

THE PRIVATISATION OF EDUCATION IN CHILE

Introduction

The Education International Regional Office for Latin America hereby presents this final version of the research into the privatisation of education in Chile. This research was coordinated by the Education International-affiliated Colegio de Profesores de Chile (CPC) and, through its good offices, was able to acquire the services of Professor Marcial Maldonado Tapia to carry out the work.

We are delighted to make this document available for use by any organisation or person interested in education, and particularly in quality public education for all. In this context, we think that the Chilean experience that has led to the privatisation of education is a valuable tool. It acts as a threshold to strengthen and promote those deeply-defended positions and actions which support the view that quality public education for all is the right way to offer all children real opportunities to receive an education, and thereby to be able to participate effectively in the development of societies in a human way.

We will also soon publish the outcome of research into this and other issues relating to each country in the Latin American Region: they will be a contribution from the Education International Latin American Regional Office and will set out the current situation and the need for quality public education.

This document may be found on our website (www.ei-ie-al.org), and may be used as long as the source is quoted. The English version will be presented by our head office in Brussels, Belgium.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this research is to analyse the process of the privatisation of education in Chile. It will also examine the indicators, character, forms and manifestations of this process in various areas, including access to the system, funding, school output, assessment, equality, and the working environment of teachers.

The research will study the profound changes that the Chilean education system has undergone since the 1973 coup d'état, and the neo-liberal policies that developed in the 1980s whereby competition, free enterprise and free markets were likened to progress and prosperity – a setting in which education was transformed into yet another product of these markets, and delivered by providers who have had to meet social demands through their schools.

In particular, there will be an examination of the various kinds of privatisation, the context in which these forms have been developed, and their consequences within a process of globalisation where, as Whitty et al remind us, national differences are eroded, state bureaucracies fragment, and the idea of mass public welfare disappears².

A view will also be developed both about the effects that privatisation of the system is having on educational equality in terms of equal opportunities of access and the process of teaching/learning and its outcomes, and about the impact that economic, social and cultural shortages are having on school failure.

Finally, given that the heaviest demands are made of teachers, there will be an analysis of the differences between those who work in private schools and those who work in public schools with regard to training, working conditions and environment.

The method employed in this research is based on an analysis of a corpus of statistical and bibliographical data. We believe that this information, which is derived from secondary sources, is adequate for the research to be valid. However, given the great variety and importance of the issues that need to be examined, it would be interesting in subsequent research to go back to primary sources; this would involve establishing working groups that gave these matters their exclusive attention.

¹ A teacher in the state system, and an Education and Vocational Counsellor.

² 'Devolution and choice in education: the school, the state and the market', G. Whitty, S. Power & D. Haplin, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998.

II. GENERAL BACKGROUND: MUNICIPALISATION AND PRIVATISATION OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

Although a privatisation process has been going on in Chile since the 19th century, the ‘teacher state’ increasingly developed public education, hand in hand with the democratisation of society, until the 1970s. The neo-liberal model imposed by the dictatorship involved the implementation of new education policies that tended to change the character of the state – from an agreement-based state to a subsidiary state. As a result, like areas such as health, social welfare, housing and means of communication, education was fundamentally regulated by the market.

The same happened in the production and services sectors: this meant that many companies, which had hitherto been state and public enterprises, passed into private hands or were transferred to international consortia; according to María Olivia Mönckeberg, they were mainly the most strategic and most profitable sectors such as chemicals, iron and steel, electricity and telecommunications³. Although a few enterprises are still owned by the state, these too – for example, companies in the healthcare sector, the *Empresa Nacional de Petróleo* (National Oil Company, ENAP), the Post Office, the *Corporación del Cobre* (Copper Corporation, CODELCO) and the *Empresa Nacional de Minería* (National Mining Company, ENAMI), to name but a few – are being targeted for privatisation⁴.

As to the education system, the state is no longer involved and has washed its hands of its historic mission of overseeing public education; the period since 1981 has seen the development of a process of decentralisation, municipalisation and privatisation of education. This has simultaneously led to a major shift in the system of funding education from supply subsidy to demand subsidy, via a pupils’ attendance subsidy allocated in the same form and quantities, both to municipal schools and to schools in the subsidised private sector⁵. Middle vocational-technical schools in the public sector have also been handed over to entrepreneurial groups: this gives the clearest signal of plans to privatise the existing public education, and it could take place much sooner than at the end of the lease (99 years), as the transfer refers solely to administration and other minor factors. Ownership remains with the state, which also provides the funding.

This process of passing the control of educational establishments from the state to private enterprises and/or municipalities occurred mainly during the period 1980-1981⁶, when 87% of schools made the switch. It came to an end between 1986 and 1989. Sales were temporarily halted between 1982 and 1985, as a result of the fall in the real value of the subsidy following the financial crisis in 1982. The value of the subsidy recovered from 1995 onwards.

³ *‘El Saqueo de los grupos económicos al Estado chileno’*, María Olivia Mönckeberg. Ediciones B Chile S.A, 2001

⁴ *‘Diario Financiero’*, 25 April 2003, Santiago, Chile.

⁵ According to the Ministry of Education, the local tax consists of a payment per pupil based on an ‘account unit’ (*unidad de cuenta*) known as School Subsidy Unit (*Unidad de Subvención Escolar, USE*). The value of the subsidy varies according to the kind of education (e.g. nursery, basic education, middle education and adult education), the kind of school (day school and evening classes), geographical region, rural location, and whether or not the institution offers a full day’s teaching. In other words, the ‘unit’ reflects how much the cost of providing education varies. The subsidy is given both to municipal establishments, which also qualify for central expenditure, and to institutions known as subsidised private schools, which do not have any greater control over how they use public resources, and receive not inconsiderable resources from families (this is permitted under the Shared Funding Act).

⁶ This also involved a radical change in teachers’ conditions of employment and pay from the status of civil servant to compliance with the laws of the market.

The Chilean education system now operates in this new decentralised framework through three kinds of institutions funded by the state: municipal schools, subsidised private schools, and establishments that are administered by entrepreneurial corporations even though they still belong to the state.

There are also private fee-paying institutions that receive no funding from the state; their economic and financial survival is based on monthly fees.

A description of the four categories of institution is set out below.

1. For the most part, **municipal schools** formed part of the centralised local education system until 1980, and they are still **publicly owned**. They receive a subsidy from the state, and a sum of money that has to be approved by parents and guardians is added to this (shared funding)⁷. Only a small percentage of municipal institutions (they are not able to establish themselves at pre-school or basic education level) are included in this category. In 1998, the parental contribution amounted to 8% of the subsidy for middle scientific-humanist schools.

Municipal institutions may be directly administered by the local authority (Departments of Municipal Education (*DEM*) and Departments of Municipal Education Administration (*DAEM*)) or by a municipal corporation⁸. Their legal representative is the Mayor or the President of the Corporation.

2. **Subsidised private schools** have formed part of the education system since the 19th century. They grew rapidly from the late 1960s onwards and were consolidated after 1981. They are privately owned and run through corporations, companies and supporters that operate on a for-profit or not-for-profit basis, although most of them seek a profit. They are officially recognised by the state and receive funding from it.

Through the shared funding scheme, they also receive different levels of contribution from families at all educational levels, as long as the families agree. In 1998, the average monthly parental contribution came to 35% of the subsidy for middle scientific-humanist schools.

The shared funding scheme has been rejected by teacher organisations on the grounds that it is an obvious mechanism to privatise education funding – one that incorporates more powerful forms of privatisation of the education system – and also because it has ushered in a series of discriminatory practices that objectively jeopardise the right to education. They include numerous and varied sanctions for non-payment, the expulsion of students, the retention of documents, pupils being liable for punishment, putting pressure on parents, and the imposition of statutory payments which, if not made, can lead to sequestration. This situation has been exacerbated in recent times by the economic difficulties being experienced by parents and/or guardians.

⁷ Although shared funding is a form of part-privatisation, it does not change the public character of these institutions.

⁸ A municipal corporation is a body governed by private law; the Director is appointed by the Mayor. Municipal corporations must not be confused with corporations of delegated administration.

3. **Private fee-paying schools** receive no funding from the state. **They are privately owned and administered.** Their money comes from charging enrolment fees and a monthly fee that pupils have to pay. Another kind of funding, or financial contribution, comes from religious orders, bi-national institutions, international organisations and other private bodies.
4. Lastly, there are schools still **state-owned** and funded by the state which, in administrative terms, come under ‘**corporations of delegated administration (*Corporaciones de Administración Delegada*)**’⁹. These are middle schools and especially vocational-technical schools; they are run by 21 entrepreneurial bodies, which in turn administer 70 establishments. The management of these institutions has been handed over to the private sector in a precarious lease (99 years) or subject to extendable agreements; they receive a subsidy from the state¹⁰.

It is important to remember that we will be calling the municipally controlled sector ‘public education’, whether it is administered by a municipal corporation, the Department of Municipal Education Administration (DAEM) or the Department of Municipal Education (DEM). We will use the phrase ‘private education’ to describe subsidised private education, private fee-paying education, and the education provided by schools that come under corporations of delegated administration.

III. ORGANISATION AND COVERAGE OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

The education system is organised on the basis of one level of basic education consisting of 8 years of compulsory schooling for children aged between 6 and 13, and a middle school level compulsory from 2003, lasting for 4 years and caring for children aged between 14 and 18, and divided into two parts: scientific-humanistic (general education) and vocational-technical (vocational education); the latter prepares pupils directly for integration into the labour market.

The pre-school education sub-system caters for children up to the age of 6 in municipal, subsidised private and private fee-paying institutions. Attendance is not compulsory, and they include major and minor transition grades of nursery education. Nursery education for children from the age of 84 days is provided by the Ministry of Education’s National Nursery Schools Committee (*Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles, JUNJI*) and the Ministry of the Interior’s National Foundation for Young Children’s Basic Schooling (*Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo Integral del Menor, Integra*).

⁹ *The Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (Capacitación Industrial de la Sociedad de Fomento Fabril); Corporación de Desarrollo Social Sector Rural (CODESER); Corporación Privada de Desarrollo de Curicó (CORPRIDE); Corporación Educacional de la Construcción; Fundación Almirante Carlos Condell; Fundación Educacional y Cultural San Pablo; Fundación de Promoción de la Educación y la Cultura (FUPEC); Instituto del Mar; Corp. Educacional de Desarrollo Artístico; Fundación de Solidaridad Romanos XII; Corporación Educacional de la Asociación de Industriales Metalúrgicos (ASIMET); Corporación Educacional Textil y de la Confección; Corporación Artes Gráficas y Afines; Corporación de la Cámara de Comercio de Concepción; Corporación de Capacitación Industrial y Minera; Universidad Tecnológica Metropolitana; Fundación Nacional de Educación Laboral; Universidad de Santiago de Chile; Fundación Privada de Desarrollo Social IX Región.*

¹⁰ Schools run by corporations of delegated administration (entrepreneurial groups) receive subsidies that are calculated differently from the subsidies given to subsidised private schools; they are based on daily attendance, not monthly attendance.

Enrolments at all levels of the education system reached 3,508,509 in 2000, and included **2,355,594 in basic education with 97% coverage** (6- to 13-year-olds), **822,946 in middle education with 84% coverage** (13- to 17-year-olds), and **329,969 in pre-school education (nurseries and special schools) with 24.56% coverage**. In 2000, the pre-school system had enrolments that came to 9% of the total: of this 9%, 8% were in nursery education and 1% were in special education. Enrolments were concentrated among 5-year-olds, where coverage in 1998 was above 51%.

These figures are the highest in Chile's history, and revive the process of access to the education system that developed until the early 1980s, albeit in a different context, given the headway made more recently by privatisation policies. There are no reliable studies of separate coverage of municipal education at all levels and for all kinds of institution.

If we look at the historical development of enrolments between 1981 and 1987, we can see a clear tendency towards a change in pupil enrolments resulting from the transfer of state institutions to the municipalities and to the private sector. As we have already described, this got under way during 1980-1981, and culminated in the period 1986-1989.

In 1980, there were 8799 institutions, of which 72% provided state education, 18% were subsidised private establishments, and 9% were private fee-paying schools (Annex 1).

In 1981, local enrolments came to 2,215,973, or 78%, while enrolments in subsidised private schools stood at 430,232 (15%); in private fee-paying schools, they rose to 195,521 (7%).

In 1984, after institutions had been transferred to the municipalities and corporations of delegated administration, there were 9788 institutions distributed as follows: municipal schools (64%), subsidised private schools (27), private fee-paying schools (9%) and institutions run by corporations (0.72%).

In 1987, enrolments in municipal institutions stood at 1,797,953, or 61%, in subsidised private schools 910,968 (31%), private fee-paying institutions 196,200 (7%), and schools run by corporations of delegated administration 57,634 (2%). Privately owned and administered schools, both subsidised and unsubsidised, catered for 1,164,802 pupils, or a little under 40%.

An examination of the 10,605 institutions in 2000 revealed a steep decline in the percentage of municipal schools to 59%, and respectively increases of 30% and 10% in the number of institutions providing subsidised private and fee-paying education, although the latter figure had fallen by 1% compared with the years immediately preceding, possibly because of the crisis that affected the year under discussion (Annex 1).

However, with regard to the number of teachers between 1998 and 2000, and projecting figures forward to 2002, we see **a considerable increase in the annual variation in subsidised private schools and private fee-paying schools, with a smaller increase in the complement of teachers in municipal schools** (Annex 2).

The total number of teachers' contact hours was 5,214,967: of these, 2,815,810 were in the municipal sector, 1,590,111 in the subsidised private sector, 721,686 in the private fee-paying

sector, and 87,360 in the corporations of delegated administration sector. **While contracted teaching hours in municipal education increased by an average of 1.6% each year between 1998 and 2000, they rose by 6.9% annually in the subsidised private sector and by 8.7% in the private fee-paying sector. The situation in enrolments and numbers of teachers was somewhat similar (Annex 3).**

Increasing coverage by the education system in general, **and by the subsidised private sector in particular, has triggered an increase in the supply of providers, and has in turn led to a significant transfer of pupils from municipal to subsidised private schools. This has resulted in an increasingly sharp deterioration in public education and in the consolidation of private ownership of education resources (Annex 4).**

An analysis of all pupils and categories of administrative control reveals that **53.7%** of pupils go to subsidised schools run by municipalities, **35.8%** attend subsidised private institutions, **8.9%** private fee-paying establishments, and **1.6%** institutions run by corporations of delegated administration (Annex 5).

Children's access to the education system increased sharply in the 1990s: according to García-Huidobro, poorer pupils now form the majority in municipal schools, and those from the middle quintiles are distributed in over a third of subsidised private schools. Pupils in the top quintile go to private fee-paying schools¹¹. García-Huidobro also notes that, 'if we compare these figures with the situation in the education system in 1990, we can see that marked segmentation has occurred with 60% of better-off young people attending municipal schools.' The same writer goes on to say that 'the last decade (during the period of democratic governments) has seen a readjustment in school enrolments whereby the middle class has preferred to send their children to subsidised private institutions and leave municipal schools for poorer pupils'¹². It is very important to bear in mind that, because of the state's withdrawal from the education system, many middle-class families have had no alternative to sending their children to subsidised private schools.

Similarly, the Human Capital Report¹³, quoting Mideplan (2000) as its source, states that 'pupils from lower-income families attend municipal institutions. In 2000, 59.5% of the municipal school population came from deciles 1-3, as compared with 39.5% of pupils in subsidised private schools, and only 3.9% of pupils at private fee-paying schools.' This shows how stark the divide between institutions actually is (Annex 6).

The system is currently catered for by 10,605 institutions (17,827 education units) of pre-basic, basic and middle education, of which 5873 are in the urban sector and 4732 in the rural sector. There are 6250 institutions run by municipalities (10,093 education units), 3217 subsidised private establishments (5547 education units), 1068 private fee-paying schools (2103 education units) and 70 establishments administered by corporations of delegated administration (84 education units) (see Annexes 7, 2 & 1).

¹¹ Quoted in '*Un cuasimercado educacional: La escuela privada subvencionada en Chile*' by C Almonacid.

¹² J E García-Huidobro, '*La reforma educacional chilena*'.

¹³ '*Informe Capital Humano en Chile*', José J Brunner et al, May 2003, p 42.

As for enrolments, there are 3,119,078 pupils in the urban sector and 389,431 in rural sectors.

Enrolments in municipal institutions are mainly concentrated in basic education and nursery education, although there are also some in middle scientific-humanist schools, but enrolments in special education in subsidised private schools are twice as high as they are in municipal schools¹⁴. And again, in middle vocational-technical education, total enrolment in subsidised private schools together with enrolments that have been picked up by corporations of delegated administration are greater than in municipal schools (Annex 5).

To summarise, municipal education has 53.7% of enrolments, and subsidised private, private fee-paying and corporations combined have 46.3%. As we shall see in due course, this distribution may be understood even more clearly if we examine coverage in the light of the number of institutions by administrative control (see Annex 5).

A description of the Metropolitan Region, which is where almost a third of the country's population lives, is an important indicator of the varied ways in which the different kinds of institution are distributed, and of the high incidence of private education. In fact, **if we add up the percentages of subsidised private schools and private fee-paying schools, together with institutions run by corporations of delegated administration, we have 46.3% of total enrolments at national level** (Annex 8).

Of the 52 municipalities in this Region, 35 have a higher enrolment percentage than the national average (46.3%) (i.e. the total of percentage national averages for subsidised and private fee-paying education, together with corporation of delegated administration establishments). Moreover, 13 of these municipalities host 13 private fee-paying schools, thereby exceeding the 8.9% national average for this kind of institution (i.e. private fee-paying establishments). The municipality of Pirque (11.74%) should also be added to these figures.

Of these 13 private fee-paying schools, 2 (Pirque and Talagante) are in rural municipalities, 3 (Las Condes, Lo Barnechea and Providencia) are in affluent middle-class municipalities, 1 (Vitacura) is upper-class, 5 (La Reina, Ñuñoa, Macul, La Florida and Santiago) are middle-class, and 2 (Peñalolén and San Miguel) are lower middle-class. The Vitacura municipality has no subsidised private schools: the school population is distributed among private fee-paying schools (for the children of well-off families) and municipal schools (for children from poorer backgrounds).

As to the rural sector (see Annex 7), there are many more municipal schools than other kinds of school. This means that education, and particularly basic education, for children in rural sectors relies fundamentally on what the state seeks to achieve through municipalities¹⁵.

¹⁴ On the subject of special education, and specifically the high percentage of subsidised schools focusing on 'alterations to language' (72%), Dr Almonacid points out that 'subsidised private supporters look around for the best profits.' He also says that this is inevitable in special education, 'where school subsidy units are worth three times more than in basic education.'

¹⁵ However, there is a relatively significant number of subsidised private schools in the rural sector in Regions IX and X. In Region IX, for example, there are three rural basic schools administered by institutions linked to the Mapuche people; they have about 100 pupils each. The Chol-Chol Peasant Cooperative in the same region also runs a vocational-technical agricultural school with a roll of 212 students.

Private fee-paying schools have no interest in the education of children in the rural sector.

Municipal schools, subsidised private schools and private fee-paying schools have similar volumes of enrolment.

In basic education, subsidised private schools, private fee-paying schools and institutions run by corporations have more children on roll than municipal institutions.

Municipal schools and institutions administered by corporations have more enrolments in middle scientific-humanist education.

Similarly, **enrolments in middle scientific-humanist education are much higher in schools run by corporations of delegated administration.**

In special education, enrolments in subsidised private schools and private fee-paying schools combined are three times higher than in municipal schools.

IV. CHARACTERISATION OF THE SUBSIDISED PRIVATE SECTOR

There are 3217 subsidised private schools compared with 5547 education units (figures for 2000). Dr Claudio Almonacid has examined 3594 institutions, but it has not been possible to classify 500 of these because of a lack of information on the Education Ministry's school subsidy database¹⁶. At all events, the information provided refers to 3094 institutions (Annex 9).

There are three categories of 'supporters': religious, social and private. Their objectives vary. In terms of numbers of institutions, private supporters are by far the most numerous; they are followed by religious supporters and, a long way behind, by those known as social supporters. Almonacid describes how subsidised private education is primarily delivered by private individuals; they are followed by groups with social objectives.

1. Religious supporters

The Catholic Church

The most important religious group is the Catholic Church. It first began to make an impact back in the 19th century, and is well established both in private fee-paying schools and in the subsidised private sector (Annex 10).

¹⁶ For the purposes of this research, Dr Claudio Almonacid's article '*Un cuasimercado educacional: La escuela privada en Chile*' will be used as the source in the section on subsidised private schooling.

As many as 73% of these institutions are to be found in the urban sector; 27% are in the rural sector (the *'Magisterio de la Araucanía'* Foundation).

Distribution of Catholic schools:

Religious orders:	248 schools
Lay schools:	235 schools
Bishoprics:	53 schools
Parishes:	20 schools
Seminaries:	2 seminaries

Enrolments in Catholic schools

There are 395,478 pupils; 66.2% of them have an *Indice de Vulnerabilidad Educativa, IVE*¹⁷ of under 50%, and 33.8% have an IVE of more than 50%. Only a third of the pupils who go to these schools belong to classes with more social needs.

Shared funding mechanisms are employed by 318 Catholic institutions (i.e. 47.8% of 674 institutions): The Catholic Church makes its educational service available to the middle class.

The Evangelical Church

There are schools linked to the Protestant Church both in subsidised private education and in private fee-paying education.

134 schools are run by the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the Methodist Corporation, the Education Society of Rural Christians (*'Sociedad de Educación Rural Cristiana'*), the Salvation Army, and 47 institutions are run by other Pentecostal denominations; a couple of schools are administered each by the Lutherans and the Anglicans.

Altogether, Evangelical schools cater for 54,159 pupils, 64.5% have an IVE of less than 50%, and the remaining 33.5% have an IVE of more than 50%: in other words, like the Catholic schools, only a third of them cater for pupils with more serious socio-economic problems.

Other churches

There are four schools that belong to what Almonacid describes as the 'non-Catholic tradition': three schools run by the Baha'i Faith (grouped together in the 'Baha'i National Spiritual Assembly of Chile') and one by the Masonic Lodge. Two of the Baha'i schools are in the rural part of Region IX, and may take Mapuche pupils; the third Baha'i institution is in the

¹⁷ The *Indice de Vulnerabilidad Educativa, IVE* (Special Educational Needs Index) is administered by the *Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar y Becas, JUNAEB*. The Index is the weighted average percentage of the unmet needs of pupils in schools: they include the mother not having completed her basic education, medical problems, dental problems, and the child being underweight for his/her age. Special needs also include biological, psychological, socio-economic and cultural factors that affect pupils' quality of life, well-being and capacity for learning (Ministry of Education).

Metropolitan Region and is part of the Ministry of Education ‘High School for All’ project for middle schools with high drop-out rates (Annex 10).

2. Social supporters

This covers institutions whose objectives are located in the social sector. It refers to not-for-profit organisations.

Charitable institutions

There are 47 institutions run by private supporters that cater for children with cognitive problems such as autism, Down’s syndrome and blindness. The *Fundación Corporación de Apoyo al Niño Limitado*, COANIL administers 24 institutions nationwide, and another 43 educational establishments are run by organisations that cater for the needs of children with social problems. The most important is the *Sociedad de Instrucción Primaria*, a traditional institution working in the field of social action. Others are bodies that defend the rights of minors in irregular situations, mostly as a result of being abandoned; they include *Fundación Mi Casa*, *Consejo de defensa del niño*, and *Aldeas infantiles SOS de Concepción* (Annex 11).

Almonacid says that the ‘the most extraordinary establishment in this group is the *Escuela Villa Baviera*, which is run by the *Organización Comunitaria de Desarrollo Social Perquilauquén*, the official title of a group of Germans known as the (‘Dignity Colony’), whose leader is on the run from the Chilean police on charges of paedophilia. It is strange that an organisation suspected of these crimes should be in charge of an educational institution that receives a state subsidy.’ We should also add that the *Colonia Dignidad* has been investigated by the police on suspicion of using its premises as a centre for the detention, torture and disappearance of political prisoners during the period of the Pinochet dictatorship.

Foundations

There are 24 institutions structured as foundations: they run 34 educational urban institutions with a total enrolment of 23,571 pupils.

The Domingo Matte Mesías Foundation runs three institutions in the municipality of Puente Alto; they provide basic education and middle vocational-technical education. The Ema Pérez Foundation runs three institutions in the municipality of La Cisterna in the Metropolitan Region. The Hernán Cortés Foundation runs institutions in the municipalities of Limache and Quilpué in Region V. The Joseph Lister School provides nursery, basic and middle scientific-humanist education; it also administers the Linda Correa Special Educational Needs Centre, which focuses exclusively on language acquisition and special education for children with hearing impairment. The El Pilar en Ancud Foundation in Region X runs two institutions offering nursery, basic, and middle vocational-technical education (commercial stream). The Barnechea Foundation in the municipality of that name runs two institutions that cater for all levels and branches of education. The pupils who attend these schools have an IVE of less than 20%: this shows that the institutions are not dealing with pupils with serious socio-economic problems. The Marcelo Astoreca Correa Foundation, which was founded by a group of right-wing professionals, has 479

pupils in nursery education, basic education and scientific-humanist education: the school's IVE is 27.4%, which shows that it does not cater for socially vulnerable children.

Entrepreneurs

Apart from the 70 institutions leased to 21 employers' institutions - a situation already examined in this research – it is curious, as Claudio Almonacid puts it, that efforts should be made to run schools subsidised in other ways, given that they are dealing with the same entrepreneurial bodies anyway. Examples of this include the *Corporación de Desarrollo Social del Sector Rural*, the *Fundación Nacional del Comercio* and the *Corporación Educacional de la Construcción*.

Other groups have no links with the entrepreneurial corporations referred to above. They include Codelco, which runs six institutions in the Chuquicamata and El Salvador mines that cater for all levels and branches of education, and have 4523 pupils on roll; there is also the *Corporación Educacional y Cultural Emprender*, which is part of the construction company Socovesa, and works in poor parts of the cities of Temuco and Osorno and in the La Florida area of the Metropolitan Region.

NGOs run three subsidised private establishments, and in Region IX there are three educational institutions that have links with the Mapuche people.

3. Private supporters (Annex 12)

The main objective of private supporters, according to Claudio Almonacid, is the administration of subsidised private schools. This means that they do not have aims any higher than those found in 'Catholic schools' and 'social groups'.

In his article "The Educational Quasi-market" (*'Un cuasimercado educacional'*), Almonacid distinguishes between two sub-groups ('private' and 'companies') that run 2121 educational institutions: 72.7% of them are 'private' schools, and 27.2% are 'companies'. The two groups have more than 350,000 pupils altogether.

Almonacid describes as 'private' that group of subsidised private schools where an individual is listed as the supporter on the Ministry of Education database. They have a total enrolment of 392,100 pupils, most of whom are concentrated in urban areas. Some have between 150 and 500 pupils (44.9%), while others have more than 500 (24%). The figures show that among this group, 1257 supporters (83.6%) each run one educational establishment, and the remainder run between two and seven each.

Some 'supporters'

Filomena Narváez¹⁸ runs seven institutions in urban areas catering for all levels and branches of education in various municipalities in the Metropolitan Region. They have a total of 12,524 pupils on roll.

Francisco Fernández runs five institutions in urban areas: one in the Metropolitan Region, and the rest in San Clemente and Talca in Region VII. They provide education at all levels, and in all branches except vocational-technical.

Hugo Casanueva runs two institutions in Recoleta and Maipú in the Metropolitan Region; in the latter, he has 6765 pupils on roll in nursery, basic and scientific-humanist education.

The 'Luhr Schools' group runs 11 urban schools in the municipality of Los Ángeles. A total of 5274 pupils are enrolled.

The Romo family runs eight educational institutions in the municipalities of Pudahuel, Independencia and La Cisterna in the Metropolitan Region: they deliver nursery, basic and middle scientific-humanist education. There are 8082 pupils on roll.

The Morales Ferreira family runs five institutions: four in Region VIII, and one in the city of Traiguén in Region IX.

With regard to these supporters, Almonacid points out that 'if we compare the "supporter's name" with the "name of the institution's director", we find that in 672 (43.5%) of all private institutions (1542) there is a direct link: in 85.3%, they are the same person, and in the remainder it is a family member (e.g. spouse, child, brother or sister). We know that most of these establishments have small numbers of pupils (fewer than 150) and similarly, if we look at the number of teachers, we see that half of them have fewer than three.'

Companies

A 'company' is a legal entity owned by a supporter either as a limited liability company or as a public limited company. This group consists of 534 institutions with a total enrolment of 248,856 pupils. Ideally, they are situated in urban areas, where there are altogether 510 institutions with a total of 245,639 pupils.

Educación e Investigaciones Pedagógicas Ltda runs five institutions with 8657 pupils on roll. Four of them are in the municipality of Ñuñoa, and one is in the municipality of La Cisterna in the Metropolitan Region.

¹⁸ The 7 June 1984 issue of the '*Fortín Mapocho*' daily newspaper carried a report of a press conference given by five senior officials of the *Asociación Gremial de Educadores de Chile, AGECH*. It stated that the Galvarino Schools, of which Filomena Narváez is the Director, operate on the basis of an 'absolutely repressive system'; one of the officials, Alejandro Traverso, gave an example of how 'a trade union of 65 teachers had been formed in one of Señora Narváez's schools. She sacked 50 of them the following day.' He went on to say that 'the ministry of Education has so far done nothing about it.' AGECH President Jorge Pavez criticised the existence of 'a chain of subsidised schools, *H C Libertadores* – a monopolistic group consisting of more than 20 establishments and about 30,000 children, and in receipt of 39 million pesos in subsidies.' (Note by the author of this research: 'Privatisation of Education in Chile')

Elsa F Bahamonde Neuman y Cía Ltda runs five 5 institutions with over 1000 pupils on roll. They are located in the municipalities of Temuco and Padre Las Casas in Region IX. Four of the schools are in rural areas and have fewer than 150 pupils; the other is in an urban area and offers nursery and basic education.

Teniente Dagoberto Godoy Ltda runs urban schools in the municipalities of La Granja (1600 pupils), San Bernardo (2200 pupils) and Lo Prado (1700 pupils): they provide nursery and basic education, and deliver middle scientific-humanist education to 176 pupils.

V. EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGEMENT BY TYPE OF FUNDING

This section of the report compares the effectiveness of the various forms of administration and funding by comparing enrolment figures, the number of schools and courses, and the number of pupils per course (see Annex 14).

In an analysis by levels of education (Annex 13), Almonacid shows that there are ‘three kinds of subsidised private supporter [that] ideally operate in nursery and basic education. If we total the percentages, we see that “private” supporters account for 79.9% at both levels and that “religious” supporters register 72.7%. By contrast, “social” supporters come in at 58.3% at both levels and are growing in middle vocational-technical education (18.3%). According to Quiroz (1997), this more substantial presence in nursery and basic education may be attributed to the fact that most subsidised private schools are unable to cover their total, and even variable, expenditure and they can become economically insolvent as they eat into capital.’

Some of the conclusions reached by Dr Almonacid in his full article are set out below:

that parents are favourably disposed to the type of education provided by subsidised private schools backed up with institutional support and state resources; that they would prefer to send their children to church schools than to secular establishments; and that municipal schools are the sole option for the poorest people. According to Almonacid, ‘in subsidised private education, we have found that the Catholic Church has 26.3% of all such schools, and that together with “private” schools (49.5%) and “companies” (20.1%), they account for its main foci (91.4%). On the basis of a study by McEwan and Carnoy (2000), Almonacid claims that the high scores achieved by subsidised private schools (higher than municipal schools) in national tests are obtained by Catholic schools. However, Dr Almonacid remains sceptical about these results, and argues as follows:

- a) ‘when academic results obtained by pupils in standardised national tests are checked against the socio-economic levels of the families, the differences are greatly reduced or non-existent (Mizala 1998; Carnoy, 2001), except in the case of religious schools;
- b) ‘the selection processes employed by these institutions (an aspect that has not been adequately researched) allow them to choose the “best” pupils (from the point of view of academic performance and behaviour), and thereby demonstrate better results to the public;

- c) **‘what appears to be the greater effectiveness of subsidised private schools conceals differences between teachers’ conditions of employment. As Carnoy points out, expenditure per pupil in for-profit schools is lower, particularly insofar as teachers are paid less than in public (i.e. municipal) schools, and this reduced wage-sum is possible because they usually operate with half-time staff who have more than one job. These schools are therefore 11% more profitable than public schools, not because they are more efficient (in fact, their performance is poorer), but because they spend less per pupil (Carnoy, 2001, 55);**
- d) ‘if we examine academic results achieved by Chilean pupils in various international tests (e.g. a comparative study by UNESCO of quality in education, and the Third International Mathematics and Science Study, TIMSS), we see that “all of our school population, including the sectors with the best resources, perform poorly compared with countries with good educational standards” (Eyzaguirre, 2001, 180). “Chile comes close to bottom in these tests.” Dr Almonacid concludes by saying that ‘the apparently good results achieved by subsidised private schools are the outcome of factors within Chilean society, but if they are set against international standards, they tend slip down the scale, and it is possible to see that the shortcoming also applies to the entire educational system, including the private fee-paying sector.’

At the end of a number of telling remarks, Dr Almonacid brings his article to a close with some scathing formulations about policies pursued by the dictatorship and continued by democratic governments: they should urge us, at the very least, to reflect very seriously on the subject.

‘For example, the Chilean version of educational autonomy derives from the application of neo-liberal policies that were conceived during the military dictatorship. These policies have been legitimised by democratic governments when they pushed through educational reform of the overall design, but they failed to change it, or even dared to correct its fundamental features. This has led to the consolidation of a model of society based on competition and on the legitimacy of inequality – and in which people have more opportunities, depending on their ability to pay for the services they receive – and on the (public and family) resources that they pour into private school coffers, thereby consolidating their heritage without any social responsibility for the outcomes (Who will deal with the fall-out of going to a “bad school”, or to a school that goes bankrupt?) It is easy and unfair to blame parents (for choosing a particular school or for failing to pay the monthly fees) or teachers (for not doing their job correctly). It is much more to do with a political option that transforms a right into a commodity, thereby creating an educational quasi-market based on social segregation.’

Looking at it from another angle, it should also be said that the average number of pupils per course is somewhat lower in private fee-paying schools (23), and similar in schools funded in other ways (34) (see Table 14)¹⁹.

¹⁹ However, data on this matter vary quite considerably from source to source, and there is no reliable research; they also differ substantially between schools in rural and urban areas and in large and small municipalities. The data are also calculated as averages, and this distorts what is actually happening in schools. More rigorous research is needed in this field. CPC has called for it in the municipal sector at least: in negotiations on their conditions of employment aimed at raising quality, Colegio is demanding a gradual reduction in the number of pupils in schools.

Lastly, it is interesting to note that *'Informe Capital Humano en Chile'* makes clear that, 'when we analyse the gap between the results of pupils at schools funded in different ways, **the fact that, unlike municipal schools, subsidised private schools can select their pupils on entry, and subsequently remove those who perform poorly is paramount (Mizala and Romaguera, 2002; Contreras 2001; Espínola 1997). There is also evidence that subsidised private schools in Chile rely more on entrance examinations, minimum marks and interviews with parents during the process of pupil selection. The evidence also suggests that families with more cultural and economic capital have more information about the quality of education and choose the best schools (Guari, 1998).'**'

VI. EDUCATION FUNDING.

The education system grew rapidly between 1960 and 1973: public expenditure on education reached a maximum of \$1583 million in 1972, but declined to \$877 million in 1975 during the period of the dictatorship, and rose again to \$1026 million in 1990.

Expenditure tripled in the 1990s, reaching a little under \$2800 million in 2001 (dollars: base-year 2000). As a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), **public expenditure on education in 2000 climbed to 4.2%, a far cry from the 7.2% achieved in 1972. On the other hand, private expenditure grew rapidly after the 1980s and in 2000 accounted for about 3.3% of GDP (Annex 15).**

1. Increased public expenditure in the 1990s²⁰

'The period of the military dictatorship led to a substantial shift in educational policies, particularly in terms of key involvement by the public sector. For example, public expenditure on education has partly recovered from the critical situation it was in, growing by 155% between 1990 and 2001, and climbing from 549,508 million pesos a 1,629,836 million pesos during that period (pesos: base-year 2000 in both cases). Public expenditure on education grew more quickly than GDP, faster than total central government spending, and more than social expenditure (from 2.4%, 11.9% and 20.9% respectively in 1990 to 4.4%, 18.7% and 26.8% in 2001).

'On the other hand, **the process of education privatisation is reflected in the increase in private spending (from 1.4% of GDP in 1990 to 3.3% in 2000). This percentage rose 2.4 times during this period, faster than the ratio of public expenditure on education to GDP, which in turn grew 1.7 times during the same period.**

'It must be remembered, however, that the largest increase in resources expended on education took place while President Aylwin was in office: for example, between 1990 and 1994, public expenditure on education, including municipal contributions, rose to an average annual rate of 11.0%, and between 1994 and 2000 stood at 10.2%, before falling to 6.5% when President Lagos

²⁰Centro de Estudios Nacionales de Desarrollo Alternativo, CENDA, Santiago de Chile, December 2002.

was in charge. Subsidies increased by 9.3% between 1990 and 1994, by 12.2% between 1994 and 2000, and by 5.7% during the period 2000-2001.

‘If measured by the Ministry of Education budget, and taking the 2000-2003 period into account, annual public spending grew by an average of 7.9%.

‘However, when compared with GDP, total public expenditure and social expenditure, public spending on education has experienced sustained recovery since the end of the military regime, with GDP rising from 2.4% in 1990 to 4.4% in 2001, social expenditure increasing from 20.9% to 26.8%, and total government expenditure up from 11.9% to 18.7%’ (Annex 15).’

If we go back to the middle of the 20th century, we find that the Ministry of Education’s total budget between 1940 and 1958 rose by 165%. If we compare that with the country’s total receipts during this period, we see that the education budget oscillated, as an annual average, between 1.3% and 2.73%²¹.

Local subsidies to private education in elementary, basic and technical education rose consistently: in pesos base-year 1950, they went from 42 million in 1942 to 401 million in 1958 (i.e. a total increase of 854.9%), and the number of pupils receiving private education also grew substantially during this period (see²¹).

Subsidies by pupil in the three branches of education in 1940 stood at \$340 (dollars: base-year 1950); following many fluctuations, this rose to \$1360 in 1956 (dollars: base-year 1950), in other words a total increase per pupil of 796.6%. Subsidies per student in private university education during this period climbed from \$1780 (dollars: base-year 1950) in 1942 to \$15,960 (dollars: base-year 1950) in 1956. In 1940, private education’s contribution to the national total budget came to 2.7%; by 1958, it had risen to 12.8% (see²¹).

The severe economic recession during the 1980s triggered a fiscal adjustment designed to reduce spending. It also hit education, cutting teachers’ salaries, and in particular undermining the infrastructure and material support of the most vulnerable groups.

The institutional, political and economic apparatus as well as the legal system that were inherited from the period of dictatorship have survived to the present day, but although education funding levels are slowly recovering, they have not returned to the historic levels that education enjoyed in the early 1970s.

2. Financial resources and mechanisms for allocating funds

The main sources of education funding are fiscal tax, local municipality funding, shared funding, municipal contributions and payments levied by private institutions.

The process of decentralising the education system signalled the end of direct state funding of local schools. The state subsidises institutions on the basis of a subsidy per pupil in attendance, and matches the subsidy given to municipal schools and subsidised private institutions.

²¹ Bulletin No 4 of the University of Chile, July 1959. Cited in ‘*Revista Educadores del Mundo*’ No 15.

Subsidised private schools existed until 1980, but the subsidy was on average approximately 50% of what was given to state schools, and it was not based on the number of pupils²².

The subsidy is now paid to school supporters²³. This school subsidy mechanism was suggested by Milton Friedman: because of the way it is applied in Chile, the subsidy ‘follows pupils’ since the government subsidises institutions that have been chosen by parents directly on the basis of the pupils enrolled, and the money moves from supporter to supporter when parents decide to move their children from one school to another (Mizala).

Milton Friedman is one of the leading exponents of neo-liberal ideology and, accordingly, advocates making the education system more competitive by a more extreme form of funding called ‘coupons’ and ‘vouchers’ that would enable families to be more involved in their children’s education and in the production of the school’s accounts (see²²).

Local subsidies per pupil vary according to the *Unidad de Subvención Escolar, USE*, levels of education, the kind of teaching, and whether or not the school operates on the basis of a full school day or *Jornada Escolar Completa, JEC* (see Tables 16 and 17). In other words, ‘there is a different value for each level and type of education. The money that a supporter receives varies according to the level and type of the supporter’s work multiplied by pupils’ average attendance over the previous three months. These values are also altered according to the school day system employed, whereby an institution receives a larger subsidy when it changes its school day system.

‘Moreover, the monthly contribution that an institution receives as a school subsidy is calculated on the basis of pupils’ average effective attendance over the previous three months (the school subsidy for January and February is paid on the basis of average attendance during the year immediately preceding).

‘The current funding model delegates the choice of school that pupils attend to parents and guardians. In this way, these decisions determine the destination of the money paid out by the state through the subsidy scheme. In terms of subsidies, the budget administered during 2000 came to \$933,400 million, of which \$809,000 million were allocated as a regular subsidy to schools’²⁴.

3. Consequences of the new funding and management model

As we have seen, Chile has schools that are subsidised by the state and run by private, not-for-profit bodies. The system of private, for-profit schools ‘funded by state subsidies has been deemed legal since the 1960s... from time to time the teacher union questions the ethics of private institutions making a profit by delivering educational services with public funding’²⁵. On

²² J Vargas and C Peirano, ‘*Escuelas privadas con financiamiento público en Chile*’.

²³ A ‘supporter’ is an individual or a legal person by whom the educational institution is run in administrative terms. In subsidised private schools, money that comes directly from the school subsidy is paid directly to the supporter; in the case of schools run by municipalities, it is paid straight to the local authority. The subsidy has to pay for a school’s operational costs, although there is no clause obliging supporters to use money from school subsidies at a given institution: it can also be spent in other establishments (C Almonacid).

²⁴ Ministry of Education, 2001.

²⁵ J Vargas and C Peirano, ‘*Escuelas privadas con financiamiento público en Chile*’.

this subject, Mr Wagner, the British educator who visited our country in 1957, said that the payment of subsidies to certain schools makes clear that the children of well-off parents are being educated at the taxpayer's expense, and that if the state is unable to improve its schools, the education of the most advantaged is being subsidised at the expense of the most disadvantaged²⁶.

It has been argued that the processes of change in the Chilean education system respond to a need to improve the way schools are run (the implementation of recent decentralisation policies are supposed to achieve that objective, for example). **However, they have led to a level of highly developed privatisation of the system** and run counter to the views of teacher organisations, which see the implications that implementation of such a scheme is having for access to quality education for all in a context of equal opportunities. The Final Report of the Colegio de Profesores de Chile's National Education Congress (1997) states that 'the state must provide the resources necessary for educational work by aiming them mainly at developing public education, and must sideline commercial and profit-making criteria, which only deepen social differences. Only by responding in this way will the state meet its responsibility for dealing with the principles of quality and equity in education'²⁷.

Furthermore, an international survey of processes of privatisation in countries that made presentations in 'Informe Capital Humano en Chile'²⁸ points out that 'the percentage of enrolments in private-paying and subsidised schools is a crude indicator of the degree to which the system has been privatised. The list was headed by Netherlands, followed by Chile.

'It is generally argued in favour of privatisation that it (i) broadens parents' and pupils' options by fostering a better match between them and school (examination) results, (ii) stimulates competition between schools by encouraging them to innovate, cut costs and improve effectiveness, and (iii) gives pupils and families opportunities to go to private schools, which are normally beyond their reach because they are too expensive (Evers, Izumi and Riley, 2001; Schneider, 2000; Chubb and Moe, 1990; Coons and Sugarman, 1978; Friedman, 1955).

'It is argued against privatisation that (i) parents and pupils in low-income families are not able to invest either the necessary resources or the time required to obtain the information they need to make a choice, and (ii) the parents are unable to send their children to schools a long way from their neighbourhoods. If better-off pupils opt for private schools, the public education system will turn into a segregated system for low-income pupils, and if public schools are not given autonomy, it is not fair to force them to compete with private schools, which certainly are able to make decisions. By and large, private schools can ask parents for money, an advantage that is not open to public institutions, and it distorts competition. It is not easy to adapt voucher systems to the parents' levels of income, and in the end they are turned into subsidies for better-off families' (Levin, 1988 and 1991; Carnoy 1997, 1998)." The system has drawn criticism because of the impact it will have on quality and equity.

²⁶ *Revista Educadores del Mundo*, July-August 1964. *La educación privada en Chile en el decenio 1950-1960*

²⁷ Final Report, National Education Congress, Colegio de Profesores de Chile, p 41.

²⁸ 'Informe Capital Humano en Chile', José J Brunner and Gregory Elacqua, May 2003, pp 66-67.

In its *Conclusiones de un Estudio de Remuneraciones del Magisterio* (December, 2002), the Centro de Estudios Nacionales de Desarrollo Alternativo, CENDA stresses **‘the importance of reviewing the system of funding education based on demand subsidies. The main objective of the system is to stimulate development in the private sector. The rigidity of this system results in huge expenditure when an attempt is made to deal with deficits registered in one school sector – mainly the municipal school sector – as it forces subsidises to rise generally.’** This conclusion is not irrelevant. Indeed, it responds directly to the policy set in motion in 1979, and made explicit in a letter dated 5 March 1979 from Alfredo Pinochet to the Minister Manuel Camilo Vial: ‘there is little likelihood of the state further expanding its work in the field of education... on the contrary, the assistance that the private sector can give education will be energetically encouraged’²⁹.

VII. THE SITUATION OF TEACHERS

1. General features

The Chilean education system employs 144,377 teachers, 43,268 (30%) of whom are men and 101,109 (70%) are women. Of this total, 80,597 (56%) work in municipal schools, 41,053 (28%) in subsidised private institutions, 21,348 (14%) in fee-paying private establishments and 2,379 (2%) in corporations of delegated administration (Annex 2).

Between 1998 and 2000, the number of female teachers grew by an average of 3.8% annually, and did so more quickly than the total of male teachers, which increased by 2.6% annually, and the total of all teachers, whose numbers rose by 3.5% during the same period (Annex 2).

On average, teachers have 16.8 years of service, slightly more than 8 two-year periods – this figure grew by 0.5% between 1998 and 2000 – and 13% of all teachers (a total of 19,251 male and female teachers) have more than 30 years’ service: this group grew by 7.6% between 1998 and 2000.

They work an average of 36.9 hours a week: this figure rose by 0.25% annually between 1998 and 2000, and by 0.9% annually between 2000 and 2002, possibly due to the introduction of the full school d.

More specifically, a total of 14,702 teachers (i.e. 10.2% of the total teaching workforce) work more than 44 hours a week, the legal limit on hours worked for a given employer. Of these, 12,888 (i.e. 8.9% of all teachers) work for two or more supporters, and build up working weeks of more than 44 hours. This percentage grew by 1.4% annually between 1998 and 2000, but there is a general tendency to work for more than one school. Most teachers (76%) have a working week of 30-44 hours, and the largest single group (31%) work a 30-hour week.

In terms of training, 55% are qualified as teachers in basic schools, and 33% as middle school teachers. Another 8% are qualified as nursery school teachers, and another 4% as special needs teachers.

²⁹ Quoted by the *Programa interdisciplinario de investigaciones en educación, PIIE*, p 93.

Teachers have an average age of 43.5 years (this figure is growing at an average rate of 1.1%), but it is significantly higher in municipal schools where the average age is 46.2 years, and where there is a concentration of teachers aged between 40 and 55. In the subsidised private sector, the average age of teachers is 39.6 years, with a concentration of teachers aged between 30 and 45, and in fee-paying schools, the average age is 40.1. The fastest-growing age-band is of teachers aged between 60 and 65; it is growing very quickly, numbers having increased from 3310 to 4955 between 1998 and 2000. A total of 6012 teachers (4.2% of the teaching workforce), of whom 3953 are women, are beyond retirement age. This number has undoubtedly been swollen by the pension problems experienced by people who switched to the AFP³⁰ system.

The fact that 39,883 teachers (28%) are between the ages of 55 and 65 suggests a kind of forced labour for older workers.

Of teachers who work in the municipal sector, 36% are between 51 and 65 years of age, while most teachers in subsidised private schools and fee-paying private schools are aged between 36 and 40.

The overall teaching workforce is distributed as follows: 65% are teachers in basic schools and 35% are middle school teachers, while in terms of teaching duties, 83% work as classroom teachers and 17% have pedagogical-technical, managerial and other duties.

Classroom teachers' contract hours have increased and, between 1998 and 2000, much more so in subsidised private and fee-paying private schools than in the municipal sector (almost five times more in subsidised private schools and six times more in fee-paying private schools) (Annex 18).

The same has happened to the contract hours of head teachers: the variation is negative in municipal education (-0.4%), but positive in subsidised private schools (+12.3%) and private fee-paying schools (+21.5%).

It may be assumed that the major increase in contract hours in the subsidised private and fee-paying private sectors is helping to improve the quality of education delivered by these schools. Head teachers are probably demonstrating effective leadership; this improves the frequency and quality of formal and informal meetings for teaching staff, and ensures that their work is subjected to ongoing assessment.

All of this depends on whether these contract hours are being used appropriately on the activities for which they were intended.

³⁰ *Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones*, AFPs fund old-age, invalidity and survivors' pensions through individual lump-sum accounts. Pensions are on average 50% lower than those received by workers who remain in the state scheme (approx. 236,000 in 1999). That year, 1,370,000 workers were AFP members. Teachers are most affected as large number of them switched to AFPs. Furthermore, many supporters transferred pension funds to other schemes at the request of teachers. Under the state pension scheme, women retired after 25 years' service and men after 30. Women currently retire at the age of 60 and men at 65 (see next footnote).

Of these teachers, 88% are qualified as teachers at basic schools and as middle school teachers, and are divided 55%/33% in the two categories. The number of middle school teachers is growing at an annual rate of 5%, that is to say faster than in basic education, where growth stands at 1%, but not as fast as in special schools and nursery schools, where numbers are rising at an annual rate of 8% and 7% respectively.

In Chile, as in Costa Rica, Cuba and Mexico, it takes 17 years to qualify as a teacher.³¹

Teacher training was passed to the higher education sector during the 1980s. The transfer to various higher education institutions from respected normal schools that had long traditions and had trained teachers throughout the country was very significant.

As for further professional training, the military government repealed Law No 16,617, which had governed teachers' further training, and retained the *Centro de Perfeccionamiento, Experimentación e Investigaciones Pedagógicas*, although nowadays this only recognises courses offered by various institutions and individuals.

2. Teachers' pay³²

Teachers' pay rose steadily between 1960 and 1972, and at a rate above the average for salaries in the rest of the country: while the Index of Salaries and Real Salaries (IGSS) rose from 45.4 in 1960 to 103.7 in 1972 (1971=100), the Index of Teachers' Real Salaries (IRM) went from 42 to 113 (1971=100).

Between 1974 and 1975, as teachers were assimilated onto the single salary scale, their pay fell calamitously and much faster than that of other workers: for example, while the IGSS dropped from 103.7 in 1972 to 51.3 in 1975, the IRM plummeted from 113 in 1972 to 28 in 1975 (both indices: 1971=100).

However, teachers' pay recovered between 1975 and 1981, although less than the average: for instance, while the IGSS climbed from 51.3 in 1975 to 79.3 in 1981, the IRM could only move from 28 up to 43 (both indices: 1971=100). In sum, teachers' pay was at a significantly lower level than that of other workers in the country.

However, between 1981 and 1990, teachers' real pay fell even more sharply both in relative and in absolute terms: during that period, the IGSS slipped from 79.3 to 76.8, and the IRM crashed from 43 back to 28, once again touching its historic low of 1975. There is no doubt that the arrival of democracy allowed teachers' pay to recover significantly and above the average rate of recovery for the rest of the country: for example, between 1990 and 2002, the IGSS rose by

³¹ Review of '*Balance de los 20 años del Proyecto Principal de Educación en América Latina y el Caribe*' (1979-1999), UNESCO, Santiago de Chile, 2001, p 123. As happens with other professional workers, the many years of training mean that teachers enter the labour market late, with all the knock-on effects that that involves as retirement approaches. Teachers need to have a minimum of 35 years' service in order to retire and also meet the age requirements. Under the terms of a government bill, the number of years' contributions to qualify for a pension will rise to 45.

³² '*Estudio de remuneraciones del Magisterio*', December 2002 version, *Centro de Estudios Nacionales de Desarrollo Alternativo, CENDA*.

41.6% while the IRM almost tripled, climbing by 151.2%. However, the previous situation had been so serious that teachers' pay was still significantly lower than average: while the IGSS eventually returned to an index of 108.7, the highest level it had ever achieved 27 years earlier in 1972 – and even exceeded it – the IRM was still down at 70.3 (both indices: 1971=100).

Furthermore, the '*Informe Capital Humano en Chile*'³³ says that 'we are not paying teachers enough to encourage high-quality new entrants... there is evidence that because of low rates of pay, many teachers in Latin America are forced to find second jobs. Willms (2002) shows how this has a negative impact on school performance.' The same report also makes the point that 'a teacher's starting salary in Chile is relatively high if compared to that in countries with similar incomes per inhabitant, but it only goes up by 10% after 15 years' service, compared with 22% in Greece, 49% in Brazil and 67% in Malaysia. This suggests that there are few incentives to attract quality teachers, to move up the career ladder and to reward good performance.' The report goes on to say that research has recently begun into the influence of teachers' socio-economic levels on the performance of their duties and on pupils' success. It is important to make clear that it is wrong to advance categorical statements about how teachers carry out their work if they are based on an incomplete and unverifiable knowledge of teachers' work and pay.

To bring teachers up to average pay for the country as a whole requires an adjustment of 54.5%. The recovery of teachers' pay involves significant extra expenditure of 500,000 million pesos (about \$700 million) a year.

Based on a 3-hour day and 10 two-year periods (*bienios*), the basis used in drawing up the IRM, and expressed in pesos base-year 1999, teachers' pay fluctuated between a maximum of \$717,454 on 1972 and a minimum of \$177,938 in 1990, before climbing back to \$446,904 in 2002.

Most teachers – and that includes the 56% who work in the municipal system and some of the 28% in the subsidised private sector – have their salaries determined by the Teachers' Statute (*Estatuto Docente, ED*). The pay of other teachers in subsidised private schools and of those in the fee-paying private sector is governed by general employment legislation. The pay structure laid down by the 1991 Teachers' Statute and subsequent amendments is set out in Annex 19.

'Gross pay for all teachers (30 hours, 10 *bienios*, 35% middle schools and 65% basic education) was an estimated \$446,904 in 2002 (pesos: base-year 2002). It was \$399,061 in 2000 (pesos: base-year 2000), and rose by 5.6% in real terms, that is to say, above the Consumer Price Index, which in turn rose by 6.05% between August 2000 and August 2002.

According to the 'Casen' survey based on Ministry of Education and CPC figures, a comparison between teachers' pay and that of other Chilean professional workers shows that:

- average teachers' pay needs to be raised by 120% to bring it in line with average pay for other professionals in the public sector;

³³ '*Informe Capital Humano en Chile*', José J Brunner and Gregory Elacqua. May 2003, p 73.

- 50% of low-paid teachers need a pay rise of 32% to bring them in line with the pay rates of 50% of low-paid professionals in the public sector;
- 50% of better-paid teachers need a salary rise of 132% to bring them in line with better-paid professionals in the public sector.

2. Teachers' conditions of employment

Teachers' pay, employment and professional conditions are clearly precarious. The neo-liberal model has handed education over to the market, and a new class of business people – many of whom have turned into real education entrepreneurs – has emerged.

Teacher leaders have previously been persecuted, imprisoned and exiled, and many were murdered – or else they simply 'disappeared' – during the 17-year-long dictatorship.

The first measures taken by the dictatorship following the coup d'état of 11 September 1973 included the abolition of the Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Enseñanza, SUTE, and on 16 October 1974, the military government established the Colegio de Profesores de Chile (CPC), later turning it into a 'workers' association' (*Asociación Gremial*).

After a lengthy struggle by teachers, the first democratic election of teacher leaders took place in 1985, and in 1987, after the Asociación Gremial de Educadores de Chile, (AGECH) which had been founded in 1981 was closed down, they joined Colegio: with over 100,000 members, CPC is still the largest workers' association in the country.

Teachers lost the rights and gains that had been built up in the course of their organisations' long, and frequently gruelling, struggles. Today, there is no professional career and no salary scale: just periods of two-year service (*bienios*) (6.6%), which replaced three-year service periods (*trienios*) – a historic victory – and they ended up with 'chairs' (*cátedras*), another historic victory. As a result, there are no grades, no horizontal or vertical mobility, either in public schools or in private schools, and no national criteria covering people who take part in competitions in municipal schools. Subsidised private and fee-paying schools operate on the basis of a wide range of mechanisms that regulate the pay of teachers in the education system without the benefit of national standards.

Teachers no longer have any say in what they do for a living: it is what used to give their jobs stability and continuity and facilitated their pupils' work. These days, the hours worked by municipal teachers belong to the local authority, and if they have not had their working hours (guaranteed hours) determined by competition, they may be removed either for legal reasons or because of an excess teaching load. And that is without looking at what happens to teachers in subsidised and fee-paying private schools covered by the Labour Code: in practice, they enjoy no stability and may be dismissed for one of the many reasons laid down in the law. Only the establishment of strong trade union organisations at school level – these are permitted by law for private schools, and for teachers who work in municipal corporations – can enable teachers to stay in work. There is a link between what is happening here and what Whitty et al³⁴ say: 'some

³⁴ 'La escuela, el estado y el mercado', G Whitty, S Power and D Halpin, pp 86-87.

writers think that instead of underlining teachers' professionalism, the recent reforms are part of a process of de-professionalisation (Harris, 1993)'; they also point out that 'allusions to greater professionalism... conceal the effective proletarianisation of teachers' work both ideologically (via the loss of control over policy) and technically (through more rigid specification of the content and rhythm of their work).' All of this is happening in a country a long way away. It couldn't happen here, could it?

The Education Professionals' Statute, also known as the Teachers' Statute (*Estatuto Docente*)³⁵ was promulgated by the first Concertation Government in 1990; Colegio mainly regulates the conditions of employment of teachers in the municipal sector; for teachers in the subsidised sector, it only determines their minimum salary.

Other employment and contractual conditions in this sector are governed by the Labour Code, which covers all workers in the country. The Code was largely put together during the dictatorship and does not offer stability or proper conditions for professional work. It follows that teachers' conditions of employment are subjected to the laws of the market.

In this respect, Chilean teachers in the municipal and subsidised private sectors are funded under a similar system (through a subsidy that the state pays for every pupil on roll), although they have different conditions of employment as a result of working in the municipal or private sector.

The Statute recognises the professional character of teaching (by stating that teachers must be qualified or, when they are not, that they must obtain a special permit to teach) and, at least as far as teachers in the municipal sector are concerned, has re-established a special status or standard (in fact, more like the status of a civil or public servant) that insists on factors such as experience, further training, managerial and other difficult tasks, and a system of teacher qualifications, but it has not yet been satisfactorily implemented because of resistance from teachers³⁶. It also sets out the conditions for dismissal, including those that have been amended since the Statute was promulgated, and the number of reasons for dismissal has been increased. Although it constitutes an improvement on the total deregulation that was established during the dictatorship, the new legislation has not been able to resolve situations created by the processes of municipalisation and privatisation.

VIII. THE SITUATION OF THE CURRICULUM

As far as curriculum formation is concerned, the dictatorship's drastic action particularly from 1973 to the late 1980s can be observed in the process of educational decentralisation. This intervention involved first the censorship, and secondly the elimination of the content of certain subjects in the areas of humanism and the arts.

³⁵ The Teachers' Statute and special regulations are set out in full on the CPC website www.colegiodeprofesores.cl

³⁶ Five years' work in this field by the Ministry of Education, the Chilean Association of Municipalities and CPC has resulted in a training scheme for the assessment of teaching that will delete punitive clauses in the Teachers' Statute. All of the country's municipal teachers were consulted on the new system, and it was approved by a majority. It will be submitted to the Senate as a law in the next few weeks. The agreement containing the new system may be read on the CPC website.

The curriculum has a national character. It is heavily centralised and operates with a degree of flexibility as far as private schools are concerned.

This flexibility is also imposed on pedagogical duties, establishing certain general features relating to objectives, plans and programmes, and handing power over to educational establishments.

Throughout this process, the state's role in education has become reduced solely to funding basic and middle education (about 93% of pupils), formally ensuring that supporters' requirements to access subsidies are met, and measuring the quality of education; its role of guiding and supervising pedagogical-technical matters has been significantly reduced.

However, the worst feature is that the educational reform being imposed on Chileans is still changing the fundamental objective that education once had: it used to be the formation of a rounded, balanced human being (a citizen), but is now the formation of a simple functional human resource in production and skill (a consumer). The conception of a teacher as nothing but the performer and instrument employed in realising these aims has therefore been strengthened.

National systems for assessing the quality of education, such as the *Sistema Nacional de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación*, SIMCE have been drawn up in a manner consistent with these ideas. Many people, particularly in CPC, believe that they substantially reduce the concept of educational quality and constitute a key factor in regulating education in the labour markets.

The SIMCE measures whether certain (easily measurable and standardisable) learning objectives in certain specific areas have been achieved. A second, and much more serious, feature involves the way in which the results are disseminated and used as a way of publicly ranking institutions in the market. These selfsame schools – and a majority of public, municipal schools – are therefore stigmatised: the very institutions that do not discriminate and take all school-age children. The way results are disseminated is also increasingly urging schools to select, and discriminate against, pupils in order to allow the best schools to enjoy a better image and more effectively compete in the education system.

The dictatorship left nothing to chance, and the model was backed by the Political Constitution of Chile in 1980 and by the Constitutional Organic Law on Education (*Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza, LOCE*), which came into force in the early 1990s, only days before the first concertation government took power under President Patricio Aylwin.

Since then, in line with the LOCE, concertation governments have drawn up a curriculum framework known as the Mandatory Fundamental Objectives and Minimum Lesson Content (*Objetivos Fundamentales y Contenidos Mínimos Obligatorios, OFCMO*). The OFCMOs were designed to govern all schools in the country from pre-school establishments and basic schools to both types of middle school (scientific-humanist and vocational-technical); alongside it, in 1997, as a particular concertation government policy aimed at raising the quality and equity of education, they implemented the full school day.

It is important to make clear from the outset that the OFCMOs were drawn up and voted on without any real involvement on the part of teachers, and that an attempt was made to implement

them by offering teachers extended further training: this was put out for tender on the market, the quality varied, and it was of very short duration, so much so that for many years now, since 1996, it has been extremely difficult for teachers to make it work for them and use it effectively on pupils in schools.

This curricular framework was put together on the basis of the design of the subsidiary state (i.e. a state policy that sees education as mainly regulated by the market, and students as human resources forming part of an economic mechanism). Educational quality is determined in different ways for different sectors: plans and programmes for the ruling and entrepreneurial élite, different plans and programmes for middle managers and technicians, and again different plans and programmes for blue-collar workers and peasants.

One way and another, we are talking about a curricular idea linked to the learning of subjects that enable learners to enter the labour market and which ignores other subjects related to a broader form of social formation. This is how the education system's ethical, democratising bias has been lost.

A good illustration is to be found in the curricular offer for middle schools: philosophy is not taught in industrial high schools, but physical education is compulsory. In other words, a rounded education for some, a depleted form of education for the rest.

However, the most serious concern is that the proposed margins of curricular flexibility and the liberalisation of times, plans and programmes is threatening the way the system – and therefore the national unitary character of the education process – hangs together: this had previously been always seen as cautious, and as the transmitter of the traditions and the very values of our identity as a nation. In other words, it undermines one of the basic tenets of the national education system.

Practical evidence comes in the form of the acceptance of discrimination in favour of schools with better resources, while establishments that cannot generate curricular projects requiring the installation of laboratories and high-cost infrastructures are left to flounder.

At the same time, the Ministry of Education is planning to develop institutional educational development projects (*Proyectos de Desarrollo Educativo Institucional, PDEIs*) in schools – schools, that is to say, that respond to the process of decentralisation and curricular autonomy, and which, to quote from the 1997 National Education Congress, ‘given the unequal resources available to local authorities and supporters, are likely to deepen the cultural and social divide’³⁷.

In practice, by establishing mandatory lesson contents and minimum objectives (OFCMOs) within the national curriculum, the Ministry of Education retains control over curriculum design and, particularly in schools that have better human, material and technological resources, will enrich it and complement it when levels of flexibility permit.

As for the full school day, it is objectively essential, if our system is to move forward, to provide higher quality and higher equity education. In fact, private fee-paying schools, which do provide quality education, have mostly been on a full school day for many years. That is also true of

³⁷ First National Education Congress (October 1997), Colegio de Profesores (CPC).

many of our public high schools. The need to broaden the coverage and the growing lack of investment in infrastructure during the decade of the military government meant that the use of premises has had to be doubled, or even trebled, thereby cutting back on the school day.

The implementation and development of the full school day was described as essential by CPC, following a government initiative that eventually grew into the Extended Day Act.

However, instead of being an important advance, the Extended Day Act as it stood was eventually weakened, and has sometimes had to underpin the fragmentation and stratification of the education system³⁸.

Features that contradict its final objectives are associated with the fact that it is non-mandatory, because some schools that demonstrate high quality (whatever that means) can choose not to adopt the extended day scheme³⁹. The first and second years of basic school are not mandatory either⁴⁰.

The project also gives public money under the same rules to both the municipal sector and the private sector, and not only gives the latter bigger subsidies for operating the complete day without exerting any control over its use, but also, for the first time in the history of our country, allocates public money for the scheme's infrastructure and maintenance, and in this way deepens the policies of privatisation.

The mechanisms for incorporating schools into the extended day via project competitions also mean that schools with smaller economic and technical resources are not able to draw up projects; this has resulted in many of them not signing up for the full school day (JEC) because the Ministry of Education does not yet have a policy that focuses on supporting these schools in the first place.

As for these infrastructural requirements, no serious study has been made of real needs because nobody has realised that constructing more classrooms means a huge amount of work, increasing the size of recreation areas, and putting up the gymnasiums, laboratories and other buildings needed to house the larger number of students than attend on a single day. Nor has there been a study to determine how many schools need to buy extra land if they cannot expand on the premises they currently occupy.

And nor has any thought been given to drawing up a comprehensive policy for feeding schoolchildren. The fact that lunch is given by the National Committee for Educational Support and Grants (*Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar y Becas, JUNAEB*) to all pupils in schools with a

³⁸ Lawmakers drafted this law without listening to the views of teachers or of the education community in general. Instead, they listened to the private sector and to entrepreneurs.

³⁹ Educational establishments have a duty to offer a complete school day in order to ensure equal educational conditions for all Chilean children and young people, and thereby maintain the National System of Education.

⁴⁰ CPC argues for a complete school day in all types of education and, quite rightly, does not exclude the sectors that are more vulnerable and need it most: the youngest children need most attention for their cognitive and for social development. It also allows women who need to work to do so, and to be able to relax knowing that their children are at school.

special needs index of over 50% has led to enormous economic difficulties, and created food and discrimination problems for many families in other schools.

No allowance has been made for what it means when a group of teachers try to work in a single school. Increasing the number of hours in the school day is not just a matter of resources: the overwhelming majority of teachers have two jobs, and working for just one school means a pay rise that actually improves teachers' working conditions and makes a single job possible in practical terms. There is also a need to look at the time required to create conditions of creativity and innovation: the extended day must not mean more of the same. Objectively speaking, the two hours referred to in the law are totally inadequate.

As official Ministry of Education documents make clear, the main aim of the JEC was to use teaching and learning time 'in new, different and better ways', and this was supposed to mean enough time for both teachers and learners. As far as teachers were concerned, the JEC was supposed to give them time outside their teaching hours to 'provide teaching that is focused on pupils' work and sensitive to individual differences'. The problem has not yet been solved.

All this has resulted in a law before the parliament that both alters the deadline for schools to sign up to the JEC, and contains changes that will help overcome problems that have not yet been addressed.

IX. SCHOOL OUTPUT

As we have already described, the quality of education⁴¹ in Chile is measured by the National Education Quality Measurement System (*Sistema Nacional de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación, SIMCE*). This test is set nationally every year for all pupils in the 4th year of basic education, and alternately for the 8th year of basic, and the 2nd year of middle, education. The system is designed and administered by the Ministry of Education's Curriculum and Evaluation Department.

According to the Ministry, 'the outcomes of the test are limited to measuring learning achievements. The indicators generated by it trigger a huge block of initiatives (flowing from a variety of actors including teachers and head teachers, parents and guardians, the Ministry of Education and researchers) aimed at improving the quality of education.' On this point, CPC's Final Report for 1997 states that neither 'the SIMCE nor the *Prueba de Aptitud Académica, PAA*⁴² is a valid or effective instrument because all pupils are being assessed using the same parameters, and no account is taken of individual differences or of the different socio-economic settings where schools are located.' The SIMCE, it adds, 'does not measure relevant abilities: in Chile, for example, the ability to live through the culture of poverty is as important for one social sector, and for the country's survival and equilibrium, as many of the skills, areas of knowledge and experiences measured by the SIMCE, if not more so.'

⁴¹ Based on the concept of the 'quality of education' used by Ministry staff.

⁴² The university entrance test.

However, a public statement in the National Directory of CPC dated 24 April 2003 says that ‘we repeat that the SIMCE results do not predict that the quality of education will improve or deteriorate. SIMCE results only provide us with incomplete – and measurable – data on some pupils’ learning. It would be absurd to think that the quality of education can be measured on the basis of national standardised tests that do not highlight the diversity, heterogeneity and meaning of subjects learned, yet that is precisely what the government’s own Reform proposes to do... Quality of education is a concept that addresses much more than the academic achievement of certain basic skills and competences.’

Some SIMCE results

In this section, we analyse the SIMCE 2002 results. The test was given to 274,864 pupils in the 4th year of basic education in 6,145 schools⁴³.

The Ministry of Education groups schools according to pupils’ predominant socio-economic characteristics, and takes account of mothers’ and fathers’ average years of schooling, family income and the school’s Special Educational Needs Index (Annex 20).

Analysis of points per socio-economic group shows that the higher the socio-economic level of the pupils at the school, the better the average results. These variations are similar in all of the sub-sectors assessed (Annex 21).

It must be remembered that the averages for each group represent a summary of the scores for a large number of schools that may have achieved very different results from one another. The maximum and minimum scores obtained by each group vary considerably, and the averages illustrate this.

The only group that registered a significant variation compared with 1999 was the low group⁴⁴, which accounts for 10% of pupils in the country and whose results in mathematics fell by 7 points. **It is important to note that 85% of schools in this group are located in rural areas** (Annex 22).

Both municipal and subsidised private schools registered significant falls in scores for mathematics and environmental studies in the middle-high group. (Annex 23).

A detailed analysis of the results easily enables us to conclude that municipal or public education has better results than subsidised and private schools in the three sub-sectors assessed. This applies to schools that cater for the low and middle-low socio-economic groups. On average, municipal schools in the low group are 13 points ahead of subsidised schools in language and communications and in mathematics, and 11 points ahead in environmental studies. Subsidised private schools in the middle-low group are on average 2 points behind municipal schools in language and communications and in mathematics, and on average 1 point behind in environmental studies. It should be remembered that the low and middle-low socio-economic

⁴³ The texts and tables that have been extracted and summarised come from the official Ministry of Education version.

⁴⁴ The fall in subsidised private school is more significant. Variations in the scores only refer to the schools that took part in the 1999 and 2002 tests.

groups account for 42% of pupils assessed, that a large percentage live in the countryside, and that many of them have Special Educational Needs Indexes ranging between 66% and 43%.

In the middle socio-economic group, which accounts for 37% of pupils in the country, the average subsidised private school is 7-10 points above that of municipal schools. However, if we look at the results achieved by public (i.e. municipal) schools in the middle-high group, the difference between them and private schools (an average of 5-7 points) in the three sub-sectors is not substantial. The gap in the high socio-economic group – with subsidised and private schools outshining municipal schools – is greater. This means that the results are linked to the families' socio-economic levels. On this subject, Pablo González⁴⁵ says that 'when assessments of academic achievement exist, a comparison of crude results usually favours the private fee-paying system. However, if the comparison is weighted by characteristics of the students' families (e.g. the socio-economic level, cultural and social capital, and the educational climate in the home), the effect is considerably reduced, or else disappears.' The case we are examining has different connotations that suggest that the public (or municipal) sector is the most effective in the system as a whole (Annex 24).

X. PRIVATISATION AND INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

Children's and young people's familiarity with computers and the Internet from basic school onwards forms part of the academic offer with which schools sweeten the incentives they give parents to persuade them to send them their children. However, the Chilean government also offers resources and support mechanisms for teaching and learning processes (e.g. through the 'Red Enlaces' (Links Network)).

This educational informatics network is part of the Education Quality Improvement Programme. The project includes the creation and maintenance of the network and the provision of software, teacher training and ongoing assessment. Universities accredited by the Ministry of Education operate as zonal centres, and are responsible for managing the traffic, incorporating schools into the network, training teachers, assessing projects, and evaluating and developing education software. The network has education software known as 'La Plaza'. 'La Plaza' is made up of numerous components: its pedagogical usefulness is not defined in advance and use of the software is determined by teachers. 'La Plaza' environments include the Kiosk, the Cultural Centre, electronic mail and the Museum.

The teacher training programme has been designed to accompany the education centre for two years, and teachers are expected to continue with their work on computers alone after school⁴⁶.

On this subject, '*Informe Capital Humano en Chile*'⁴⁷ describes how a significant amount of work has been done in Chile to familiarise children with using computers and the Internet. The

⁴⁵ Pablo González, '*Lecciones de la investigación económica sobre el rol del sector privado en educación*', Centre of Applied Economics, Department of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Physical Sciences and Mathematics, University of Chile, and UNICEF.

⁴⁶ '*Balance de los 20 años del Proyecto Principal de Educación en América Latina y el Caribe*', UNESCO, Santiago de Chile, 2001, p 116.

⁴⁷ '*Informe Capital Humano en Chile*', José J Brunner and Gregory Elacqua, p 111.

table in Annex 23 shows the situation in Chile compared with other countries in the world that have developed along the same lines.

However, there is no systematic assessment of how these tools are used in schools. In practice, there are still serious shortcomings in the way schools can support the functioning of systems because of the amount of money that such items as telephone bills and maintenance cost. And nor are we aware of studies dealing with the use and impact on the processes of teaching and learning.

In addition to setting up technological and informatics networks, the government has provided local authorities and middle schools with libraries to be used by both pupils and teachers.

XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Current educational policies in Chile have been pursued during the last ten years by concertation governments (coalitions of political parties: Christian Democrats, Socialists, Radicals and the Party for Democracy), and have not fundamentally changed the policies put in place by the military government.

Pinochet privatised everything. At the same time, since it was a key issue in any neo-liberal policy, he also re-defined the role of the state, changing it from a benefactor state to one that was subsidiary to educational demand. He ended up demolishing what had been built up over two centuries: a state that guaranteed the right to education, and put together a single system that was the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, which in turn drew up national policies from pre-school to higher education, and provided the funding for teachers to be paid according to a pre-established scale, for the construction and maintenance of school infrastructures, and for pupil support through grants and school breakfasts and lunches.

This process developed, together with its particular characteristics, through the two linked axes of privatisation and municipalisation: on the one hand, responsibility for managing the schools and high schools that came directly under the Ministry of Education was passed to Chile's 340+ local authorities; on the other hand, private education was encouraged, and public funds and financial, administrative and pedagogical tasks were transferred to these private bodies. Both the mechanisms of state funding and teachers' contractual conditions of employment were assimilated into those of the private sector.

The processes of privatisation were even more radical in higher education, forcing self-funding policies on state universities, thereby putting an end to free higher education.

In short, during the years of the military dictatorship, market and competitiveness logics were introduced into the management and funding of education, thereby reducing state investment to sums significantly lower than historical levels, and at the same time radically changing the funding system through a subsidy that the state gives schools – both municipal schools and establishments managed by private bodies and entrepreneurs (known euphemistically in Chile as 'education supporters') – for every pupil.

The process of Chilean education reform that got under way in the 1990s was organised in the light of the dictatorship's policies around a system that was still legally, and even constitutionally,

restricted. This meant that to stimulate any changes, it was necessary to push through large amounts of new legislation.

Since 1990, concertation governments have sought to grapple with the serious issues of quality and equity that had emerged during the years of the dictatorship, and have been putting together what has been called the ‘Chilean education reform’, much of which has been exported to many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Current educational policies are characterised by two contradictory logics: first, maintaining the neo-liberal educational model, which underscores and deepens the privatisation of education, and increasingly weakens public education; and secondly, the intention to promote measures and programmes designed to help the quality and equity of education to be improved.

Against this backdrop, the main policies impacting on the framework of the reform are as follows:

a) Teaching

In order to guarantee that the country will be able to enter international markets, the emphasis on the market shapes the education of pupils as basically economic actors, and more extensive learning of competitiveness as a principle of education.

At the same time, the Ministry has allocated significant resources to programmes (they are administered by the Ministry itself, or under the terms of agreements with public and private schools) designed to improve the quality and equity of education; the aim is to foster processes of pedagogical decentralisation and the focusing of quality on more marginal sectors, that is to say in municipal schools and subsidised private schools, although in the latter, there is no control whatsoever over the way the resources are used.

It is argued that the aim of these programmes and curricular proposals is to encourage the quality of education insofar as they enable educational institutions to attain levels of autonomy by drawing up their own curricular ideas, according to their own educational project, with a view to meeting the pupils’ learning needs in line with specific features of the various educational communities. The high levels of flexibility given to each school, together with the range of special programmes that all schools have to develop, has caused the system to fragment and stratify considerably.

Paradoxically, the state has set up a national system for measuring education quality, the SIMCE. This single tool – it can presumably only take account of success in subjects that can be measured and standardised – is applied to all schools and high schools in the country. The SIMCE’s final objective is to rank the country’s schools in the education market and to stigmatise municipal education which, since it does not discriminate, accepts all pupils, caters for pupils with the greatest special educational needs, and obviously, year after year, achieves lower results than the subsidised private sector, which works with Middle and High groups.

b) Education funding

A series of problems has arisen – objectively speaking, as a result of funding policies. Some of these problems are linked to the fact that the current funding system fails to understand the

real funding that education needs in order to achieve effectiveness and quality. Money has been invested over the last few years, but it is still not enough (among other reasons) in terms of teachers' contractual hours, pay, and the need for further training, infrastructure, equipment and teaching materials.

However, the problem is not just that resources are scarce; there is also the issue of how they are allocated. The mechanism for funding schools via pupils' average attendance subsidies has meant that, insofar as the law on subsidies does not regulate how they should be used, large sums of state funds are used by subsidised private schools for profit-making purposes. This mechanism similarly does not grasp the schools' real needs because most monthly outgoings are determined by fixed expenditure, and the subsidy is a variable income.

The incorporation of shared funding (the family contribution added to local sums of money handed over via subsidies) throughout subsidised private basic and middle education and municipal middle education has led to higher and higher degrees of segmentation and social stratification. The fact that schools set a level of fee, which is obviously associated with the economic options of a group of parents, explains the existence of differing qualities of education based on socio-economic strata: this accordingly undermines the historic role that our public education system has played in the processes of social integration. Worse still, there are no mechanisms to monitor the resources employed to improve the quality of education.

c) The teaching profession

Although the Teachers' Statute partly devolved the status of civil servant to teachers working in municipal schools in the sense that it provided them with national-level statutory and salary-related standards, it does not favour teachers in the subsidised private sector, who now account for 40% of the total; nor does it favour those who only have their single salary guaranteed by the law, and who have to negotiate the remainder of their conditions of employment collectively in each school, despite the fact, as I have already pointed out, that the subsidised sector receives the same resources as municipal schools, in addition to the family contribution.

Although teachers' salaries have risen thanks to a series of increases awarded by concertation governments, this was not done in recognition of a deteriorating situation that had to be abolished, but it did lead to major mobilisations by teachers. Nonetheless, their salaries are still 54% below what teachers with similar workloads earned in 1972. It should also be remembered that, as a result of the various programmes initiated under the reform, teachers now have more tasks to perform and more demands on their time: these jobs have to be done on top of their normal duties, and everything has to be completed in the same working time.

Shortcomings in the education system have also been exacerbated in recent years because, like the rest of the system, universities and training institutions are now centrally regulated by the market. There is a wide range of quality. The same is true of available further training programmes. Moreover, teachers have had no real involvement in policy design; by contrast, entrepreneurs and the Catholic Church wield enormous influence.

At all events, leaving to one side the basis for the current decentralisation process and the political educational policies on which the concertation government education reform has been based, the forms and conditions of the way they are being applied are failing to ensure democratisation of the education system and quality public education for all Chileans.

We would like to emphasise that unlike what has happened in other countries, where public education is defended in the face of plans to privatise, in Chile, after the entire system was privatised, mobilisations by unionised teachers in the last few years have helped to shape a doubly complex task.

On the one hand, we need to be aware, in a country seriously damaged not only by the dictatorship, but also by the neo-liberal ideology permeating it, of the need to bring about structural and fundamental change. This means recovering a national awareness of what public education is, because it caters for all: it can create the conditions for building democratic societies by teaching people to experience living with other people and plurality.

On the other hand, while it has not been possible to achieve fundamental change, it is still right to try and effect change within the model in order to make it fairer. This will come about by stopping the state developing and expanding subsidised private education, through the need, with due regard for quality, to monitor and regulate the enormous resources that the state pours in without monitoring the private system in any way, and by installing more democratic and participative management in an education system that continues with authoritarian practices at all levels.

Out of a total of 130,000 teachers in the country as a whole, 110,000 have voluntarily joined CPC. Colegio has taken up the challenge of attempting to transform the current situation, and acknowledges that teachers must play a fully active role in defending public education and building a democratic education system.

In this context, and in addition to its work involved in lodging trade union claims, CPC has been conducting research into teaching. This work involves not only criticising the current model and many of the proposals for education that are being generated at the present time, but also drafting proposals. To this end, it has established the Pedagogical Movement, which, during the last three years, and not without difficulty, has set up standing working groups of teachers all over the country: they engage in critical reflection on the current situation in education and on teaching issues, such as the development not only of draft policies but also of substantive changes in their schools and teaching practices.

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ANNEXES

Annex 1

HISTORICAL LIST OF SCHOOLS BY TYPE OF FUNDING, 1980-2000

Year	Total schools	%	Local	%	Municipal	%	Subsidised private	%	Fee-paying private	%	Corporations	%
1980	8,799	100%	6,370	72%	0	0%	1,627	18%	802	9%	0	0.00%
1985	9,811	100%	808	8%	5,668	58%	2,643	27%	668	7%	24	0.24%
1988	9,743	100%	0	0%	6,308	65%	2,663	27%	698	7%	74	0.76%
1990	9,814	100%	0	0%	6,288	64%	2,694	27%	759	8%	73	0.74%
1991	9,822	100%	0	0%	6,274	64%	2,689	27%	786	8%	73	0.74%
1992	9,773	100%	0	0%	6,269	64%	2,650	27%	784	8%	70	0.72%
1993	9,808	100%	0	0%	6,252	64%	2,654	27%	832	8%	70	0.71%
1994	9,788	100%	0	0%	6,221	64%	2,637	27%	860	9%	70	0.72%
1995	10,372	100%	0	0%	6,422	62%	2,822	27%	1,058	10%	70	0.67%
1996	10,768	100%	0	0%	6,536	61%	2,996	28%	1,166	11%	70	0.65%
1997	10,470	100%	0	0%	6,351	61%	2,921	28%	1,128	11%	70	0.67%
1998	10,621	100%	0	0%	6,327	60%	3,065	29%	1,159	11%	70	0.66%
1999	10,705	100%	0	0%	6,290	59%	3,170	30%	1,175	11%	70	0.65%
2000	10,605	100%	0	0%	6,250	59%	3,217	30%	1,068	10%	70	0.66%

Source: División de Planificación y Presupuesto

Annex 2

NUMBERS OF TEACHERS AND SCHOOLS BY TYPE OF FUNDING, NATIONAL TOTALS, 1998-2000 (INCLUDING PROJECTION FOR 2002)

	SCHOOL			TEACHERS			
	1998	2000	Annual variation 98-00 %	1998	2000	2002	Annual variation 98-00 %
Total	10,621	10,605	- 0.1	134,885	144,377	155,064	3.5
Municipal	6,327	6,250	- 0.6	78,744	80,597	82,494	1.2
Subsidised private	3,062	3,217	2.5	36,084	41,053	46,706	6.7
Corporations	73	70	- 2.1	2,539	2,379	2,229	- 3.2
Private fee-paying	1,159	1,068	- 4.0	17,418	20,348	23,635	7.8

Source: Compendio de Información Estadística, Ministry of Education.

Values for 2002 projected at 98-00. Hours in subsidised schools: data provided by María Isabel Valladares, Ministry of Education, Sept. 2002. Quoted by CENDA.

Annex 3

BACKGROUND STATISTICS: WHOLE COUNTRY BY TYPE OF FUNDING, 1998-2000

HOURS

ENROLMENTS

	1998	2000	2002	Annual Variation		2000	2002	Annual variation 98-00
	#	#	#	98-00 %	1998 #	#	#	%
TOTAL	4,822,513	5,214,967	5,696,729	4.0%	3,337,976	3,508,509	3,692,864	2.5%
MUNICIPAL	2,726,849	2,815,810	3,041,995	1.6%	1,840,184	1,884,320	1,929,515	1.2%
SUBSIDISED PRIVATE CORPORATIONS	1,391,478	1,590,111	1,720,420	6.9%	1,138,080	1,256,116	1,386,394	5.1%
PRIVATE FEE-PAYING	93,172	87,360	81,911	-3.2%	50,334	55,265	60,909	4.8%
	611,014	721,686	852,404	8.7%	309,378	312,808	316,276	0.6%

Source: Compendio de información Estadística, Ministry of Education. Values for 2002 projected at 98-00;

Source: María Isabel Valladares, Ministry of Education, Sept. 2002.

Annex 4

**BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
ENROLMENTS WHOLE COUNTRY BY TYPE OF FUNDING, 2000**

YEAR	TOTAL	%	LOCAL	%	MUNI- CIPAL	%	SUBSID- ISED PRIVATE	%	FEE- PAYING PRIVATE	%	CORPOR- ATIONS	%
1981	2,841,726	100%	2,215,973	78%			430,232	15%	195,521	7%		
1982	2,819,139		425,518	15%	1,695,038	60%	553,600	20%	144,983	5%		
1983	2,869,435	100%	369,189	13%	1,672,593	58%	643,868	22%	183,785	6%		
1984	2,886,552	100%	341,994	12%	1,626,968	56%	758,842	26%	158,748	5%		
1985	2,963,410	100%	331,110	11%	1,605,185	54%	832,455	28%	194,660	7%		
1986	2,967,864	100%	316,594	11%	1,555,059	52%	913,925	31%	182,286	6%		
1987	2,962,755	100%			1,797,953	61%	910,968	31%	196,200	7%	57,634	2%
1988	2,989,032	100%			1,781,413	60%	939,445	31%	209,758	7%	58,416	2%
1989	2,976,011	100%			1,745,598	59%	954,642	32%	217,737	7%	58,034	2%
1990	2,963,139	100%			1,717,222	58%	960,460	32%	228,205	8%	57,252	2%
1991	2,938,720	100%			1,698,842	58%	949,038	32%	234,442	8%	56,398	2%
1992	2,983,383	100%			1,721,375	58%	963,061	32%	245,585	8%	53,362	2%
1993	3,007,628	100%			1,725,620	57%	973,515	32%	256,700	9%	51,793	2%
1994	3,047,572	100%			1,746,235	57%	985,854	32%	264,625	9%	50,868	2%
1995	3,111,727	100%			1,777,750	57%	1,005,131	32%	282,659	9%	46,187	2%
1996	3,270,614	100%			1,828,022	56%	1,080,412	33%	309,468	9%	52,712	2%
1997	3,306,154	100%			1,839,124	56%	1,104,650	33%	311,483	9%	50,897	2%
1998	3,337,976	100%			1,840,184	55%	1,138,080	34%	309,378	9%	50,334	2%
1999	3,429,927	100%			1,866,991	54%	1,202,327	34%	306,591	9%	54,018	2%
2000	3,508,509	100%			1,884,320	54%	1,256,116	36%	312,808	9%	55,265	2%

Source: Compendio de Información Estadística, Planning and Budget Division, Ministry of Education, 2000.

ANNEX 5

ENROLMENTS BY TYPE OF FUNDING, 2000. NATIONAL TOTALS.

	Municipal	Subsidised private	Fee-paying private	Corporations	TOTAL
Nursery	132,677	97,102	47,582	0	277,361
Special	17,597	34,930	81	0	52,608
Basic	1,331,207	839,586	184,561	240	2,355,594
Middle (scientific-humanist)	233,828	141,483	80,034	901	456,246
Middle (vocational-technical)	169,011	143,015	550	54,124	366,700
Total	1,884,420	1,256,116	312,808	55,265	3,508,509
	53.7%	35.8%	8.9%	1.6%	100%

Municipal = 53.7%
Subsidised private + fee-paying private + corporations = 46.3%

Source: Compendio de Información Estadística, Ministry of Education, 2000.

Annex 6

PUPILS IN BASIC EDUCATION BY TYPE OF SCHOOL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP, 2000

Decile	Funding				Average family independent income	Value in dollars
	Municipal	Subsidised private	Fee-paying private	Total		
I	22.1	10.6	1.1	16.4	56.312	93.86
II	21.1	12.1	1.4	16.3	129.596	215.99
III	16.3	13.2	1.4	14.0	181.122	301.87
IV	11.9	10.5	1.8	10.6	220.614	367.69
V	9.5	13.4	3.8	10.5	280.087	466.81
VI	6.8	11.7	3.8	8.3	325.447	542.41
VII	5.2	9.3	3.9	6.5	389.452	649.08
VIII	3.8	9.4	13.4	6.5	521.078	868.46
LX	2.2	6.9	23.1	5.5	751.189	1251.98
X	1.1	3.0	46.4	5.3	2.091.133	3485.22
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	494.576	824.29

Source: Mideplan, 2000. Values have been updated to dollars/base-year 2002.

Annex 7

**NUMBERS OF SCHOOLS AND ENROLMENTS BY TYPE OF FUNDING
AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREA**

Funding	Urban		Rural		TOTAL ENROL- MENTS	TOTAL N° OF SCHOOLS
	Enrolments	N° of schools	Enrolments	N° of schools		
Municipal	1,571,278	2,385	313,042	3865	1,884,320	6,250
Subsidised	1,186,410	2,378	69,706	839	1,256,116	3,217
private						
Private fee- paying	308,830	1,050	3,978	18	312,808	1,068
Corporations	52,560	60	2,705	10	55,265	70
TOTALS	3,119,078	5,873	389,431	4,732	3,508,509	10,605

Source: Compendio de Información Estadística 2002, Ministry of Education.

Annex 8

**Table No 4: SCHOOL ENROLMENTS IN THE METROPOLITAN REGION
BY LOCAL AUTHORITY, 2000**

This table contains a ranking that we have drawn up ourselves. It may have been drafted in a somewhat arbitrary manner, but it nonetheless demonstrates the focus in education offer on the private sector.

LOCAL AUTHORITY	TOTAL	MUNI CIPAL	%	SUBSI DISED PRIVA TE	%	FEE-PAY ING PRIVA TE	%	CORP. OF DELEGA TED ADMIN ISTRATION	%	% TOTAL
LAS CONDES	47,916	5,424	11.32%	4,111	8.58%	38,381	80.10%	0	0%	88.68%
VITACURA	21,413	3,554	16.60%	0	0%	17,859	83.40%	0	0%	83.40%
LA CISTERNA	43,971	7,433	16.90%	33,064	75.20%	2,606	5.93%	868	1.97%	83.10%
INDEPENDENCIA	29,382	5,080	17.29%	23,266	79.18%	1,036	3.53%	0	0.00%	82.71%
SAN MIGUEL	34,634	6,538	18.88%	21,413	61.83%	3,500	10.11%	3,183	9.19%	81.12%
LA REINA	26,728	6,798	25.43%	6,346	23.74%	13,584	50.82%	0	0.00%	74.57%
LA FLORIDA	92,987	24,303	26.14%	56,561	60.83%	12,123	13.04%	0	0.00%	73.86%
MAIPU	87,201	23,379	26.81%	57,265	65.67%	5,989	6.87%	568	0.65%	73.19%
LO BARNECHEA	13,337	3,592	26.93%	3,240	24.29%	6,505	48.77%	0	0.00%	73.07%
ÑUÑO A	45,101	13,223	29.32%	13,016	28.86%	14,531	32.22%	4,331	9.60%	70.68%
RECOLETA	37,814	11,969	31.65%	20,085	53.12%	2,432	6.43%	3,328	8.80%	68.35%
SAN JOAQUIN	18,695	5,925	31.69%	11,222	60.03%	48	0.26%	1,500	8.02%	68.31%
HUECHURABA	12,686	4,083	32.19%	8,392	66.15%	211	1.66%	0	0.00%	67.81%
PROVIDENCIA	36,031	11,960	33.19%	3,746	10.40%	20,325	56.41%	0	0.00%	66.81%
PUENTE ALTO	88,974	29,869	33.57%	55,434	62.30%	3,671	4.13%	0	0.00%	66.43%
PADRE HURTADO	7,654	2,731	35.68%	4,849	63.35%	74	0.97%	0	0.00%	64.32%
CERRILLOS	17,952	6,686	37.24%	10,961	61.06%	305	1.70%	0	0.00%	62.76%
P. AGUIRRE C.	20,253	7,929	39.15%	11,054	54.58%	186	0.92%	1,084	5.35%	60.85%
LA PINTANA	37,359	14,655	39.23%	22,704	60.77%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	60.77%
LA GRANJA	27,248	10,763	39.50%	16,485	60.50%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	60.50%
MACUL	21,444	8,511	39.69%	9,568	44.62%	3,365	15.69%	0	0.00%	60.31%
EL BOSQUE	42,531	17,020	40.02%	23,339	54.88%	2,172	5.11%	0	0.00%	59.98%
TALAGANTE	18,592	7,603	40.89%	8,341	44.86%	2,648	14.24%	0	0.00%	59.11%
PEÑALOLEN	32,575	13,521	41.51%	13,969	42.88%	5,085	15.61%	0	0.00%	58.49%
PUDAHUEL	29,083	12,114	41.65%	15,067	51.81%	1,902	6.54%	0	0.00%	58.35%
SAN RAMON	20,667	8,670	41.95%	11,061	53.52%	0	0.00%	936	4.53%	58.05%
RENCA	24,496	10,362	42.30%	13,266	54.16%	0	0.00%	868	3.54%	57.70%
EST. CENTRAL	28,148	12,152	43.17%	13,465	47.84%	1,672	5.94%	859	3.05%	56.83%
SANTIAGO	94,313	40,872	43.34%	38,440	40.76%	8,639	9.16%	6,362	6.75%	56.66%
COLINA	15,686	7,858	50.10%	6,858	43.72%	970	6.18%	0	0.00%	49.90%
QUILICURA	17,432	8,786	50.40%	8,327	47.77%	319	1.83%	0	0.00%	49.60%
MELIPILLA	24,674	12,604	51.08%	10,236	41.48%	1,834	7.43%	0	0.00%	48.92%
CONCHALI	26,836	13,844	51.59%	12,566	46.83%	426	1.59%	0	0.00%	48.41%

EL MONTE	5,462	2,835	51.90%	2,627	48.10%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	48.10%
QUINTA NORMAL	34,443	18,390	53.39%	13,173	38.25%	669	1.94%	2,211	6.42%	46.61%
PEÑAFLORES	14,417	8,179	56.73%	5,950	41.27%	288	2.00%	0	0.00%	43.27%
CERRO NAVIA	23,030	13,879	60.26%	9,151	39.74%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	39.74%
SAN BERNARDO	49,465	30,022	60.69%	14,720	29.76%	3,332	6.74%	1,391	2.81%	39.31%
LO ESPEJO	17,797	11,044	62.06%	6,738	37.86%	15	0.08%	0	0.00%	37.94%
LO PRADO	16,904	11,268	66.66%	5,348	31.64%	288	1.70%	0	0.00%	33.34%
BUIN	17,073	12,220	71.58%	3,499	20.49%	1,354	7.93%	0	0.00%	28.42%
CURACAVI	5,239	3,835	73.20%	1,339	25.56%	65	1.24%	0	0.00%	26.80%
SAN J. DE MAIPO	2,710	2,058	75.94%	554	20.44%	98	3.62%	0	0.00%	24.06%
ISLA DE MAIPO	5,634	4,372	77.60%	1,232	21.87%	30	0.53%	0	0.00%	22.40%
LAMPA	7,359	5,764	78.33%	1,595	21.67%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	21.67%
PAINE	10,137	8,074	79.65%	1,790	17.66%	273	2.69%	0	0.00%	20.35%
PIRQUE	3,100	2,498	80.58%	238	7.68%	364	11.74%	0	0.00%	19.42%
C. DE TANGO	2,963	2,423	81.78%	341	11.51%	199	6.72%	0	0.00%	18.22%
TIL TIL	3,391	2,911	85.84%	480	14.16%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	14.16%
MARIA PINTO	1,907	1,907	100%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
ALHUE	1,098	1,098	100%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
SAN PEDRO	1,165	1,165	100%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0.00%
TOTALS	1,319,191	518,329		632,381		140,992		27,489		

Source: Compendio de Información Estadística 2002, Ministry of Education.

Table of percentages in descending order of figures for subsidised private and fee-paying private schools and corporations.

Annex 9

DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSIDISED PRIVATE SCHOOLS BY TYPE OF SUPPORTER

	N° of schools	%	Enrolments	%
Religious	812	26.6	454,790	35.6
Social	163	5.2	75,787	5.9
Private	2,121	68.6	747,107	58.5
Total	3,094		1,277,684	

Source: Figures compiled by Dr Claudio Almonacid using the Ministry of Education's School Subsidy Database 2001.

Annex 10

DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPORTERS LINKED TO RELIGIOUS GROUPS

	N° of schools	%	Enrolments	%
Catholic Church	674	82.9	399,462	87.8
Evangelical churches	134	16.5	54,159	11.9
Other churches	4	0.6	1,147	0.3
Total	812	100	454,768	100

Source: Figures compiled by Dr Claudio Almonacid using the Ministry of Education's School Subsidy Database 2001

Annex 11

NUMBER OF SCHOOLS RUN BY 'SOCIAL SUPPORTERS'

	N° of schools	%		N° of schools	%
Charitable bodies	90	55.2	Mapuche	3	1.8
Foundations	33	20.2	Trade unions	3	1.8
Entrepreneurs	22	13.5	Colonies	3	1.8
NGOs	5	3.1	Sports	1	0.6
Universities	3	1.8			
Total	163	100			

Source: Figures compiled by Dr Claudio Almonacid using the Ministry of Education's School Subsidy Database 2001.

Annex 12

NUMBERS OF SCHOOLS BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA AND 'PRIVATE SUPPORTER' ENROLMENTS

	Urban		Rural		Total	
	N° of schools	Enrolments	N° of schools	Enrolments	N° of schools	Enrolments
Private	973	361,121	569	30,979	1,542	392,100
Companies	510	245,639	24	3,217	534	248,856
Total	1,527	710,247	594	36,860	2,121	640,956

Source: Figures compiled by Dr Claudio Almonacid using the Ministry of Education's School Subsidy Database 2001.

Annex 13

NUMBERS OF SUBSIDISED PRIVATE SCHOOLS BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION

National total

Level of education	Type of supporter			Total
	Religious	Social	Private	
Nursery education	418	16	926	1,478
Basic education	490	19	1,053	1,703
Middle education (scientific-humanist)	192	7	293	545
Middle education (vocational-technical)	137	11	147	307
Special education	12	7	57	84
Total	1,249	60	2,476	4,117

Source: Figures compiled by Dr Claudio Almonacid using the Ministry of Education's School Subsidy Database 2001.

Annex 14

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENROLMENTS AND NUMBERS OF SCHOOLS AND
NUMBERS OF COURSES BY TYPE OF FUNDING**

Numbers of courses – enrolment volume – number of pupils per course

	TOTAL ENROLMENTS: 3,508,509				N° OF SCHOOLS: 10,605 N° OF COURSES EDUCATIONAL UNITS: 17,827							
	Muni cipal	Subsid private	Fee-p. priv.	Corp.	Muni cipal	Subs. priv.	Fee-p. priv.	Corp.	Muni cipal	Subs. priv.	Fee-p. priv.	Corp.
Nurse ries	132,677	97,102	47,582	0	2,503	1,601	871	0	4,812	3,236	2,800	0
Special	17,597	34,930	81	0	298	329	2	0	2,023	3,703	10	0
Basic	1,331,207	839,586	184,561	240	5,872	2,543	685	1	37,674	22,370	7,722	10
Middle (sc/ hum)	233,828	141,483	80,034	901	879	677	541	3	6,358	3,844	3,136	22
Middle (voc/tech)	169,011	143,015	550	54,124	541	397	4	81	4,771	3,846	21	1597
TOTAL	1,884,320	1,256,116	312,808	55,265	10,093	5,547	2,103	84	55,638	36,999	13,689	1,629
	53.7%	35.8%	8.9%	1.6%	56.6%	31.1%	11.8%		0.47%			

	ENROLMENTS/ N° OF SCHOOLS (Enrolment volume)				ENROLMENTS/ N° OF SCHOOLS (N° of pupils per course)			
	Munic.	Subs. priv.	Fee priv.	Corp.	Munic.	Subs. Priv.	Fee priv.	Corp.
Nurse ries	53	61	55	0	28	30	17	0
	50	106	41	0	9	9	8	0
	227	330	269	240	35	38	24	24
Middle (S/H)	266	208	148	451	37	37	26	41
Middle (V/T)	312	360	138	668	35	37	26	34
TOTAL	187	226	149	658	34	34	23	34

Source: Censo de Información Estadística Educativa 2000, Ministry of Education, p. 30, 51 & 61.

Annex 15

PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION

	Total expend- iture MINEDUC	Public expend- iture on Educ.	Subven. DL 3166/80	Public expend- iture on basic education	Private expend- iture on education/ GDP	Total expend- iture on education/ GDP	Public expend- iture or total education	Public expend- iture on total education
	*	*.**	*				Social expendit.	Govern. expenditure Central
YEAR	\$	\$	\$	%	%	%	%	%
1990	549,508	589,584	325,882	2.4%	1.4%	3.8%	20.9%	11.9%
1991	588,019	638,479	335,221	2.6%	1.4%	4.0%	21.6%	13.1%
1992	671,515	731,507	372,728	2.7%	1.6%	4.3%	22.5%	13.9%
1993	748,797	824,199	409,147	2.8%	1.7%	4.6%	22.3%	14.1%
1994	803,468	896,295	465,347	2.9%	2.0%	4.8%	23.0%	14.8%
1995	932,286	999,246	565,796	2.9%	2.0%	4.9%	23.9%	15.6%
1996	1,048,534	1,125,790	640,407	3.2%	2.5%	5.7%	24.4%	16.1%
1997	1,177,269	1,244,536	726,985	3.4%	2.3%	5.7%	25.7%	16.9%
1998	1,293,042	1,362,117	782,529	3.7%	2.6%	6.3%	26.2%	17.3%
1999	1,401,351	1,477,174	848,172	4.0%	3.2%	7.2%	26.5%	17.9%
2000	1,516,003	1,604,899	929,705	4.1%	3.3%	7.4%	26.8%	18.4%
2001	1,629,836	1,709,848	982,993	4.4%				18.7%
Increase								
1990-01	196.6%	190.0%	201.6%					
Annual average								
1990-01	10.4%	102.0%	10.6%	1.7%	2.4%			
1990-04	10.0%	11.0%	9.3%					
1994-00	11.2%	10.2%	12.2%					
2000-01	7.5%	6.5	5.7					

* millions of pesos/base-year ** includes Ministry of Education
2000 and municipal contributions

CENDA, Santiago de Chile, 2002

Source: CENDA, Santiago de Chile, 2002.

Annex 16

FULL SCHOOL DAY. SCHOOLS AND ENROLMENTS

	2000		2002	
	N ^a	%	N ^a	%
Total Subsidised Education.	9,467		3,356,731	
Part Day	3,473	36,7%	1,884,320	56.1%
Full School Day	5,994	63,3%	1,095,991	32.7%

Source: Compendio de Información Estadística, Ministry of Education. 2002 values
 María Isabel Valladares, Ministry of Education, September 2002. Quoted by CENDA.

Annex 17

**THE SCHOOL SUBSIDY UNIT (UNIDAD DE SUBVENCIÓN EDUCACIONAL, USE)
AND VALUE BY PUPIL, BY TYPE OF SUBSIDY AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION, 2000**

Level and type of education	Not a Full School Day			Full School Day		
	USE factor	Value in pesos	Value in dollars	USE factor	Value in pesos	Value in dollars
Nursery education (2 nd level transition)	1.5601	16,815,08	28.03			
General basic education (1 st - th)	1.5636	16,852,81	28.09	2.1419	23,085,85	38.48
General basic education (7 th - th)	1.6972	18,292,78	30.49	2.1419	23,085,85	38.48
Special differentiated education	5.1894	55,932,46	93.22	6.5175	70,247,01	117.08
Middle scientific/humanist Education	1.8952	20,426,87	34.04	2.5603	27,595,45	45.99
Middle vocational/technical (agricultural and maritime) education	2.8093	30,279,22	50.47	3.4684	37,383,15	62.31
Middle vocational/technical (industrial) education	2.1913	23,618,30	39.36	2.7052	29,157,23	48.60
Middle vocational/technical (commercial and technical) education	1.9654	21,183,50	35.31	2.5603	27,595,45	45.99
Basic adult education	1.1596	12,498,41	20.83			
Middle scientific/humanist and vocational/technical education for adults (up to 25 hours)	1.3177	14,202,46	23.67			
Middle (scientific/humanist and vocational/technical) education for adults (26 hours and above)	1.5959	17,200,94	28.67			

Source: Compendio de Información Estadística Educacional 2000, Ministry of Education.
Values have been updated to dollars/base-year 2002.

Annex 18

**BASIC, MIDDLE AND OTHER LEVELS OF EDUCATION:
CONTRACTED HOURS BY OCCUPATION AND FUNDING, 1998-2000**

	Municipal 57%			Subsidised private 29%			Fee-paying private 13%			Corporations 2%		
	1998	2000	% va- ria- tion	1998	2000	% va- ria- tion	1998	2000	% varia- tion	1998	2000	% varia- tion
TOTAL	2,726,849	2,815,810	3.30 %	1,391,478	1,590,111	14.3 0%	611,014	721,686	18.10 %	93,172	87,360	- 6.20%
Classroom teacher	2,236,932	2,301,644	2.9	1,160,235	1,326,005	14.3	526,065	623,538	18.5	80,197	74,803	-6.7
Classroom technician	116,109	123,173	6.1	50,101	58,650	17.1	20,626	23,502	13.9	2,393	2,024	-15.4
Management	226,697	239,423	5.6	110,622	123,773	11.9	37,476	42,579	13.6	7,552	7,982	5.7
Head teacher	116,828	116,417	-0.4	46,052	51,698	12.3	10,181	12,373	21.5	492	474	-3.7
Other employment in school	25,687	29,715	15.7	22,909	28,817	25.8	16,471	19,352	17.5	2,458	2,077	-15.5
Other employment outside school	4,596	5,438	18.3	1,559	1,168	- 25.1	195	342	75.4	80	-	-100

Source: Compendio de Información Estadística 2000, Ministry of Education.

Annex 19

Colegio de Profesores de Chile AG
Salary Study
Table 13.3

Model of teachers' pay 2002 (\$ September 2002)

	Weekly contracted hours	Elements in total pay (%)	Description
1	RBN	43.9	National Basic Pay (Renta Básica Nacional, RBN), the amount per hour according to level (Basic or Middle). May only be demanded by teachers who negotiate according to the Teachers' Statute.
2	AEDs 1991 as a proportion of RBN	44.3	Teachers' Statute Allowances 1991. Only available to teachers who negotiate according to the Teachers' Statute
2.1	Experience (Two-year periods (<i>bienios</i>))	29.3	Allowance for experience (maximum of 15 <i>bienios</i> , % of RBN: 6.76% for the first year, and 66% subsequently; capped at 15 <i>bienios</i> = 100% R.
2.2	Further training	5.4	Further training (up to 40% of RBN; % varies according to level and duration of courses and <i>bienios</i>).
2.3	Allowance for difficult working conditions	1.9	Allowance for difficult working conditions (% of RBN; working conditions; capped at 30% of RBN.
2.4	Responsibility allowance	1.8	Allowance for managerial duties (% of RBN: 0-20% for managerial posts, 0-10% for classroom technical posts).
2.5	Locality allowance	5.7	% of RBN according to locality or zone; can reach 174% of total salary in very difficult localities.
2.6	Teaching Excellence Bonus	0.2	New additional payment for excellence; paid in tranches; awards seniority payments to the very outstanding.
3.	Allowances not expressed as a proportion of RBN	10.3	
3.1	Unidad de Mejoramiento Profesionales, UMP (basic)	3.7	Extra payment in proportion to hours worked; capped at 30 hours = \$16.440; all subsidised teachers qualify.
3.2	Unidad de Mejoramiento Profesional Complementaria	0.2	Payment awarded on the basis of the number of <i>bienios</i> completed on 30 October 1993; in proportion to hours worked; capped at 30 hours; only teachers in the municipal sector qualify.
3.3	Proportional Bonus (SAE)	5.0	Special additional payment that is awarded according to the number of contract hours; all teachers in the subsidised sector qualify.

33.1	Minus: Additional allowance and special bonus	-1.0	A percentage of the Proportional Bonus (SAE) is used to complement IMD for low-paid workers.
3.3.2	Additional allowance and special December bonus	1.0	A percentage of the Proportional Bonus (SAE) is used to complement IMD for low-paid workers.
3.4	Bonus for Excellence - Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de desempeño, SNED (National System of Performance Evaluation)	1.1	Excellence in teaching; awarded to 25% of schools.
3.5	Allowance for teachers in rural areas	0.3	New payment for teachers in rural areas; the sum is fixed in pesos.
	Sub-total	98.6	
4	Other historical payments	1.4	
5	Additional payments and allowance	0.7	ED (evaluation of performance) + a compensatory sum per area; only teachers in post in 1991 qualify. Average of \$213 per hour. Only the municipal sector qualifies.
6	Compensation rebate for taxability	0.7	Tax compensation bonus for relocated staff covered by a welfare state scheme for public-sector employees
	Total	100	
7	Minimum pay for teachers		All teachers qualify.
8	Factors increasing pay		Total remuneration is boosted by increased enrolments (1.8%), the full school day (JEC) (1%) and supplement to municipalities running up deficits (11.34%).
9	Total Mineduc expenditure on teachers' pay		

Source: María I Valladares, Ministry of Education, September 2002.

Annex 20

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION VARIABLES

CLASSIFICATION BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP (PARENTS). SIMCE 2002

Socio-economic group	Years of schooling		Family income (2002)	Special Educational Needs Index
A (Low)	7	7	US\$ 167.60	66%
B (Middle Low)	9	9	US\$ 216.29	43%
C (Middle)	11	11	US\$ 326.28	23%
D (Middle High)	13	13	US\$ 652.07	8%
E (High)	15	16	US\$ 2087.26	0%

Values have been updated to dollars/base-year 2002 by the author of this study.

Annex 21

NUMBER OF SCHOOLS AND PUPILS ASSESSED BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP

Classification by socio-economic group. Pupils. SIMCE 2002.

Socio-economic group	PUPILS						Institutions	
	Totals		Funding			Number	%	
	Number	%	% Municipal	% Subsid. private	% Fee-pay. private			
A (Low)	28,099	10%	8%	2%	0%	1,713	28%	
B (Middle-Low)	87,395	32%	26%	6%	0%	1,863	30%	
C (Middle)	100,993	37%	18%	19%	0%	1,396	23%	
D (Middle-High)	39,403	14%	2%	12%	1%	749	12%	
E (High)	18,974	7%	0%	0%	6%	424	7%	
National totals	274,864		54%	39%	7%	6,145		

Source: Unidad de Currículum y Evaluación, USE, Ministry of Education. Sistema de Mediación de la Calidad de la Educación, SIMCE. Santiago de Chile, April 2003.

Annex 22

NATIONAL RESULTS, SIMCE 2002. BASIC EDUCATION 4th YEAR

SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP	LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATIONS				MATHEMATICS				ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES			
	Average	Variation	Min.	Max.	Average	Variation	Min.	Max.	Average	Variation	Min.	Max.
LOW	226	2	123	316	220	-7	147	332	227	0	153	349
MIDDLE LOW	232	1	138	320	229	-3	129	335	232	0	160	334
MIDDLE LOW	254	1	182	310	250	-2	171	324	253	1	156	315
MIDDLE HIGH	280	0	165	333	274	-2	169	337	279	1	167	335
HIGH	302	0	128	337	301	-1	169	347	300	-3	181	342
National totals	251	1	123	337	247	-3	129	347	251	1	153	349

Source: Unidad de Currículum y Evaluación, *USE*, Ministry of Education. Sistema de Mediación de la Calidad de la Educación, SIMCE. Santiago de Chile, April 2003.

Annex 23

CHILE HAS MADE PROGRESS IN SCHOOL INFORMATICS

	Pupils per computer		Percentage of pupils at schools connected to the Internet	
	Basic	Middle	Basic	Middle
Chile	51	31	71	76
Finland	24	11	96	S
Hungary	36	8	41	S
New Zealand	10	8	89	S
Czech Republic	44	17	33	68

Source: Ministry of Education, 2003

Annex 24

AVERAGE SCORES AND VARIATIONS BY FUNDING

TYPE OF FUNDING	LANGUAGE & COMMUNICATIONS		MATHEMATICS		ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES	
	AVE	VAR	AVE	VAR	PROM	VAR
MUNICIPAL	239	+1	235	-4	238	0
SUBSIDISED PRIVATE	259	+1	254	-2	259	+2
PRIVATE FEE-PAYING	300	+2	298	0	298	-2
NATIONAL TOTALS	251	+1	247	-3	251	+1

AVERAGE SCORES BY FUNDING AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP

SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP	LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION			MATHEMATICS			ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES		
	Munic	Priv Sub	Priv Fee	Munic	Priv Sub	Priv Fee	Munic	Priv Sub	Priv Fee
LOW	229	216		223	210		229	218	
MIDDLE LOW	232	230		229	227		232	231	
MIDDLE	249	258		246	253		248	258	
MIDDLE HIGH	276	281	282	270	275	277	275	280	280
HIGH		303	302		299	301		300	300

Source: Unidad de Curriculum y Evaluación, USE, Ministry of Education. Sistema de Mediación de la Calidad de la Educación, SIMCE. Santiago de Chile, April 2003.

Annex 25

VARIATIONS BY FUNDING AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP

SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP	LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATIONS			MATHEMATICS			ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES		
	Munic	Priv Sub	Priv Fee	Munic	Priv Sub	Priv Fee	Munic	Priv Sub	Priv fee
LOW	° +2	° +1		V-6	V-9		° 0	° 0	
MIDDLE LOW	° +2	° 0		° -3	° -3		° 0	° 0	
MIDDLE	° 0	° +1		° -3	° -3		° 0	° +2	
MIDDLE HIGH	° +1	° 0	° -4	° 0	° 0	V-6	° +2	° +1	V-8
HIGH		° +3	° 0			° -1		° -1	° -4

° Indicates no significant variation in score.

v Indicates a substantially lower score.

Annex 26

Number of libraries in the country:	354 ⁴⁸
Number of public libraries:	281
Number of branch libraries (outlying areas):	31
Number of neighbourhood libraries:	8
Number of the Libraries, Archives and Museums Directorate (Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos, DIBAM) libraries:	12
Number of users (students):	
in library	3,684,762
home readers	707,500
Number of users (adults):	
in library	1,223,481
home readers	558,742

Source: Compendium of Statistical Information 2000, Ministry of Education.

⁴⁸ Libraries belonging to institutions of higher education, private fee-paying schools and other establishments are not included.