the first partnership between UNDP and a private foundation in the region, and is a major step forward for UNDP’s initiative to work with all sectors of the Arab society, including governments, the private sector, civil society and foundations.

234. *UNDP and Cisco Systems Collaboration in Vietnam:* UNDP and Cisco Systems® have brought their global collaboration on Internet education to Vietnam, according to a CISCO report of 2004⁵⁰. A UNDP-sponsored United Nations Volunteer (UNV) has been appointed to widen the availability of the Cisco Networking Academy® Program in smaller cities such as Cantho, Dalat, Danang, Hue and help them understand the value of the Internet and IT education (ibid).

⁴⁷ For more http://www.undp.org.my/uploads/HDF_MOU_PR_4JAN2008.pdf

⁴⁸ For more http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2002/issue2/0202p22_elearning.html

⁴⁹ For more http://business.maktoob.com/News-20070423130841-Mohammed_bin_Rashid_Al_Maktoum_Foundation_Partners_with_UNDP_to_Boost_Knowledge_Creation_in_Arab_World.aspx

⁵⁰ For more http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/global/asiapac/news/2004/pr_12-08.html

235. *UNDP and Microsoft Partnership*: Microsoft's partnership with UNDP was initiated at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2004 when Bill Gates and the then UNDP Administrator Mark Malloch Brown (later a Minister in the UK government) signed a memorandum of understanding. UNDP and Microsoft have signed a three-year agreement to improve educational achievement through the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT)⁵¹. UNDP's goal is to accelerate the implementation of ICT in schools and for the benefit of the wider communities. Microsoft will support this goal by bringing its experience of implementing ICT in schools through its Pathfinder Blueprint for Schools programme. The Pathfinder Blueprint – piloted in Namibia – is a step by step guide for governments in countries underserved by technology for the integration of ICT into national educational strategies.

Box. 2: UNDP and CISCO systems bring internet education collaboration to Vietnam

UNDP, through the Asia Pacific Development Information Programme (APDIP), and Cisco® have worked successfully together for several years to bring the Networking Academy program to underserved populations in Asia Pacific. In addition, UNVs have been appointed by the UNDP and Cisco to support participation in the program in remote areas throughout the region. Currently, there are UNVs working in Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand - and now Vietnam.

"The UNDP is committed to bridging the 'digital divide' in remote areas. Countries such as Vietnam can benefit tremendously from advanced education. While the country has a 94 percent literacy rate, it is only in the 112th position of the UNDP Human Development Index with 50 percent of its population 18 years or under", said Mr Subinay Nandy, UNDP Resident Representative (ad interim) in Vietnam.

"The UNDP is delighted to have committed private sector companies such as Cisco Systems to help in our efforts. The Cisco Networking Academy program has proven to be an excellent building block for many people in underdeveloped nations to get a start in the Internet economy."

Since it was launched in 1997, the community investment-based Cisco Networking Academy program has become a model for partnership between the public and private sectors. One of the largest e-learning "laboratories" in the world, the Academy program curriculum uses technologies associated with networking and the Internet to impart skills for how to plan, build and deploy those same networks to students. The program has been embraced globally for its open-standards content by 10,000 educational institutions around the world. Over 380,000 students in 160 countries have already completed the Networking Academy program (CISCO 2004).

⁵¹ For more: <http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/unlimitedpotential/docs/undp.pdf>



WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM

236. WEF multi-stakeholder partnerships: The World Economic Forum became active in education in 2003, when the Forum launched the Global Education Initiative (GEI) with the overall objective of raising awareness and support the implementation of relevant, sustainable and scalable national education sector plans on a global level through catalysing MSPEs . The Jordan Education Initiative (JEI) was the first initiative of this kind, launched at an Extraordinary Meeting of the WEF at the Dead Sea. It was followed by other programmes such as the Palestinian Education Initiative (PEI), Egyptian Education Initiative (EEI) and Rajasthan Education Initiative (REI). A short summary of these programmes is presented in the following box.

Box 3: The Global Education Initiative

The Jordan Education Initiative (JEI)

The Jordan Education Initiative (JEI) is a global local, public-private partnership that aims to improve education in Jordan through effective use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), while at the same time building local ICT industry capacity and creating a model of reform for other countries. Some of the results achieved by JEI: engagement of over 30 active partners from the public and private sectors, development of a full Math e-Curriculum (grades 1-12), ongoing deployment of in-classroom technology and training to 50 Discovery Schools, transfer of ~\$3.7 million to local companies as part of JEI programs and initial steps to expand the model to other countries in the Middle East region. Direct contributions to the Initiative from global and local partners have reached over US\$ 25 million. For more: <http://www.weforum.org/pdf/JEI/JEIreport.pdf>

The Palestinian Education Initiative (PEI)

Under the leadership of Dr Sabri Saidam, former Minister of Telecommunications and Information Technology and Dr Naim Al-Hommus, Minister of Education and Higher Education of the Palestinian Authority, the PEI was launched at the World Economic Forum in Jordan in June 2005 at the Dead Sea. The overall objective of the PEI is the enhancement of the future of education in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) through pedagogical techniques empowered by technology that catalyzes socio-economic development. The main objectives of the initiative are:

- To improve the existing ICT utilization in the PNA education system and pave the way for the development of Knowledge Based Palestinian Economy through Public/Private collaboration

- To encourage innovation in the education system and throughout the Palestinian ICT industry by fostering a sustainable model of public/private partnership in an effective adaptation and use of information and communication technology in the education system
- To build the capacity of the PNA education, ICT and knowledge industry for the development of innovative learning solutions in partnership with world class and local firms, creating economic value leading to mutually beneficial business opportunity
- To enhance a student centered learning process that provides skills, knowledge, and experiences that will lead to employment and an entrepreneurial mindset.

For more: <http://www3.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gei/Palestinian%20Education%20Initiative/index.html>

The Egyptian Education Initiative (EEI)

The Egyptian Education Initiative (EEI) is a public-private partnership that aims to improve education in Egypt through effective use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). With the support of the World Economic Forum, multinationals and donors, the Ministries of Communications and Information Technology, Education and Higher Education have put in place several initiatives to provide ICT to all Egyptians at an affordable cost. The objectives of the Initiative are:

- To improve the development and delivery of education for Egypt's citizens through private-public partnerships
- To facilitate educational reform in Egypt by devising efficient public-private models to enhance the creativity of teachers and students through the effective use of ICT
- To develop the capacity of the local IT industry to adopt innovative learning solutions in partnership with world-class firms
- To upgrade channels of lifelong learning that foster socio-economic development through e-learning and delivery centres
- To establish a virtual learning community that will enhance educational performance and connect, remove limitations and create opportunities for 21st Century students to realize their full potential
- To prepare all students in schools and universities to join the digital workforce
- To leverage national government commitment and corporate citizenship in building a model of educational reform that can be exported and replicated throughout the Arab region

For more: <http://www3.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gei/EgyptEducationInitiative/index.html>

The Rajasthan Education Initiative (REI)

Led by the Chief Minister of Rajasthan, Vasundhara Raje, the REI was launched at the India Economic Summit in November 2005 in New Delhi. Partners of the REI include the Government of Rajasthan, World Economic Forum, Confederation of



Indian Industry (CII) and the Global eSchools and Communities Initiative of the UNICT task force (GeSCI). The REI will play a facilitating role in the creation and implementation of public private partnerships through projects that focus on improving the delivery of educational services, and in particular on promoting equitable access, enrolment and retention of children in schools, reducing gender disparities, promoting skill development and enhancing learning levels. The REI is an ambitious initiative aimed at balancing the goal of Education for all, through a two-pronged approach:

ICT based programmes:

Project GRACE (Girls of Rajasthan And Computer Education)

District Computer Education Centres

School Computer education programme CALP

Computerisation of department

EDUSAT

Teacher training Technology Academies

Non-ICT based programmes:

Learning Skills development

Adoption of schools Scholarships for indigent children

Mid-Day meals programme

Children with special needs

For more: <http://www3.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gei/Rajasthan%20Education%20Initiative/index.html>

The Global Education Alliance (GEA) in Rwanda

From the WEF website: www.weforum.org/gei :

"Working within the FTI framework, the GEA will initiate an unprecedented collaboration between corporations, the national government and the local donor group to obtain the greatest efficiencies and sustainable, long-term results. "This new pilot programme in Rwanda is a perfect complement to 50x15, a global initiative founded by AMD to enable affordable, accessible Internet connectivity and computing capabilities for 50% of the world's population by the year 2015." "Providing universal access to education is crucial to influencing the standard of living and economic prosperity for individuals and countries," said John Chambers, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Cisco. "We believe this new alliance will be a powerful advancement in global education, uniting public and private sectors to provide children a future of greater social and economic opportunity." "Broadening access to quality education for all children is a critical building block of sustainable and prosperous societies" said William Gates, Chairman of Microsoft Corporation. AMD, Cisco, Edelman, Intel and Microsoft among other partners have strongly expressed their wish to explore effective ways of collaborating with the FTI to help the government of Rwanda and others achieve their priorities in education."

What is particularly interesting in the case of Rwanda is that the national teacher union (the EER) has been involved from the very beginning in the process of negotiation for the definition of the abovementioned initiative.

ILO

237. Although ILO has not used the MSPE terminology, the definition of PPPs it provided recently is close to the concept:

Public–private partnerships are voluntary and collaborative relationships among various actors in both public (State) and private (non-State) sectors, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common goal or undertake specific tasks. Partnerships may serve various purposes, including advancing a cause, to implement normative standards or codes of conduct, or to share and coordinate resources and expertise. They may consist of a specific single activity, or may evolve into a set of actions or even an enduring alliance, building consensus and ownership with each collaborating organization and its stakeholders. While they vary considerably, such partnerships are typically established as structured cooperative efforts with a sharing of responsibilities as well as expertise, resources and other benefits (ILO, 2008).

Reasons and motivations behind the MSPEs

238. The terrain of initiatives in education is vast. All the research and papers dedicated to MSPEs or related PPP initiatives start with the Millennium Development Goal of Elementary Education for All, followed by a bleak description of the dire state of the education systems in the developing world:

The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on education pledges to ensure that by 2015 children everywhere – boys and girls alike – will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. However, since 2000, much of the world is not on track to meet this goal. More than 100 million school-aged children do not attend school; of these, 60% are girls. The vast majority (96%) are in the developing world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Among children who do enroll, many drop out before completing primary school. In sub-Saharan Africa, primary school enrolment is 58% and the completion rate just 33% (WEF, 2006: 31).

239. Whereas all agree that intervention is needed to help achieve education for all – motivations vary. The business case for improving education is described in the WEF publication (2006: 32):



An effective education system is critical to economic growth and developing a thriving private sector. Improving education benefits the private sector in several significant ways by:

- *Building a skilled labour force.* Education expands the pool of qualified workers, which attracts foreign investment and leads to job creation.
- *Increasing purchasing power.* Well-educated children are more likely to have higher paying jobs as adults, giving them more purchasing power and boosting the country's economic growth.
- *Improving productivity.* Primary education is a key factor in manufacturing productivity in least developed countries, while post-primary education is necessary for innovation.

240. The WEF paper also quotes a business leader stating that “for a PPP to be sustainable in business terms, the company should get a measurable benefit out of it” (WEF, 2006: 41). (PPPs in education are promoted in all regions as a factor in building productivity. For example, Downes (2006) argues that the process of repositioning and developing the new Caribbean economy through the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy would require creative planning and generation of significant resources, which in turn would necessitate the formation of public-private partnerships.)

Evaluating the GEI

241. In 2006 WEF mandated Professor Tom Cassidy of Harvard University to describe and evaluate the GEI model of partnership as implemented in Jordan, Egypt and Rajasthan, India. The GEI partnership model is set out in by Cassidy (2007) as follows:

1. Core values and development objectives
2. Vision, goals and objectives
3. Organizational readiness (enabling environment)
4. Leadership, governance and decision-making
5. Management and implementation
6. Planning
7. Communications
8. Resource mobilization
9. Schools and communities:
 - i) Principals
 - ii) Teachers
 - iii) Students
10. Partners: ICT partners and other partners
11. Monitoring and evaluation
12. Results

242. He then developed a “standards-based education system change model” showing inputs from local or international private sector, NGOs, donor/lender organisations and universities, and went on to state:

“Partnerships are not new in education. Good school principals in many countries have long understood the value of partnerships in securing resources for their schools through partnerships with parents, the community and nearby civil and private sector partners.” “What is different about the GEI in the broadest sense is the following:

- *The idea of mustering and integrating the involvement of many very different partners in a genuinely shared and coordinated strategy for education reform and change*
- *Expansion of the concept of ‘partner’ to invite and legitimize the active participation of a much broader set of stakeholders in education reform than has typically been the case in the past*
- *Explicitly inviting partners into the dialogue about both the substance of the reform and how change might/should happen*
- *Trusting partners to deliver with minimal government interference; and*
- *Commitment to the value-added proposition that all partners can and should gain value from their participation in the partnership*

These differences represent a significant shift from past strategies in which ministries entered multiple, but largely bilateral, one-to-one relationships with a number of external partners, mostly NGOs and regional and international donor/lender agencies, relationships that were most often contractual arrangements of the ‘tender’ variety and that involved partners in activities that were loosely coupled at best with the activities of other partners.”

243. He also noted that: *“Making the shift from a “tendering mentality” to a “partnering mentality” has in the past challenged and continues to challenge some partners. Multistakeholder partnership initiatives like the GEI represent a significant shift in the model of educational development.”*

244. Resources are made available through these initiatives. It’s difficult to ascertain the amount involved financially, but they would seem to be relatively small in relation to the overall needs. More significant perhaps is the introduction of a “cans-do” business approach to “getting the job done.”



Impact of MSPs in Education

245. Although there is an increasing amount of literature on MSPs in education, “the empirical evidence about their functioning and results is still in need of enrichment”, says Draxler (2008). There is lack of clear evidence on the impact of these initiatives. However, some considerations regarding the impact could be made based on the existing literature and drawing from the experiences of MSPs in Health, which have a longer history. As Draxler (2008) puts it, the bulk of the existing literature about the theory and experience of partnerships in the social sector concerns the health sector. Education as a topic on its own is not prominent.

246. While the need for more money and aid in education is the highlight of international meetings, there are critical issues to be considered, i.e. the sustainability of these initiatives, the impact on the infrastructure and the public system as well as implications for state structures having to deal with bureaucracies and reporting procedures to the international organisations, as well as issues of regulatory mechanisms.

247. *Needs and Supply*

The first important consideration is pointed out from Draxler (2008): most partnerships arise from a programme or project idea rather than a clearly identified need. Indeed, most partnerships are developed around a notion of supply: the will of a party or several parties to contribute to the provision or enhancement of education in a way that they judge positive (Draxler, 2008). When there is a definition of needs, this is often based more on the perceived collective wisdom and knowledge of the principal initiators than on detailed assessment or consultations with end users (*ibid*). Indeed, as an Oxfam report found out in 2004, less than 8% of aid was directed into government plans and budgets. All the rest is directed to individual and capital projects, to technical assistance, and to “vertical”, initiatives (for example, based on the campaigns against diseases such HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB) (Global Campaign for Education, 2007).

248. Another facet of the need-supply paradox is unearthed by the Global Campaign for Education report of 2007.

Box. 4: Donors, darlings and orphans – money follows interests

Another factor that results in children being left behind is rich countries' persistence in favouring development partnerships with countries in which they perceive a strategic interest or where they have historical links. This leaves many nations facing big education challenges with serious shortages of cash - despite having mobilised domestic political will towards achieving the goals. This is most amply demonstrated when we examine the experience of the Education For All Fast-Track Initiative (FTI), the innovative approach developed since 2002 to ensure that aid is targeted where it can most effectively be spent, and to incentivise low-income countries to plan ambitiously. FTI encourages developing countries to place a single sector plan for the achievement of EFA at the forefront of their poverty reduction strategies, demonstrably backed with domestic resources. The theory is that donors respond by providing coordinated and increased financial and technical support, in a transparent and predictable manner. Yet, as more and more poor countries pass the stringent tests of viability and political commitment required to get the FTI stamp of approval, donors dawdle and dissemble instead of coughing up the cash. As of April 2007, 29 developing countries have fulfilled their side of the FTI 'contract', but donors have replied with a shoddy and lacklustre response. But tragically, some of those facing the biggest challenges remain stranded, having raised the hopes of their populations in vain. These include a number of African countries which still have over a million children out of school: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Niger. All have taken bold steps to open the doors of learning to all, including such measures as the abolition of user fees and active pursuit of policies aiming to redress the gender balance. The message their experience sends is: your efforts may not be rewarded. Now, this innovative initiative of great potential is in a precarious position just when it should be the centrepiece of the drive to achieve EFA (Global Campaign for Education Report, 2007).

249. *The impact on the education systems*

Concerns over the impact of these vertical interventions in the national systems are voiced by various commentators. The case of Senegal elaborated earlier is a case in point. Critics point to the potential weakening of governmental and intergovernmental action as the private sector becomes more closely involved in conceiving and implementing development objectives (Draxler, 2008). Likewise, in the case of MSPs in health, IMF (2007, in Maciocco, 2008) argues that multiple donors, each with their own priorities, bureaucratic requirements, and supervisory structures have created waste and confusion in recipient nations. Other



problems related to aid in education, are highlighted from the Global Campaign for Education (2007), for example the use of high-cost consultancies. The same has been confirmed by the World Bank, which estimates that one-third of education Official Development Assistance is spent on consultants (*ibid*).

250. *Regulatory mechanisms*

Those who feel that education is a public good, and that public goods must be provided under the responsibility and control of governments feel that the inclusion of the private sector needs to be closely monitored and regulated (Draxler, 2008). The voluntary nature of current regulatory mechanisms, and the difficulty of monitoring – let alone enforcing – private sector compliance with even these, is worrisome in this context (Draxler, 2008). This seems to be even more so for the reality of many poor countries, which are stuck in a vicious circle of weak institutions, poor regulatory mechanisms and implementation capacities.

251. *Sustainability*

An important consideration remains the sustainability of these vertical programmes, since as IMF (2007, in Maciocco, 2008) argues in the case of MSPs in health, donors' funds may not prove stable or longstanding. For recipient countries, these inflows have created difficult challenges in the management of health sectors (*ibid*). As Draxler (2008) puts it, so far, public-private partnerships in education have not generated enough additional funds in terms of percentage of overall spending to be highly significant in monetary terms. There is the possibility that market influences may shift priorities, possibly resulting in much greater inequality, but without significantly expanding overall access and funding (Bull and McNeill, 2006 in Draxler, 2008). Serious concerns are raised by government officials, who prove skeptical on the sustainability of these initiatives in the long run (USAID, 2008: 16).

252. *Political implications*

What are the political implications of having the voice (followed by abundant funds) of big corporations or foundations on education policy? Zammit, (2003 in Draxler, 2008), argues that “partnerships to undertake development-related tasks in countries of the South (such as ‘providing cheap medicines to save lives’) also provide opportunities for corporate image enhancement, vehicles for market penetration by providing already powerful enterprises with preferential access to developing country markets, and other means of increasing competitive advantage and policy influence, for example, through privileged access to developing countries governments.”

253. Likewise, a case from the US should be considered. In December, 2006, the New Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce released its report, *Tough Choices or Tough Times*, published by the National Center on Education and the Economy. It was funded by, notably, The Bill and Melinda Gates, Hewlett, Casey and Lumina Foundations. It called for, among other things: making all public schools into something beyond charter schools, called “Contract Schools”; ending high school for many students after the 10th grade; ending teacher pension plans and cutting back on teacher health benefits; introducing merit pay and other pay differentials for teachers; eliminating the powers of local school boards (with the “public” schools to be owned by private companies and all regulation done by the states) (Gerson and Miller, 2006). An economic rationale was put forward for the changes to be made. However, as Gerson and Miller (2006) put it, while the Commission claims it will save \$60 billion on K–12 education, it does not mention that corporations today already access a trillion dollar a year market based on privatizing public schools and their services. In a following up paper, Miller and Gerson (2008) argue that these measures, taken together, could effectively cripple public control of public education. They could dangerously weaken the power of teacher unions, thus facilitating still further attacks on the public sector, by leaving education policy in the hands of a network of entrepreneurial think tanks, corporate entrepreneurs, and lobbyists.
254. MSPEs raise a number of issues that we need to be aware of and discuss. For one, we should interrogate further the question of the balance of power (or lack thereof) within MSPEs. It's one thing to call something a partnership, and quite another to ensure that all stakeholders have equal voice and influence. Would the fact, for example, that a private sector partner is contributing financial resources to the project give it more sway than a trade union or other social partner? We should also think more about how we would like to see MPSEs governed and organized. This question is particularly important as different stakeholders in an MPSE may well have very different objectives. In some cases, these objectives may complement each other, but in other cases they will be contrary and in conflict. The distribution of power within an MSPE arrangement will determine how these differing objectives will be reconciled, or which objective will predominate.
255. There are also questions to be raised about the extent to which MSPEs might be used as strategies by some governments and the private sector to sell PPPs to a reluctant public under a different guise while co-opting unions and other stakeholders. In other words, to what extent might MSPEs become ways of dressing up PPPs?



Corporate Social Responsibility

256. We met with the WEF Founding President and his senior officials responsible for the Global Education Initiative and the Partnerships for Education Program. With a constituency of major corporations, and the motto: "*Committed to improving the state of the world*", WEF has placed particular emphasis on the concept of "Corporate Global Citizenship".
257. There is no doubt that the importance of education is a core conviction of the WEF Founder and a range of CEOs from global companies forming the WEF constituency, and that they regard the Global Education Initiative as one of their key programs. Hence the GEI began with the view that corporations should contribute to "improving the state of the world" through education. However there are broader question about Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Some of these are addressed in the TUAC publication: "*Organizing workers globally: the need for public policy to regulate investment*" (John Evans, 2008). This paper points out that corporations generally press for a voluntary approach to CSR, particularly in relation to respect for fundamental labour rights and environmental standards. But the paper makes a cogent case that voluntary CSR cannot replace appropriate public policy and regulation. The current financial crisis, which is now turning rapidly into a worldwide recession of the real economy, provides dramatic evidence, if it were needed, for the necessity for such regulation.
258. There is another important dimension to consider. CSR is also based on a tradition of private philanthropy in a number of countries, notably the United States, but also Germany, Sweden, Korea and Japan. In these and other countries, companies and entrepreneurs who have made fortunes state that they have a responsibility to "put something back into the community". One thinks, for example of Foundations like Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford, in the United States, Nobel in Sweden, or Bertelsman in Germany. More recently, we see a number of new Foundations from the IT industry, the most prominent and well-funded of which is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. This tradition of philanthropy is not to be decried, for several of the Foundations just mentioned have done much good, and plan to continue doing so. Increasingly, they are focused on education and health, both in the industrialized countries and in the developing countries, and they are explicitly committed to supporting the achievement of the MDGs, including Education for All. At the same time, there is legitimate questioning of the extent to which major foundations influence the policies as well as strategies in social field including education, and some warn of a tendency for policy-making itself to be privatized.

259. An additional element, and this is relatively new, is the direct involvement of corporations. So we have today a range of Foundations and corporations increasingly engaged not only in the GEI, but more broadly in education. Nevertheless, the question which we posed to the WEF, and has yet to find a response, is whether these corporations are also fulfilling their responsibilities to all the communities in which they operate, and from which they draw profits, through the payment of fair and reasonable taxation. In other words, a big issue to be placed on the table is that philanthropy, however honorable, and however well-intended, cannot be a substitute, and even less an alibi, for failing to accept responsibility to resource quality public services through fair and reasonable taxation.
260. That being said, several of the Foundations and corporations with whom we have entered into contact, explicitly state their support for quality public services. They may be considered potentially as weighty allies in the re-affirmation of our advocacy in support of properly resourced quality public services. We will return to this point in our conclusions.

Initiatives by major companies

261. The following boxes (Box 5 to 8) illustrate some significant initiatives from global companies. The text is taken from their websites and it represents a useful illustration of their programmes, the language they use and the key aspects they focus on.

Box. 5: The P21 initiative

From the P21 website: <http://resources21.org/moved.htm/resources/p21strategies.pdf>

“The Partnership for 21st Century Skills has emerged in the United States as a leading advocacy organization focused on infusing 21st century skills into education. The organization brings together the business community, education leaders, and policymakers to define a powerful vision for 21st century education and to ensure that students emerge from schools with the skills needed to be effective citizens, workers, and leaders in the 21st century. The Partnership for 21st Century Skills urges business, education, and government leaders to join this effort, think strategically about implementing 21st century skills into learning, and work long-term to create an education system that best prepares today’s students for tomorrow’s workplace.

Current **Board Member organizations** reads like a ‘Who’s Who’ of corporate America, while including the NEA. Members are: Adobe Systems, Inc., American Association



of School Librarians, Apple, ASCD, Atomic Learning, Blackboard, Inc., Cable in the Classroom, Cisco Systems, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Davis Publications, Dell, Inc., Discovery Education, Education Networks of America, Education Testing Service, EF Education, Ford Motor Company Fund, Gale, Cengage Learning, Hewlett Packard, Intel Foundation, JA Worldwide®, K12, KnowledgeWorks Foundation, Learning.com, Learning Point Associates, LEGO Group, Lenovo, McGraw-Hill, Measured Progress, Microsoft Corporation, National Education Association, Oracle Education Foundation, Pearson, PolyVision, Scholastic Education, Sesame Workshop, THINKronize, Verizon, Wireless Generation. Strategic Partners: Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO), International Society for Technology in Education (ISTE)

The Partnership's framework for learning in the 21st century is based on "essential skills" that children are considered to need to succeed as citizens and workers in the 21st century. The Partnership has identified six key elements of a 21st century education, which are described below:

1. **Core Subjects.** The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, which reauthorizes the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, identifies the core subjects as English, reading or language arts; mathematics; science; foreign languages; civics; government; economics; arts; history; and geography.

2. **21st Century Content.** Several significant, emerging content areas are critical to success in communities and workplaces. These content areas typically are not emphasized in schools today:

- * Global awareness
- * Financial, economic, business and entrepreneurial literacy
- * Civic literacy
- * Health and wellness awareness

3. **Learning and Thinking Skills.** As much as students need to learn academic content, they also need to know how to keep learning — and make effective and innovative use of what they know — throughout their lives.

4. **ICT Literacy.** Information and communications technology (ICT) literacy is the ability to use technology to develop 21st century content knowledge and skills, in support of 21st century teaching and learning

5. **Life Skills.** Good teachers have always incorporated life skills into their pedagogy. The challenge today is to incorporate these essential skills into schools deliberately, strategically and broadly.

6. **21st Century Assessments.** Authentic 21st century assessments are the essential foundation of a 21st century education. Assessments must measure all five results that matter — core subjects; 21st century content; learning skills; ICT literacy; and life skills. To be effective, sustainable and affordable, assessments must use mod-

ern technologies to increase efficiency and timeliness. Standardized tests alone can measure only a few of the important skills and knowledge students should learn. A balance of assessments, including high-quality standardized testing along with effective classroom assessments, offers students a powerful way to master the content and skills central to success. Serve as a catalyst to position 21st century skills at the center of US K-12 education by building collaborative partnerships among education, business, community and government leaders

Every child in American needs 21st century knowledge and skills to succeed as effective citizens, workers and leaders in the 21st century. There is a profound gap between the knowledge and skills most students learn in school and the knowledge and skills they need in typical 21st century communities and workplaces. To successfully face rigorous higher education coursework, career challenges and a globally competitive workforce, U.S. schools must align classroom environments with real world environments by infusing 21st century skills into their teaching and learning.

Within this framework, educators or administrators who want to take action can advocate for the infusion of 21st century skills into education by:

- * Embracing a vision of education that incorporates 21st century skills
- * Gathering the right stakeholders including key individuals from the education, business, government, afterschool and parent communities
- * Utilizing the Partnership's MILE Guide Self-Assessment tool to determine where they are today
- * Creating a plan of action using the Partnership's interactive guide: Route 21."

Box. 6: Microsoft Education Programmes

From the Microsoft Education website: <http://www.microsoft.com/unlimited-potential/programs/default.msp>

"The programmes can be divided in four main areas:

Education content

Digital StudyHall is a research project designed to improve educational opportunities in urban and low-income areas through a database of videotaped lessons that can be used and mediated by teachers in the classroom.

Microsoft Digital Literacy is an online curriculum for adult learners new to computing, providing them with a general awareness of the benefits and applications of computing, and teaching the basic skills to perform everyday tasks.

Microsoft information and communications technology (ICT) curriculum and certification programs allow individuals to earn industry-respected credentials toward specific IT functions.



Education programs

Imagine Cup allows students from around the world to apply their passion and creativity for technology innovation that can create a better world.

Partners in Learning is a global initiative designed to increase technology access for schools, foster innovative approaches to teaching, and provide education leaders with tools to better engage students and improve learning outcomes. It includes programs for Innovative Teachers, Innovative Schools, and Innovative Students—which involves Microsoft Student Innovation Suite, a software package for governments purchasing Windows-based PCs for students to use at home.

Microsoft Inspire Program promotes interaction between academics in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East while recognizing exceptional students from developing countries who want to embark on a research career.

Microsoft IT Academy program connects educators, students, and communities, and introduces students to IT through a life-long learning model for continuous improvement and career development.

Education technologies

The Microsoft Managed Interactive Learning Platform and Application (Milpa) is a learning solution that provides access to learning and training curriculum, and professor expertise to students who may not have direct access to a classroom. The solution consists of a rich client application that resides on a personal computer, coupled with a web service that facilitates real time interactions, and learning on demand access when internet connectivity is intermittent. Students in remote locations can gain the education and skills needed to improve their lives and benefit their community. Teachers and trainers can use Milpa to deliver course content, track student progress, and provide useful one-on-one feedback to students. Content authoring tools code-named **Grava** are a set of tools designed to allow the education community to author, assemble, and present rich-interactive content that will increase discovery and allow learners to go at their own pace and learning style.

Learning Essentials for Microsoft Office provides curriculum-based templates and toolbars for students and educators to get the most out of Microsoft Office system programs. Learning Essentials is available in 15 languages.

Microsoft Math is a collection of tools, tutorials, and instructions designed to help students tackle math and science problems—from prealgebra through calculus—step-by-step.

Affordable computing

Ultra Low Cost PCs are a new and growing class of devices that aim to make basic technology accessible and affordable to more people around the world. These devices typically have lower-end hardware specifications, and are priced below US\$300.

Microsoft is working with numerous hardware manufacturers to bring the benefits of the Windows operating system to more economic segments, and to support a high-quality Windows experience.

Starter editions of Windows operating systems offer first-time computer users in developing countries affordable and easy-to-use computers with a variety of basic features. Tailored to local markets and available in local languages with customized support, Windows XP Starter Edition and the Windows Vista Starter operating system are compatible with a wide range of Windows-based applications and devices.

Secondary PCs refers to the used PC computer market, which seeks to meet the goals of digital inclusion and environmental stewardship. Microsoft and other public and private organizations are working together to build programs that support PC computer donation, refurbishment, and redistribution to underserved communities. These programs include the Microsoft Authorized Refurbisher (MAR) program, Community MAR program, Digital Pipeline, and Fresh Start for Donated Computers.

Shared PCs can provide entire communities with affordable access to technology and information through telecenters, Internet cafés, libraries, and schools. Particularly in rural areas, Microsoft is working to find ways to maximize technology access and guide sustainable and scalable approaches to telecenter development.

Windows MultiPoint technology enables collaborative learning in the classroom from a single computer. The multiple mice with unique cursors help shift students from passive to active learning."

Box. 7: CISCO Education Programmes

From CISCO website: <http://www.cisco.com/web/strategy/education/index.html>

"The programmes can be divided in four main areas:

Schools

Building 21st Century Schools: Cisco's solutions for schools help integrate technology into all aspects of the organization to enhance learning, improve communication, and simplify operations.

Higher Education

Building a 21st Century Campus: Cisco's solutions for higher ed are designed to help colleges and universities develop into globally-focused, student-centric institutions of the 21st century.

Cisco Networking Academy Program

Preparing Future Technology Leaders: Cisco's largest social investment began in 1997, when we developed a curriculum to train instructors, staff, and students to design, install, and maintain networks in their schools. Since then, the Cisco Networking Academy program has been established in all 50 U.S. states and in



more than 165 countries, teaching more than two million students in nine languages. By training local staff and teachers, these academies provide self-sustaining models for continuing education in these communities.

Research

Creating a New Form of Collaborative Education: Cisco TelePresence combines interactive, rich media with the potential of student-centered learning methodologies to create new teaching and learning environments and facilitate a more collaborative educational experience.

Expanding the Boundaries of Knowledge: Whether using grid computing for advanced genome research or visualization tools to study geophysical events, researchers rely on networks with optical, storage, and video technologies as the foundation for advanced research."

Box. 8: Intel Education Initiative

From Intel website: http://www.intel.com/education/index.htm?iid=ed_nav+home

"Each year Intel invests USD 100 million to help teachers teach, students learn and universities around the world innovate-particularly in the areas of math, science and technology. In particular:

Intel Teach Program

The Intel Teach Program helps teachers understand how, when and where to bring technology tools and resources into their classrooms. For a decade, the Intel® Teach Program has been helping K–12 teachers to be more effective educators by training them on how to integrate technology into their lessons, promoting problem solving, critical thinking and collaboration skills among their students. To date, the program has trained more than five million teachers in more than 40 countries, and is committed to reaching 13 million teachers by 2011.

Science and math

Intel sponsors Intel Science Talent Search and Intel International Science and Engineering Fair, both programs of Society for Science & the Public, and Intel Schools of Distinction to inspire and expand students' knowledge and enthusiasm for science and math.

Higher education

The Intel Higher Education Program is a worldwide effort that brings cutting-edge technology expertise to universities through research grants, technology entrepreneurship forums, and mentoring by Intel technologists.

Community learning

The Intel Learn Program and Intel Computer Clubhouse Network are after school programs that teach technology literacy and problem-solving skills to underserved youth globally."

262. There is another option to which we should give some consideration – namely: Public-Public Partnerships. These would involve educational partnerships between public institutions, authorities, and unions and NGOs. These partnerships could be used to help build capacity and improve education systems but in a way that explains and defends against privatization. The South African Regional Network on Equity in Health has commissioned some work on this concept.

Critical engagement

263. This report has shown that the involvement of global corporations in public education is probably far more extensive than EI and its member organizations had previously recognized. UN agencies have also developed relationships with several of the best known corporations. The contribution they are making financially is difficult to assess. It is significant that those private entities have an increasing say in the development of strategies for education reform and change. They also bring expertise. The expectation of more resources may also enhance their capacity to influence governments and agencies. In any event their involvement is a reality.

264. This report raises some issue that need to be addressed, that national education unions should not hesitate to raise with governments and that EI should raise with the intergovernmental agencies. The challenge will be to harness the very real and widespread interest of major private players in improving public education in such a way that concepts of fundamental importance including equity and quality in a broad sense are reinforced.

265. At its September 2008 meeting the EI Executive Board adopted the following decision in relation to the WEF/UNESCO Partnerships for Education initiative:

That EI accept the invitation to participate in meetings of the WEF/UNESCO Partnerships for Education (PfE) programme on the basis that EI will:

- a. Seek a critical engagement with WEF and UNESCO to advocate EI policy;*
- b. Reserve judgment on the policies and principles underpinning the PfE Programme pending the report of the EI Taskforce on PPPs;*
- c. Obtain information on the different models for private company participation and involvement in education;*
- d. Assess Multistakeholder Partnerships in Education (MSPE) initiatives on a case-by-case basis.*

266. Standing aside from these developments does not seem to be a good option. But there are serious questions to be raised, just as there are positive aspects to be developed. For these reasons, the path of **critical engagement** which is inherent in that Board decision is the way for education unions to go.



CONCLUSIONS

The Executive Board of the Education International established the Taskforce on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Education in 2007 in order to promote a critical understanding about the engagement of private sector corporations in public education through the phenomenon of PPPs. This study builds on the EIs commitment to quality education for all through publicly funded and regulated systems of education and the belief of the EI that the privatization and commercialization of education represents a threat to the public's confidence in public education. The report interrogates the evidence on the operation of PPPs, how PPPs are represented within the policy, scholarly and other discourses, and, taking account of the views and responses of EI affiliates, the report considers how PPP arrangements impact over time upon quality public education systems.

1. Private participation in the provision of public education has a long history in many countries. Over the last 15 to 20 years, however, new forms of private participation have developed in public services including education. These forms involve contractual arrangements under which private entities build or operate public educational institutions or provide education services to them. They are based on the concept that the private sector contributes capital and expertise in return for the opportunity to make profits. These are the arrangements generally described as public private partnerships – PPPs.
2. Within the last decade, the private sector has also become engaged more substantially in public education in ways that are non-contractual yet significant. The philosophy underlying them is essentially that of corporate social responsibility. To distinguish these kinds of engagement from contractual PPPs, they are described as Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships in Education (MSPEs).
3. While it is useful to understand the distinctions between for-profit, contractual PPPs and MSPEs, there is often overlap between the two.
4. Another kind of interaction between public and private in education, sometimes included in the discussion of PPPs, is the involvement of non-profit entities, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or trusts, in the building or operation of public schools. NGOs are particularly active in developing countries and they may be part of MSPE operations.

A wide range of arrangements

5. The term “PPPs” describes a wide range of arrangements, and there is no single agreed definition. It is an “umbrella notion”. The word “partnership” implies equal

or at least comparable participation by two or more parties. In reality “partnership” is often used to put a positive spin on a contractual relationship in which there is no real sharing of power. In some instances, it may be a form of “hidden privatization”, the word “partnership” being used to render “privatization” more palatable to public opinion. Broadly speaking, education PPPs are various types or forms of short-term or long-term arrangements, either for profit or otherwise, between a public and a private entity in the delivery and/or operation of an educational infrastructure or service.

6. There is a strong case for EI and affiliate policy development to focus on specific types of arrangements that are grouped together as Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). This is desirable for the purpose of clarity, given the different understandings of the concept of PPP among affiliates. The term private includes commercial and not for profit organizations.
7. Five main kinds of **contractual PPPs** are identified in education:
 - a. **Infrastructure PPPs**
 - b. **Private operation of public schools**
 - c. **Outsourcing of educational services**
 - d. **Outsourcing of significant non-educational support services**
 - e. **Partnerships for innovation and research**

These are the cause of considerable concern among EI members.

Other forms of public private interaction are referenced but are not given detailed attention in this report. They include vouchers, subsidies, and fundraising.

Infrastructure PPPs

8. Infrastructure PPPs are perhaps the best known. They have been promoted by governments ranging across the political spectrum as a means for mobilizing private resources for the construction or renovation of public educational facilities. It is no coincidence that such PPPs have come to the fore at a time of serious constraints on public budgets and restrictions on government borrowings. They seemed to present an innovative way out of the tension between growing infrastructure needs and flat if not diminishing public resources.
9. Infrastructure PPPs have often been combined with the private operation of public schools, most commonly through the process of build-operate-transfer (BOT). The argument of need for capital is combined with the argument that private management would improve effectiveness. It is precisely this combination of build and operate that gives rise to the greatest concern. In the best of circumstances,



the private company will make a profit while the taxpayer, through the government, will defer costs. But these costs will have to be covered at some time in the future, with interest and including the profit margin. So the total cost to the public purse will be greater over time. The report provides specific examples of cases where build-operate-transfer PPPs have resulted in situations nothing short of scandalous for the communities concerned. When facilities have been below standard, avenues for recourse have been limited. Taxpayers have had to pay extra for repairs, and considerably more for the total project than if a standard procurement procedure had been followed. The business logic of private corporations may even lead to the closing of facilities. Risk is not really transferred to the private entrepreneur, because the government obligation to provide education remains. In a nutshell, the arguments advanced in favour of build and operate PPPs simply do not hold up. This report provides material to help education unions demonstrate to governments and the public the fallacy of those arguments.

10. The survey of EI member organizations shows that infrastructure PPPs are the most widely known. Overwhelmingly, there is deep concern about this kind of PPP. Member organizations are evenly divided as to whether or not these PPPs provide needed financial and technical support, but most reject the other arguments usually advanced by governments, such as greater discipline in procurement, improving educational quality or saving public money. It is important to note the overwhelming rejection by education unions of the argument that infrastructure PPPs provide great discipline in procurement. Clearly, the experience of education unions is that they do not. On the other hand, many education unions – a slight majority of those surveyed – feel that these PPPs change the role of teachers and change the ethos of public education. These are important findings from the EI survey, which have not generally come to the fore in previous studies on PPPs.

Private operation of public schools

11. The second type of PPP that is both well known and a reason for significant concern is the private operation of public schools, or contract schools. As we have seen, this type of PPP can be associated with infrastructure PPPs, through a build-operate-transfer (BOT) process. The arguments advanced in favor of these PPPs are based less on the prospect of mobilizing private resources, and more on the perceived benefits of applying private sector operating principles to the delivery of an essential public service. Here there is every reason to see PPPs as the beginning of a privatization process, along the lines set out in EI's 2008 study on "Hidden Privatization".

12. The survey of EI member organizations reported fewer countries with this type of PPP – about 40% (compared to about 70% for infrastructure PPPs). But the sur-

vey also showed that the majority of unions reject such arguments from their governments as: that these PPPs raise management standards, provide innovation in management, provide financial support for educational reform or save public money. On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that a significant minority of unions – of the order of 25%, essentially from low-income countries - were prepared to accept these arguments. That was not the case, however, for ‘more discipline in procurement’, again rejected as an argument by an overwhelming majority.

Outsourcing of services

13. Outsourcing of education services raises somewhat different issues. In this case, a clear majority of unions saw such PPPs as providing financial and technical support, while the majorities rejecting the other arguments were smaller. Clearly, however, a great majority of EI member organizations saw such PPPs as changing the role of teachers and, especially, changing the ethos of public education. The high level of these latter responses merits close attention.
14. Outsourcing of significant non-educational support services is perceived by fewer unions, albeit still a majority, as affecting the role of teachers. As might be expected, they do change the role of support staff. Most unions rejected the usual arguments advanced by governments as for other types of PPP.

Partnerships for innovation and research

15. Partnerships for innovation and research between industry and either governments or public institutions are applicable especially at the higher education level. While unions are evenly divided as to whether they provide finance and technical support, clear majorities again reject the arguments that they provide greater discipline in procurement, or financial support for reforms, or that they save public money.

Overall perception

16. The overall perception of contractual PPPs among EI member organizations is negative, rejecting to varying degrees the arguments advanced in favor of them, and seeing negative impacts on the roles of teachers and the ethos of public education, often backed up with detailed comments. However, the perceptions vary significantly according to the income levels of countries and regions. African education unions, in particular, see PPPs as providing financial and technical support (80%), helping to provide quality education (65%) or providing financial support to educational reforms (just over 50%).
17. There appears to be a strong correlation between the percentage spent by each country on education and whether or not Unions accept PPPs. In countries where



there is a low percentage spent on education it would be reasonable to assume that Unions believe that PPPs are the “only game in town” if education service provision and infrastructure are to be improved. Such a view does not change the objective reality of PPPs or the relevance of EI advice but it highlights the need for understanding the existing circumstances of individual Unions.

Impact on working conditions

18. The taskforce’s survey has produced previously unavailable data on the impact of PPPs on working conditions. Two-thirds of unions reported that PPPs resulted in short-term or sub-standard contracts and increased part-time hiring, and hiring of non-regular staff. These effects were closely related to changes in the ethos of public education, and many unions noted negative impacts on the quality of education. Just over half noted negative impacts on women teachers, and two-thirds stated PPPs made union organizing more difficult. It should be noted that one-third of unions reported that the private entities engaged in PPPs determine wages and conditions, so by implication public authorities had abandoned this responsibility to their private partners. However, while over a third of unions reported that PPPs damage working conditions, about one-fifth stated they actually improved conditions; this shows, as in other instances, the difficulty in generalizing about the impact of PPPs across countries.

Union involvement

19. The need for transparency in PPP contract awards, processes and the detail of contracts is evident, and is affirmed by two-thirds of unions.
20. The question of union involvement is more complex. About half of national unions regard union participation, at least in evaluation, and to a lesser extent in implementation, as a necessary condition for improving the impact of PPPs on education. But two-thirds report no involvement – and the level does not vary much among the different types of PPP. In some cases, this non-involvement is the result of union policy; in other cases it is because unions are actively excluded or simply not invited by the public authorities and their private partners.
21. Among unions, just under 60% have a policy on PPPs, but 40% do not. This varies greatly however across regions. All responding Latin American unions have a policy, as do 70% of European unions and half of Asian/Pacific unions, but less have policy in North America/Caribbean and particularly in Africa.
22. A key question is whether unions would consider involvement in PPPs. Under half say they would, out of 51 organizations giving detailed responses to this question.

Roughly half would agree to involvement to some degree, while the remainder expresses strong skepticism or outright opposition.

23. The survey showed that it is difficult to arrive at a consensus among EI member organizations as to how best to respond to the phenomenon of PPPs in education. This is in part because of the different experiences in different regions, ongoing debates about the purposes of education and the meaning of quality, and different views among organizations about political and negotiating strategies. The survey has in this sense confirmed the variety of views expressed at the World Congress, which led to the mandate to set up a taskforce in the first place. What the taskforce has been able to do, through the research of existing studies, and especially the survey, is to provide a better understanding of the contours that underlie those differences.
24. The taskforce has been able to show the extent to which PPPs have become a phenomenon to be reckoned with in education, starting in a number of the industrialized countries of the OECD group, and spreading out to all regions. Clearly the phenomenon cannot be ignored, nor is it sufficient to declaim it. And PPPs are attractive in a region like Africa, where official development assistance has so far failed to make sufficient headway in helping nations toward the Millennium Development Goal of Education for All.
25. This report does provide strong evidence that PPPs of the infrastructure or operational type are based on premises that do not hold up to examination, and that should be challenged vigorously and convincingly in the public and political arenas. In particular, the arguments that have been advanced about saving taxpayers' money are demonstrably ill-founded. Other consequences of these types of PPP in education have been set out earlier. It is to be hoped that the evidence collected by the taskforce will be of use to member organizations as they engage in this debate in each country.
26. For other types of PPP in education, particular the outsourcing of educational or significant support services, the picture is more complex. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that these types of PPP do not live up to the claims made for them, and especially, that they do change in a negative way the role of teachers and other education employees, and especially, the ethos of public education.
27. Where education unions decide to become involved with PPPs, whether in their planning, in their implementation, or in the evaluation of them, it is important to be clear about the purpose of that involvement. An essential purpose must be to ensure that PPPs are not used as a means for degrading working conditions or learn-



ing conditions. Related key purposes are to ensure that quality standards are maintained and that the ethos of public education as a public service is maintained.

28. The nature of union involvement is also important. In the first place, involvement based on democratically adopted policy will always be more effective. Hopefully, the report will assist member unions in developing such policy. Secondly, each union should be clear about what it considers to be an acceptable modality for involvement. Simply being informed by the authorities of a plan to introduce a form of PPP is not enough. There must be genuine consultation, and the union must be prepared to marshal the facts and the arguments in a coherent and convincing way. Beyond that, it is a matter for each union to decide if it wishes to press for regular consultations, or for more structured involvement through joint entities – commissions, committees, working groups and the like – set up for the purpose. Given the evidence presented in this report, the taskforce is of the view that the key to effective union involvement, whatever the form, must be “critical engagement”.

The financial and economic crisis

29. The current financial and economic crisis must also be taken into account. The crisis greatly increases the risk that large-scale infrastructure PPPs will fail, and that public authorities will have to intervene to rescue them. The risk therefore still remains with governments. Similar risks may emerge with schools operated under contract by for-profit business entities. In the developing countries, and especially in Africa, any prospect of mobilizing private resources through PPP will recede dramatically. It would be an illusion to suggest otherwise. Beyond these practical and realistic considerations, the current crisis does put into question many of the ideological underpinnings of PPPs, in particular the notion that the private sector would make up for the supposed shortcomings of the public sector. The taskforce is of the view that unions should consider that this is precisely the time for “critical engagement” with governments over PPPs in education. “Critical engagement” will enable the unions to press for either significant changes in the operation of PPPs (requiring full transparency of contracts and proper regulation), or for their abandonment altogether.

30. The current global financial crisis demonstrates the policy error of governments and multinational institutions over the last few decades in artificially limiting public debt while relying upon the supposed virtues of the market to regulate the quantity and quality of private debt. The result has been to constrain many governments from using low risk public debt to finance economically and socially productive infrastructure in education and other areas while the combination of the lowering of credit standards for private borrowings and securitization by private financial

institutions generated a massive asset bubble. Now the effective debt of many governments has blown out massively due to taking over or underwriting much of the toxic debt of the private sector in order to maintain systemic stability. This has contradictory short and medium term consequences. There are likely to be fewer infrastructure PPPs because of greater difficulty faced by infrastructure companies in obtaining loans from banks and subsequently securitizing the debt. But governments that have accepted the toxic debt of the private sector may cite that fact, along with the decline in tax revenue and rise in spending caused by the recession, as additional constraints on making public sector borrowings to provide education and other infrastructure.

Multi-stakeholders Partnerships in Education (MSPEs)

31. The growing involvement of corporations in public education under arrangements that are non-contractual and non-commercial, but based rather on a concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), raises a somewhat different set of issues. The taskforce finds useful the term “Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships in Education” (MSPEs) in order to distinguish this kind of public-private interaction from contractual PPPs, while noting that the distinction is often not so clear-cut in practice, and the terms MSPEs and PPPs are at times used interchangeably.
32. The enquiry undertaken by the taskforce has revealed that MSPE-type involvement has increased considerably in many countries – in both North and South – to a degree that most education unions had probably not imagined. International agencies like UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP and UNICEF are involved in partnerships with major corporations not only through the WEF’s Global Education Initiative and the WEF/UNESCO Partnerships for Education, but also directly with many of those corporations. Significant joint programmes are underway in many countries.
33. There are questions to be raised about this recently developing phenomenon, such as the potential for overlap between CSR-type and straight out commercial activity, and the substitution of philanthropy for contributions to communities through fair and responsible taxation. Nevertheless, there are also positive features, including a degree of transparency through detailed websites, programmes that are pedagogically sound and run mainly by professional teachers, some with union backgrounds. There is openness and willingness to talk with education unions, and a sense of speaking the same language. However, it is difficult to get an overview of the total financial contributions made through MSPEs or to get the funding and operational details of specific projects. The contribution by major companies in the Information Technology sector, notably Microsoft, INTEL and CISCO systems, appears



from public statements to total up to US 1 billion dollars, for programmes in at least 50 countries around the world, but more information needs to be obtained.

34. In addition to direct corporate involvement are those of major foundations, pursuing a long tradition of endowment funding in education, particularly in higher education, and of contributions to development. By their nature foundations are separated from their corporate sources of funds, such that commercial spillover is said to be minimized. But as they exert influence over policy, there is a risk that policy development itself could become privatized.
35. There has to be differentiation among the entities, and caution should be exercised in generalizing about the roles of these corporations and foundations. Some may have objectives and approaches to the development of public education that are compatible with the objectives, values and perspective of education unions. Others do not.
36. A philanthropic contribution by a commercial company to a public education institution in the form of a donation for a new building may well have some public relations benefit for that company but still differs markedly from a commercial company constructing the building, and operating and maintaining it for 25 years. On the other hand a building donation that is tied to ongoing advertising for that company and exclusive supply of that company's products at the institution is best viewed as a commercial arrangement.
37. Proposed multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) at either national or international level also warrant scrutiny as to whether they legitimize further commercialization or privatization of education. The involvement of corporate representatives in MSPs or on joint government-business education foundations may provide useful resources and expertise, particularly to countries with poorly resourced Education Ministries. However there may be commercial opportunities or spin-offs associated with their contribution. Moreover, curriculum development for public institutions should continue to be the responsibility of public education authorities.
38. Despite reservations which can be placed openly on the table, many such corporations and foundations can be allies in advocacy for quality education. Education unions can work with them not only as sources and mobilizers of resources, but also as allies in advocacy for quality public education for all. This is not to say that the compatibility of objectives and interests is perfect, nor to have any illusions about the need for robust exchanges of views. But to ignore the growing interest of these corporations and foundations, and their programmes links with UN agencies, would to risk being marginal to significant developments. "Critical

engagement" must again be the key to our approach – engaging with these groups in order to be better informed about their activities, but also to influence their policies and actions, and to enlist them as potential allies in advocacy.

39. Several corporations state they are already working with EI member organizations at the national level. EI should seek to obtain information from affiliates about such involvement, including their experiences and evaluation.
40. One strategy for "**critical engagement**" would be for EI to take the initiative in convening exchanges with selected corporations and foundations active in MSPEs. Many of the companies to be invited would be those already active at a national level in P21 in the United States. Such a pro-active approach by EI would be along similar lines to the initiative taken by EI at the time of the 1st World Congress to convene meetings of member organizations with the World Bank. EI could not only pursue "critical engagement" with the WEF and its constituents through participation in WEF meetings, but could set the agenda for these exchanges by itself convening such meetings. As in the case of previous strategies related to the World Bank, EI should engage member organizations directly in such a process, as it will be important to move beyond general exchanges of views to the realities confronting our member organizations at the national level.

Likely future developments

41. In view of the financial crisis, there may be fewer infrastructure projects and those that are undertaken could differ from the established model for infrastructure PPPs. Hybrid infrastructure projects are likely to emerge, where governments either directly borrow a significant proportion of the money needed to finance the infrastructure or underwrite it by guaranteeing a sizeable proportion of the money raised by the infrastructure company from private financial institutions. While this scenario suggests that it will be more difficult for EI affiliates opposed to infrastructure PPPs to persuade governments to use traditional public borrowings, it is also possible that in some countries governments will increase the number of infrastructure projects that are financed in the traditional manner because of newly found skepticism about the value of such PPPs. Even the hybrids mentioned above would involve a greater role for government, one which has the potential to expand further once recessionary conditions end.
42. Furthermore the current push by political leaders, against the background of the global financial crisis, for the construction of a new international economic order is a political opportunity to challenge the restrictive orthodoxy on government borrowings. While this is a matter for EI affiliates at the national level, it is also a mat-



ter for EI and its engagement with international institutions and intergovernmental meetings.

43. That engagement also needs to take into account the specific needs of developing countries that already have very high levels of government debt either as a proportion of gross domestic product or in terms of the servicing cost, ie the proportion of the annual budget devoted to debt repayment. While there has been some progress in terms of debt relief, many promises of relief by OECD countries either have not been honoured or have been acted upon only in part. The global financial crisis increases the risk of further delay on this matter, and also of declines in the aid contributions of OECD countries, and greater unemployment and lower tax revenues for the debtor countries. The PPP option for these countries has the advantage that it is not classified as debt. However, unless the cost is transferred to students and their families by way of fees, an education infrastructure PPP adds to the burden on the relevant government because both the commercial hurdle rate of return used by the infrastructure company and the risk of default on payments to the commercial partner in the event of budget crisis will be reflected in the payment amount required from the government's recurrent annual expenditure on education. While there may be some interim relief steps such as specially underwritten new debt instruments that have a lower interest rate than what would normally be required given such a government's general level of debt and repayment capacity, debt relief and increased aid remains the key solution to developing countries in this position. EI should develop further its advocacy for debt relief and Official Development Assistance (ODA) together with its Global Union and Global Campaign for Education partners.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That EI endorse the conclusion of the taskforce that there is no evidence that PPPs for **education infrastructure** provide long-term cost savings for public budgets, nor do they provide greater efficiency, innovation, or superior discipline to government procurement.
2. That EI campaign for the removal of inappropriate limits on government borrowings for the purpose of funding education infrastructure.
3. That EI endorse the conclusion of the taskforce that PPPs for **innovation and research** may limit the research of academics and the dissemination of research results, and that they do not provide greater discipline in government procurement.
4. That EI oppose the **outsourcing of education and related services** that are traditionally provided by public education systems and institutions.
5. That EI recommend that affiliates which have not adopted a **policy on PPPs** in education initiate policy development in this area as a matter of priority.
6. That EI acknowledge the distinction between PPPs and **Multi-stakeholder Partnerships in Education** and will consider participating in MSPEs on a case by case basis provided that an MSPE does not initiate or legitimize privatization or commercialization of education, or erode public responsibility for governance and for curriculum development, or result in other inappropriate developments in education.
7. That EI take the initiative in convening exchanges with selected corporations and foundations that are active in MSPEs. The objectives of such exchanges must be clear, based on EI policy and directed towards the mobilization of political advocacy as well as resources for quality public education for all.
8. That EI develop a protocol for participation in MSPEs based on EI policy recalling *"that education systems should provide opportunities for people of all ages. These should include preparation for life as active citizens in a democratic society; the transmission of knowledge, skills and critical thinking capabilities; and preparation for the world of work, including retraining for older workers and citizens. Quality education systems should provide a careful balance between these three dimensions of education"* (World Congress, Porto Alegre 2004).

Such a protocol shall include provision for refraining from participating in an MSPE where the balance of power is skewed in favour of the corporate interests and the conflict in values and perspectives on the purposes of education between those interests and EI policy is too great.



9. That EI acknowledge the value of **philanthropic contributions** to public education institutions provided that the contributions are not tied to exclusive advertizing or product placement by a donor corporation, the imposition of restrictions on research and the dissemination of research results, or donor control of governance, education content or staffing.
10. That, recognizing that the **global financial crisis** is likely to reduce the ability of private infrastructure companies to borrow money and to securitize the resulting debt, EI should call upon governments to reject proposals to underwrite new borrowings by such companies. Governments should instead take responsibility for the public financing and provision of new public education infrastructure.
11. That, where governments persist with education PPPs, EI recommend that education unions endeavour to engage with governments in order to safeguard working and learning conditions, teachers' professionalism, the ethos of public education, and to achieve transparency in PPP contracts.
12. That EI recommend to education unions that they challenge the inappropriate use of the term "partnership" to disguise forms of commercialization and privatization of education.
13. That EI note that some developing countries governments are constrained by high levels of public debt and have resorted to PPPs which simply substitute expensive annual operating payments from recurrent education budgets for debt. EI calls upon OECD countries to reduce such constraints by fully implementing their debt relief commitments and by maintaining in real terms their aid programs, notwithstanding the global financial crisis. As an interim step, EI also calls upon international institutions to examine options for underwriting new borrowings for education infrastructure by such governments, in order to assist them to access debt finance at a reasonable rate of interest.
14. That in advocacy at all levels, global, regional, national and local, EI and its member organizations emphasize that education and training are critical to economic recovery, that investment in education and training must be included as an integral element in coordinated stimulus packages, and that the rights of the most vulnerable must be protected.
15. That this report be published and widely disseminated to EI member organizations, as well as Global Unions and Global Campaign for Education partners, for use as resource material in national and local negotiations and campaigns; that background papers be maintained on the EI website and on-line Research Center, and be made available to the Global Union Research Network (GURN); that EI cooperate with PSI in maintaining and updating work on PPPs through GURN, including support for the GURN website on PPPs in education and health.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AVEC	Venezuelan Association of Catholic Education
BNPP	The Bank of Netherlands Partnership Programme
BOT	Build-Operate-Transfer
CEART	ILO-UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CUPE	Canadian Union of Public Employees
DFBO	Design-Finance-Build-Operate
EFA	Education for All
EHEA	European Higher Education Area
EI	Education International
EMOs	Education Management Organisations
ESC	Educational Service Contracting
EU	European Union
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEI	Global Education Initiative
GNP	Gross National Product
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IIEP	International Institute for Education Planning
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MSPEs	Multi Stakeholder Partnerships in Education
NASUWT	National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PACES	Program for Expansion of Secondary Education Coverage
PFI	Private Finance Initiative
PPP	Public Private Partnership
TUAC	Trade Union Advisory Committee
UCU	University and College Union
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISON	Public Service Union of Britain
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WEF	World Economic Forum



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ANNEX I: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE TASKFORCE ON PPPs

Resolution on QUALITY EDUCATION: PRESENT AND FUTURE

CONGRESS:

Mandates the Executive Board to establish a task force which will examine the implications of public private partnerships in the provision of public education and consult with the EI research network in order to develop EI policy in this area.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The taskforce is requested by the Executive Board to:

2. Identify the various definitions of public private partnerships that exist in different parts of the world, or are used, sometimes with variations in the terminology, among intergovernmental agencies and other global or regional organizations.
3. Seek information from EI member organizations on their experiences to date with PPPs or similar concepts, the policies they have adopted in relation to them, their decision regarding union responses to them, and any other views.
4. Review the programs and activities involving PPPs or related concepts with international agencies such as UNESCO, the World Bank, UNICEF and UNDP (partners with EI in Education for All campaign) as well as EI's Global Campaign partners, Global Unions, and the World Economic Forum.
5. Review the extensive literature on PPPs and related concepts, including official reports, academic studies and reports from civil society organizations.
6. Invite, as requested by the Congress resolution, the active involvement of the EI Research Network, in its work.
7. Prepare a report to the EI Executive Board. While the taskforce will have the liberty of structuring the report and its contents as it sees fit, it should include:
 - an account of the taskforce's findings on the definitional questions;
 - the experiences and views of EI member organizations;
 - an evaluation of international agency and civil society programs and activities;
 - an analysis of current trends in public-private interactions now affecting or likely to affect education at all levels;
 - proposals for action by EI and member organizations.

The EI Executive Board requests the taskforce to present the report in Spring 2009, in order to examine its conclusions. The Board will then determine the future dissemination of the report to the EI Membership and to the public.

ANNEX II: EI RESOLUTION

QUALITY EDUCATION: PRESENT AND FUTURE

The 5th Education International (EI) World Congress meeting in Berlin (Germany) from 22 to 26 July 2007,

Quality public education

1. Affirms that Education International is committed to the achievement of quality education for all people through publicly funded and regulated systems of education;
2. Notes that attacks on the quality of public education are used by those who promote privatisation of aspects of public education systems in order to undermine the public's confidence in public education and to justify cutbacks in public investments;
3. Notes that many international institutions wish to extend privatisation to the social sectors, in particular health and education, and are increasing pressure for withdrawal by the State and cuts in public budgets;
4. Recalls that Education International has consistently campaigned for public education budgets to be allocated at least 6% of gross national product (GNP);
5. Notes that, in a very large number of comparative studies carried out on the achievements of pupils in the public and private education systems, there is no evidence to support the view that achievements of pupils in the private system are superior to those in the public system, when pupils' socio-economic backgrounds and the selective nature of the private education system are taken into consideration;

Assessment

6. Notes that the assessment of teaching and learning is an important tool in the provision of quality education and one that has traditionally been used effectively in public education;
7. Considers that any evaluation of the quality of education provided by any public education institution must not be based solely on student achievement test scores



but take into account a range of factors related to the context of the school and the class, such as students' capacities, skills, socio-economic circumstances, financial and learning resources, facilities, school administration, class sizes and school organisation characteristics;

8. Recognises that assessment systems may become a political and economic tool to promote privatisation: private assessment agencies use inappropriate assessment tools designed for use in business, not in schools.;

Public-Private Partnerships

9. Affirms that the provision of public education is the responsibility of public authorities, which are accountable to the community through democratic governance structures and which mandates them to determine education policy and principles and the regulatory framework within which the education institutions operate;
10. Notes that the increasing use of public-private partnerships in the public education sector has potential negative consequences for access to, and the democratic control and quality of, public education;
11. Notes that public-private partnerships may be appealing when initiated as a means of supplementing scarce or non-existent public financial resources if they are set within clearly defined educational goals. But at the same time public-private partnerships carry with them the risk of reductions in governments' investment in public education services, and may promote the privatisation and the commercialisation of education;
12. Emphasises that the social partners must be consulted by the public authorities whenever it is proposed to use public-private partnerships in the public education sector;

Brain drain

13. Notes the growing trend of industrialised countries recruiting education staff in developing countries by offering significantly better living and working conditions. This practice penalises the countries of origin, which inevitably lose the best amongst the qualified educators in whom they have invested, and who are urgently needed to maintain and improve the quality of education in their home countries;
14. Emphasizes that the "brain drain" in teaching from developing countries to industrialised countries creates an international labour market in the education sector, particularly in higher education and research. A system of international regulation, including forms of compensation, is required to protect the interests of developing countries in this competitive labour market;

Digital divide

15. Notes that, in complex modern societies, acquisition of competence in the use of technological tools is vitally important, and that educators have a responsibility to help young people acquire the technological knowledge and skills they need;
16. Emphasises that education authorities must invest in the necessary facilities, resources and training of teachers to enable public schools to meet this challenge;
17. Recognises that access to technology and to the necessary training to make use of it, is not universal and that the current "digital divide" is undermining efforts to achieve quality Education For All. Governments, international organizations and agencies should ensure that all students are educated in the use of technology and have access to appropriate technological tools;

Education for global citizenship

18. Notes that preparing young people to be active and productive global citizens is an important element of their education. The development of critical thinking, conflict resolution skills, respect for diversity, gender equality, artistic and sporting values and environmental awareness are among the behaviours that must be developed in young people through appropriate learning opportunities;
19. Urges education systems to encourage young people to learn additional languages so that they can develop their communication skills, have a better understanding of the cultural values underpinning these languages, and thereby build better understanding between people;
20. Notes that, in a world where peaceful co-existence is threatened by terrorism, by the invasion and occupation of sovereign countries, by religious and racist violence and war, education systems must promote peace, democracy, mutual understanding and cultural diversity;
21. Recognises, in light of the recent United Nations report on the catastrophic damage to the environment and the implications of global warming for the future of the planet, environmental awareness must be an essential part of any quality education system.

Therefore, the 5th EI Congress

22. Mandates the Executive Board to promote the ideas and recommendations contained in this resolution in international organisations, including strategies to provide initial and continuing education and training for teachers aimed at the achievement of the Education for All goals by 2015 and to support the member organisations in any actions directed at their governments;



23. Mandates the Executive Board to commission a study on the best content and format of initial and continuing training for educators to enable them to meet the multiple professional challenges of teaching in a global context;
24. Mandates the Executive Board to establish a task force which will examine the implications of public private partnerships in the provision of public education and consult with the EI research network in order to develop EI policy in this area;
25. Mandates the Executive Board, in order to reduce the effects of "Brain Drain" in teaching, to promote the adoption of the principles in the Commonwealth Protocol on teacher migration in countries throughout the world;
26. Mandates the Executive Board to
 - a. undertake a study of the effects of migration in the education sector and, in particular, with regard to its gender implications;
 - b. encourage member organisations to have regard to the effects of international migration in their work, taking into account its gender dimension and
 - c. seek the ratification in full of the ILO Convention on Migration.
28. Mandates the Executive Board to include in the Program and Budget initiatives which will enable EI affiliates to inform their members about, and act on, the urgent issues of environmental awareness and global warming. Such initiatives should involve actions undertaken at the individual, community, national member organization and international level.
29. Mandates the Executive Board for EI to take action in international bodies so that all countries begin to ratify the Kyoto protocol.
30. Encourages member organisations to pursue the inclusion of global citizenship, environmental awareness, peace education and positive social values in teacher training and school curricula.
31. Encourages member organisations to develop relationships with other member organisations from different cultural, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds in order to foster mutual friendship and understanding.
32. Provide members organisations with access to updated information on international trends and surveys, on reports of comparative tests and on decisions taken at international summits and conferences which affect education globally, regionally and nationally, including information about the developments in the policies of international financial organisations and their impact on education policy and the implementation of core labour standards.

ANNEX III: EI RESOLUTION

EDUCATION – PUBLIC SERVICE OR COMMODITY ?

The Fourth World Congress of Education International, meeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, from 22 to 26 July 2004:

1. Notes that in recent years numerous innovative proposals have been put forward by intergovernmental organisations, individual governments and trade unions in order to reform the public education systems so as to improve their efficiency. At the same time, however, other proposals have been advanced to subject education systems to the rules of the market;
2. Notes that there is a general consensus today that education systems at all levels should prepare young people to develop a socially responsible attitude, a critical approach, a positive attitude to innovation and the capacity for dialogue.
3. Recalls that education systems should provide opportunities for people of all ages. These should include preparation for life as active citizens in a democratic society; the transmission of knowledge, skills and critical thinking capabilities; and preparation for the world of work, including retraining for older workers and citizens. Quality education systems should provide a careful balance between these three dimensions of education.
4. Notes, furthermore, that adequately trained human resources and the use of new information technologies have become strategic factors in the harsh competitive struggle between companies at the international level and that some political and economic actors are raising the question of the ability of public education systems to meet these challenges;
5. Notes that today globalisation is no longer limited to economic activities relating to material goods but is increasingly encompassing the production of immaterial goods such as education, which is viewed by some investors as a new area for profitable investments, this leads to the privatisation of education and research by the WTO and GATS;
6. Further notes, that the international commercialisation of education has the following negative results:
 - a. It leads to greater homogenization and the further domination of colonial languages, undercutting national and local cultures and languages;
 - b. It undermines and disempowers national and local education systems which cannot compete with the greater resources brought to bear and the availability of relatively cheap - in the first instance - ready made, one size fits all course material;
 - c. It threatens to undermine the very special role that education plays in histori-



- cally divided societies in nation building, fostering democratic values, reconciliation and respect for diversity;
- d. It also represents a massive disengagement and abdication of the state from one of its core responsibilities - i.e. to provide quality education to all.
7. Notes that new information and communication technologies (ICTs) are still being little used in education in comparison with others sectors, and that the opportunities and challenges associated with ICTs cannot be mapped out completely;
8. Notes, however, that increasing numbers of policymakers regard the new technologies as an ideal tool to commercialise education and training via the Internet, in context to primary, secondary, tertiary and lifelong education.

The Fourth World Congress of Education International:

9. Gives priority to strengthening the actions taken by affiliates against the threats to public education stemming from the neo-liberal economy and from education policies advocated by international institutions, particularly the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and the OECD;
10. Recalls that public education is a system open to all without discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, culture or social class, free of charge, publicly funded, and managed and evaluated in accordance with the objectives and principles established democratically by public authorities;
11. Reaffirms that access to quality education for all, especially girls, is a fundamental right which is enshrined in law by the international community but is far from being put into practice;
12. Reaffirms that the public authorities bear a major responsibility in opening up access to education for all and that transferring some or all of that responsibility to non-governmental organisations can only be considered as a makeshift crisis solution.
13. Instructs the Executive Board to take appropriate initiatives during the next three years to ensure that gender inequalities in primary and secondary education are eliminated by 2005, and that gender equality in education to be achieved within ten years after that, as provided in the Framework for Action on EFA adopted by the Dakar Forum in April 2000;
14. Affirms that education should be a common space for sharing and transmitting knowledge, where people learn to live together without any form of discrimination based on ethnic origin, religion or culture, and that undermining the public education system through privatisation policies will profoundly change the nature of our democratic societies and increase inequalities in access to education;
15. Affirms that, as a public service, education should pursue its efforts at modernisation and do its utmost to improve quality and ensure higher levels of achieve-

ment in order to meet the concerns of parents and young people experiencing insecurity as a result of the economic and social changes under way;

16. Affirms that education should be free of charge and funded on the basis of the concept of fiscal solidarity, i.e. individuals should contribute to financing public services in accordance with their average income rather than in accordance with their needs. Furthermore, these public funds should be managed with the greatest transparency and any instances of mismanagement or corruption should be publicly denounced and punished.

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17. Mandates the Executive Board to continue EI's advocacy before intergovernmental organisations, trade union internationals and international political groupings with regard to the contents and importance of EI's proposals on these issues;
18. Requests member organisations to continue their reflection on the reforms to be implemented in order to turn the public education system into a school of achievement that guarantees, on the one hand, the pedagogical freedom of the teacher in conformity with the 1966 joint ILO/UNESCO Recommendation and, on the other hand, the rights of young people and adults to genuine initial and further training. To this end, further requests member organisations to establish the necessary dialogue with their respective governments, the media, and parents' and young people's associations;
19. Reiterates that education is not a commodity and should not be privatised, and demands that education, research and development and other social services be excluded from GATS and from negotiations towards bilateral, multilateral and regional commercial agreements;
20. Recognise the importance of promoting initiative and actions between ministerial meetings related to the GATS, bilateral, multilateral and regional trade agreements with a view to monitoring and influencing trade related issues, in particular, those affecting education, other public services and core labour standards;
21. Mandates the Executive Board to continue and broaden EI's work on GATS by campaigning for appropriate exclusions for education and research from GATS, and from regional and bilateral free trade agreements;
22. Mandates EI to raise the awareness of EI members of the relevance, impact and importance of international trade agreements to the work of national organisations representing education workers.

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ANNEX IV: QUESTIONNAIRE: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND THEIR IMPACT ON QUALITY OF EDUCATION

15 May 2008

Study ID

EducPPP

Respondent No.

INTRODUCTION

A taskforce established by the EI Executive Board is currently conducting a study, together with the EI Research Institute and the Research Network, on the impact of public-private partnerships on education. This study will look into issues of quality and equity of access.

PPP is a generic term used to describe partnerships through which the private sector participates in the provision and/or operation of public education. There is not a precise definition of PPPs and different types of private sector involvement in public education are considered to fall into the PPP continuum. Such arrangements may include, for example:

- a) **Infrastructure PPPs** - the most common type is Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) – where a private operator is granted a franchise (concession) to finance, build and operate an educational facility such as a public school, university building or hostel, usually for a period of 25-35 years.
- b) **Operation of public education institutions** – Private firms or organisations operate them under contract to a public agency; they remain publicly owned and publicly funded, but are managed by a private operator in return for a management fee.
- c) **Outsourcing of educational services** - Government contracts with the private sector for the provision of education-related services such as: curriculum development and/or delivery; assessment or administration of examinations; school evaluation, review and/or school improvement programmes.
- f) **Outsourcing of a significant range of support services**
- e) **Innovation and research PPPs** - Government programmes encourage industry-research institute partnerships and promote commercialisation of public research.

These are definitions drawn from the extensive literature on PPPs. But what is the experience in your country? One of the main objectives of this questionnaire is to draw on the experience with PPPs in your country.

We would greatly appreciate your input. You can indicate your answer, by double-clicking on the respective box. If you reply by fax, please type your answers. Please send your completed questionnaire to edlira.xhafa@ei-ie.org or by fax: +41 22 365 2197, by 15 June 2008. Thank you.

NAME OF ORGANISATION :

COUNTRY :

NAME OF RESPONDENT :

POSITION IN ORGANISATION :

I. ORGANIZATION PROFILE

Q1 How many members does your organisation have?

Total: _____
 Male: _____
 Female: _____

Q2 Who are your members? Of your total union membership, please indicate the number of members according to their tasks.

[Please leave empty non-applicable boxes]

Members' task	Public	Private
Teachers		
Non-teaching support staff		
Senior management/supervision		

Others: please specify _____

Q3 Please indicate the union membership as a percentage (%) of all teachers/employees working in each of the following categories

[Please leave empty non-applicable boxes]

Levels of education	Public	Private
Pre-school		
Primary/elementary		
Secondary compulsory		
Secondary post-compulsory		
Vocational/further education		
Higher education		

Others: please specify _____



II. COUNTRY INFORMATION

Q4 Which level(s) of government is/are responsible for funding of public education in your country? *Note: It is understood that different levels of government may have various funding roles.*

[Please tick all the applicable boxes and leave empty non-applicable boxes]

Level(s) of government	Public education
National/federal	
State/provincial	
Regional	
Local/municipal	

Please use this space to provide any relevant information on responsibilities for education funding

Q5 To the knowledge of your organisation what is the percentage (%) of annual GDP and the percentage (%) of government spending (all levels) on education (see footnote⁵³)?

Public education	Private education	All education	Year of reference
% of GDP			
% of Government spending (budget)			

Please provide any comment if necessary _____

⁵³ Assistance in responding to this question may be provided by reference to: (a) **OECD Education at a Glance** (http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,en_2649_39263294_39251550_1_1_1_1,00.html) and (b) **UNESCO and World Bank: EdStats** (<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/EXTDATASTATISTICS/EXTEDSTATS/0,,menuPK:3232818~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:3232764,00.html>)

III. EXISTENCE OF EDUCATION PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (PPPs)

Q6 Is your organisation familiar with the term PPP as applied to education (see Introduction)?

- Yes.....
- No.....

If so, please describe your general understanding of the term. _____

Q7 The following are several features commonly associated with PPPs in education (see introduction to the survey). Please indicate which features exist in your country (whether described as PPPs or not). [Please tick all the applicable boxes]

- Infrastructure PPPs: construction of building and maintenance
- Private operation of public education institutions.....

Outsourcing of:

- Curriculum design
- Curriculum delivery
- Assessment, school evaluation, or administration of examinations
- Significant support (non-educational) services

Industry government partnerships for innovation and research

Others, specify _____

Q8 To your knowledge, which are the main actors initiating/promoting PPPs in your country? Please elaborate with comments on the benefits to/ financial interests of these actors



Q9 Which actors are engaged in education PPPs as mentioned above in your country? [Please tick all the applicable boxes]

- Domestic private for profit entities.....
- Foreign private for profit entities
- Domestic NGOs and faith based organizations.....
- International NGOs and faith based organizations
- International financial and development institutions
- Don't know
- Others, specify _____
- _____
- _____
- _____

Q10 Here are some reasons often stated by government(s) for promoting and engaging with PPPs in education. Please indicate if any of these reasons are presented by government(s) in your country. [Please tick all the applicable boxes]

- Budgetary limits/need for more finance for education system.....
- Limit public debt
- Raise management standards in public education institutions
- Provide innovation in management and delivery of services
- Provide greater discipline in procurement process.....
- Need for regulating the operation of private sector providers
- Finance educational reforms
- Improve the quality of education
- Improve access to education
- Don't know
- Others, specify _____
- _____
- _____
- _____

IV. UNION PERCEPTIONS ON IMPACT OF PPPs ON EDUCATION SYSTEMS

Q11 How does your organization define quality education ? _____

Q12 Overall, how does your union perceive PPPs in public education?
[Please check only one response per question]

a. Do they provide needed financial and technical support to the education system?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>

If yes, does your organisation nevertheless advocate other means? Please elaborate for each PPP type if necessary _____

b. Do they raise management standards in public education institutions?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please elaborate for each PPP type if necessary _____

c. Do they provide innovation in management and delivery of services?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please elaborate for each PPP type if necessary _____

d. Do they provide greater discipline and transparency in procurement/tendering processes?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please elaborate for each PPP type if necessary _____



e. Do they help provide adequate and acceptable quality of education?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>

f. Do they provide financial support to educational reforms?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>

g. Do they save public money?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>

h. Do PPPs change the role of teachers?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>

If yes, please elaborate how

i. Do PPPs change the role of support staff

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>

If yes, please elaborate how

j. Do PPPs change the ethos of public education?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>

If yes, please elaborate how

k. Other perceptions about PPPs: specify _____

V. IMPACT OF PPPs OR OTHER FORMS OF PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION, ON EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR

Q13 On a scale of 1-5, with 1 *being a great deal* and 5 *being not at all*, to what extent do PPPs impact on casualization (short term contracts or other non-regular forms of employment) in the education sector?

1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------

Please elaborate how _____

Q14 On a scale of 1-5, with 1 *being a great deal* and 5 *being not at all*, to what extent do PPPs affect women teachers or other female education employees?

1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------

Please elaborate how _____

Q15 On a scale of 1-5, with 1 *being a great deal* and 5 *being not at all*, to what extent do PPPs affect organizing among teachers and other employees in the education sector?

1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------	----------------------------

Please elaborate if necessary _____

Q16 Who determines wages and employment conditions in PPP contracts?

- Private entity Public entity Don't know

Please elaborate your answer for each PPP type if necessary _____

Q17 What impact do PPPs have on working conditions in general?

- Improve Damage Don't know

Please elaborate if necessary _____



Q18 For any negative impact of PPPs in education to be minimised, or for the impact to be positive, what are the necessary conditions?

[Please tick all the applicable boxes]

- Participation from unions in the implementation of PPPs
- Participation from unions in the evaluation of PPPs
- Transparency in PPP contract awards and processes
- Identification and effective involvement of other stakeholders in the planning and implementation stage of PPPs
- Don't know

Other: specify _____

VI. ORGANIZATION'S POLICIES ON PPPs

Q19 Does your organization have a policy on PPPs in general or any type of PPP in particular?

[Please check only one response]

- Yes No Don't know

Q20 If answer to Q19 is YES, please provide any relevant policy statement(s).

Q21 REFER TO Q19: If answer is NO, why is there no union policy on PPPs in education?



VII. EXPERIENCE AND INVOLVEMENT WITH PPPs

Q22 Has your organization been involved in any PPP program or project?

[Please check only one response]

- Yes [Proceed to Q23 & Q24]
- No [Proceed to Q25& Q26].....

Q23 Please elaborate on PPPs of any type in which your union has been involved, directly or indirectly, and the nature of involvement?

Type of PPPs	Nature of Involvement

Q24 What in your view has been the impact so far of union involvement in PPPs?

Q25 Refer to Q22: If your organization was/is not involved in any PPPs, what could be the reasons? _____

Q26 a. If there would be opportunities for union involvement in PPPs, would your union consider them?

[Please check only one response]

- Yes No Don't know

b. If yes, on which types of PPPs would your union be involved _____

c. If yes, in what capacity _____



Q27 Please comment on current and foreseeable trends in PPPs in education in your country

Q28 Please use this space to write any comments about the unions' position on PPPs in education.

ANNEX V : TECHNICAL REPORT

Completed questionnaires were received from 79 organisations, namely:

Africa: CSC – Enseignement; EER; FETRASSEIC; GNAT; GTU; KNUT; NANTU; NAPTOSA; S.Y.E.CO; SNNEPPCI; STEB; SYNESCI; SYNTRA; TUM; ZNUT.

Asia/Pacific: AEU; IEU; NTEU; CITA; AUSPS; HKPTU; AIPTF; JTU; KTU; NUTP; NZPPTA; STU; NTA; ACT.

Europe: ACOD; COC; SEB; OELMEK; KTOEOS; BUPL-DK; DM; OAJ; SNES; UNSA; BLBS; GEW; VBE; OLME; ASTI; TUI; ITU; FLC; MUT; AOOb; UEN; NSZZ Solidarnost; ZNP; FenProf; FNE; ESEUR; ESTUS; FE.CO.oo; FETE UGT; L  rarf  bundet; SER; Egitim Sen; ATL; EIS; NASUWT; NUT; UCU.

Latin America: CNTE; CPC; SITEK; ADP; ANPROTED

North America and Caribbean: BSTU; BUT; CAUT; CSQ Canada; FQPPU; JTA; AFT; NEA.

The questionnaire from Tunisia (sent by fax) arrived with more than 4 pages missing and it was not possible for the person responsible to retrieve it and send it again.

5 organisations replied by email stating that PPPs in their country or level of education that they cover are not yet present or at a very early stage. Those organisations were:

- 1. Argentina: CTERA - Stating that there are no PPPs as stated in the questionnaire. However, they are aware of cases in which the public sector pays the salaries of teachers in the private sector.
2. Ireland: INTO - Stating that there are no PPPs at the education level that union represents
3. Nicaragua: CGTEN ANDEN – refused to complete the questionnaire.
4. South Korea: KFTA – Stating there is not enough data on PPPs in Korea and the union does not have official opinion on the issue.
5. Trinidad and Tobago: ERO TTUTA – PPPs as defined by the questionnaire do not exist in the country, although there are early attempts in administration of exams.

Table 1 Regional Distribution of Respondent Organisations

Africa (13 countries, 15 organisations - 18.9%)	Benin (1); Burundi (1); Congo (1); RD Congo (2); Cote d'Ivoire (2); Ghana (1); Kenya (1); Malawi (1); Mauritius (1); Namibia (1); Rwanda (1); South Africa (1); Zambia (1);
Asia-Pacific (12 countries, 14 organisations - 17.7%)	Australia (3); Cambodia (1); Fiji (1); Hong-Kong (1); India (1); Japan (1); South Korea (1); Malaysia (1); New Zealand (1); Singapore (1); Taiwan (1); Philippines (1).
Europe (23 countries, 37 organisations - 46.8%)	Belgium (2); Bulgaria (1); Cyprus (2); Denmark (2); Finland (1); France (2); Germany (3); Greece (1); Ireland (2); Israel (1); Italy (1); Malta (1); Netherlands (1); Norway (1); Poland (2); Portugal (2); Russia (1); Slovenia (1); Spain (2); Sweden (1); Switzerland (1); Turkey (1); UK (5);
Latin America (4 countries, 5 organisations - 6.3%)	Chile (1); Rep Dominican (2); Curacao (1), Brazil (1);
North America and Caribbean (5 countries, 8 organisations - 10.1%)	Barbados (1); Bahamas (1); Canada (3); Jamaica (1); US (2);

Table 2 Income Classification of Respondent Organisations

Low-income economies (10 countries, 12 organisations - 15.1%)	Benin (1); Burundi (1); Congo (1); RD Congo (2); Cote d'Ivoire (2); Ghana (1); Kenya (1); Malawi (1); Zambia (1); Cambodia (1);
Lower-middle-income economies (5 countries, 6 organisations - 7.5%)	Namibia (1); Rwanda (1); India (1); Philippines (1); Dominican Republic (2);
Upper-middle income economies (12 countries, 14 organisations - 17.7%)	South Africa (1); Fiji (1); Malaysia (1); Turkey (1); Jamaica (1); Brazil (1); Chile (1); Mauritius (1); Poland (2); Portugal (2); Russian Federation (1); Bulgaria (1);
High-income economies (30 countries, 47 organisations - 59.4%)	Australia (3); Hong Kong (1); Israel (1); Japan (1); South Korea (1); New Zealand (1); Singapore (1); Taiwan (1); Barbados (1); The Bahamas (1); Canada (3); the US (2); Curacao (1); Belgium (2); Cyprus (2); Denmark (2); Finland (1); France (2); Germany (3); Ireland (2); Italy (1); Malta (1); the Netherlands (1); Norway (1); Slovenia (1); Spain (2); Sweden (1); Switzerland (1); UK (5); Greece (1);

Detailed analytical framework

The study proposed seven major variables that could explain commonalities and/or variances of perception related to union experiences with PPPs in education. These independent variables were:

- income classification of respondents' countries;
- level of GDP for education;
- regional location of respondents' countries;
- types of PPPs existing in respondents' countries;



- familiarity with PPPs in education;
- unions' perception of government reasons for PPP engagement;
- impact of PPPs on casualisation.

Each major variable tended to influence significantly a specific set of dependent variables. For example, the income classification of a country may determine the dominant type of PPPs existing in that country, the union's familiarity with the term PPPs in education, the union's perception of education PPPs and the nature or extent of involvement of unions on education PPPs. Similarly, how unions perceive the impact of education PPPs on casualization may be influenced significantly by their perception on the overall impact of PPPs on acceptable and quality education, on the role of teachers and support staff, and on the ethos of public education.

First, unions were grouped in clusters according to their positions towards PPPs. Each cluster/position was then analyzed to find out some key characteristics that could allow the identification of patterns, such as:

1. the forms of PPPs dominant in each group
2. the level of involvement of unions in each group
3. the overall impact as described by unions in each group
4. the level of GDP per capita and the percentage of GDP spent in education, together with the regional distribution of unions in each group.

These steps allowed us to identify the existence of correlations, such as:

- a. is there an overlap of the same variables in each group, which could help explain unions' positions?
- b. hence, do the same conditions lead to similar positions towards PPPs or are there other factors involved?

The aim was to spot patterns in relation to:

- whether there is or not a differentiation between industrialized and developing countries;
- union reaction towards PPPs in the different contexts, i.e. if there is any pattern emerging, and if the approach taken by unions is strategic or tactical;
- which forms of PPPs are acceptable (if any), under which conditions unions could accept them, and which forms appear to be completely unacceptable.

This analysis allows us:

- a. to help unions understand these developments, in order to provide them with the instruments to adopt a more strategic position towards PPPs, bearing in mind the 'bigger picture';
- b. to draw conclusions and recommendations for EI to develop a consistent and long-term policy towards PPPs.



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